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Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 05:25:15 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                       September 22, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4314 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE UAE     

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04314

SIPDIS
Laser1:
    INFO:   FCS 
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   AMB ECON DCM USLO P/M RSO DAO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT; USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI873
OO RUCAACC RUEKJCS RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #4314/01 2651042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221042Z SEP 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1799
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S 
VISIT TO THE UAE 
 
Ref: Abu Dhabi 4206 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶2. (C) General Abizaid:  I would like to welcome 
you back to the UAE for your full introductory 
visit.  You will be calling on Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and have 
an opportunity for fuller discussions with UAE 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG Sheikh Muhammad bin 
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince GEN 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR). 
 
¶3. (S) Your September 8 visit to Abu Dhabi was 
greatly appreciated, in large part because of your 
frank exchange with MbZ on Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
terrorism (described in reftel), but also because 
we benefited from a first-hand account of 
developments on the ground in Iraq.  Your expressed 
concerns about the Sunnis will no doubt resonate 
with your Emirati hosts during your upcoming visit. 
 
¶4. (C) Your meeting with Crown Prince Khalifa will 
take place in a large, open majlis setting.  It 
will be a general discussion during which the Crown 
Prince will want to hear your views on Iraq, Iran, 
and Afghanistan.  As all major decisions regarding 
deployments require his approval, you may wish to 
thank him for his support during OEF and OIF and 
strong UAEG support for the Governing Council and 
Iraq reconstruction.  MbZ is the appropriate 
interlocutor for the full range of bilateral 
issues. 
 
---------------- 
SUGGESTED THEMES 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) We propose that you touch on the following 
key bilateral military issues, in addition to the 
more general themes outlined below in para five: 
 
-- Provide a "look-ahead" on our likely military 
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the 
region more generally, including the proposed 
establishment of CENTAF Forward Headquarters in Abu 
Dhabi (MbZ); 
 
-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need, 
as part of our commitment to building and 
solidifying our strong military ties, to work out a 
functioning Defense Cooperation Agreement (MbZ, 
MbR); 
 
-- Express our enthusiasm about the validation 
course at the Air Warfare Center, now tentatively 
scheduled for December 2003.  The Center will be a 
model for multilateral training in the region 
(MbZ); 
 
-- The Dubai Air Show takes place December 7-11, 
and will be preceded by a UAE-hosted Air Chiefs' 
Conference.  The UAE Government regards this as a 
major event and expects strong US support and 
presence.  You can anticipate a request to provide 
both static display and demonstration aircraft for 
the Air Show, as well as topics and briefings for 
the Air Chiefs' Conference (MbZ, MbR). (For your 
background: We are concerned by the lack of formal 
DOD approval of US participation in Dubai Air Show. 
Without this approval, we cannot retain the rooms 
we have reserved beyond Oct. 1, nor can we arrange 
for the logistical support of aircraft and air 
crews.) 
 
¶6.  (S) More broadly, you may also wish to: 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support 
for U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, namely access to bases and logistical 
support, including air and sealift of Bulgarian 
troops to Iraq, the UAE SOC deployment at Bagram, 
as well as extensive intelligence coordination 
(Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ); 
-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous 
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed 
Force's establishment of the very successful Sheikh 
Zayed hospital in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to 
re-supply with equipment and medicine other Iraqi 
hospitals and the provision of basic foodstuffs to 
the Iraqi people (Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ); 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's strong public statement of 
support for the Iraqi Governing Council and the newly 
formed government of Iraq (Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ, MbR); 
-- Consult and provide assurances on need to 
maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize 
external influence (Iran) and manage sectarian 
rivalries (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Convey our concern over Dubai-based Al-Arabiya 
Television's occasional sensationalistic 
broadcasting, including threats to kill Iraqi 
Governing Council members and their supporters 
(MbZ, MbR). 
 
------------------------- 
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
Regional Footprint: 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) If appropriate, I would recommend that you 
outline with the leadership -- MbZ -- what we see 
in terms of our likely regional footprint, and 
specifically what we have in mind for the UAE.  MbZ 
and his Air Force Commander have dropped strong 
hints at being open to a more robust presence, 
including a CENTAF Forward Headquarters, but we 
need to prepare them for the direction in which we 
may wish to move here. 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) We need to discuss a successor agreement to 
the dormant, unimplemented Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA), which comes up for renewal in 
¶2006.  This will require heavy lifting on both 
sides and the sooner we agree on a strategy and 
define our "non-negotiable" items, the easier it 
will be to proceed with the Emiratis.  Your visit 
would provide a good opportunity to resurface this 
important bilateral military issue. 
 
Air Warfare Center 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) The Gulf Air Warfare Center at al-Dhafra 
Base is an important initiative.  The Center has 
tremendous potential to become a resource for 
multilateral training, defense cooperation, and 
compatibility.  The AWC will provide an excellent 
opportunity for CENTCOM pilots to hone their skills 
in theater.  It comes with the added benefit of 
offering the perfect setting for our officers to 
build long-term relationships with their Arab and 
European coalition counterparts.  The AWC 
represents the UAE leadership's commitment to 
increasing inter-operability with U.S. and 
coalition forces. 
 
ATACMs/Predator Update -- (If Raised) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A 
deal.  The Emiratis have agreed to the principles 
outlined in what will be a regional Memorandum of 
Understanding governing the use of this system.  We 
are awaiting the provision of a revised P&A, 
following an Emirati visit to the US last July to 
discuss their forecast system requirements. 
 
¶11. (S) Over the past year, MbZ raised his desire 
to procure the armed Predator B with just about 
every interlocutor in Washington.  He believes this 
system will provide the UAE the much-needed 
capability to survey and defend its long, porous 
coasts and inland borders.  MbZ has indicated he is 
not interested in purchasing the unarmed Predator. 
The Joint Staff is currently coordinating a policy 
decision with State regarding release of this MCTR 
Category I weapon system to the UAE.  CENTCOM 
recently forwarded an assessment to OSD supporting 
sale of an unarmed Predator B to the UAE.  We are 
awaiting an OSD policy decision on this issue.  The 
Emiratis will find it difficult to understand that 
we can sell them F-16s while denying them an armed 
Predator B. 
 
E-2C Hawkeye - (If Raised) 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) We are making progress on a UAE request to 
obtain E-2C Hawkeye Advanced Early Warning 
aircraft.  Although the original LOA lapsed in July 
without a UAE signature, they have signed a Letter 
of Intent to study the offer further and deposited 
$5 million to continue negotiations.  The US Navy 
International Programs Office has the lead on this 
project.  A team arrives on September 26 bringing 
with them a restated LOA extending pricing and 
availability until the end of the year.  The goal 
is to obtain a signed LOA in time to announce a 
deal at the Dubai Air Show in December 2003.  The 
five aircraft have been transferred to Northrop 
Grumman, which is awaiting UAE acceptance of an LOA 
to begin refurbishing. 
 
¶13. (CS) The AH-64 Apache A-to-D Remanufacture LOA 
lapsed in July.  UAE officials continue to conduct 
discussions with Boeing and US Army officials as 
though the LOA were still valid, despite notice to 
the contrary.  This issue will be a key discussion 
item at the upcoming UAE Financial Management 
Review in Washington, Sept. 29-Oct. 3.  The UAE 
needs to provide another formal Letter of Request 
and obtain updated Pricing and Availability before 
Boeing and USASAC proceed with this project. 
Meanwhile, the planned transfer of the AH-64H fleet 
from UAEAF to UAE Land Forces has been postponed, 
pending a remanufacture decision. 
 
-------------- 
BROADER ISSUES 
-------------- 
 
Afghanistan:  SOC Deployment 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man 
Emirati Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air 
Base.  As you know, the UAE continues to play a 
very helpful role in Afghanistan, particularly in 
the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance.  The UAE Armed Forces provided the 
Afghan National Army with approximately $50 million 
in assistance in kind in 2002 and overall 
humanitarian assistance has crossed the $50 million 
mark.  The UAEG also continues to provide 
substantial personal financial support to President 
Karzai. 
 
Iraq:  UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) As you know, the Emiratis were among the 
first in the Arab world to step up to the plate in 
providing much-needed humanitarian assistance and 
medical relief to the Iraqi people.  The Embassy, 
the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM worked closely with 
the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move supplies 
into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE 
for treatment.  This cooperation continues.  Thanks 
to the system put in place by CENTCOM and the HOC, 
the Emiratis are now moving assistance into Iraq on 
an almost daily basis using their own 
transportation.  The Sheikh Zayed hospital in 
Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of patients a 
day and the Emiratis are now considering adopting 
yet another hospital. 
 
Iraq: Timely Public Statements 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (U) The Emiratis strongly supported Iraqi 
delegations to the IMF/World Bank meetings in 
Dubai, and at the Arab League summit in Cairo.  In 
mid-August, the Emirati leadership hosted six 
members of the GC - the first Gulf country to do 
so.  Strong public statements of support for the GC 
and the Iraqi people followed the visit and after 
the formation of the new Iraqi Cabinet.  The 
Emiratis issued a strong public condemnation for 
the attacks against the UN's Baghdad headquarters 
and against Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim and his 
followers in Najaf.  Publicly and privately, the 
UAEG's message has been consistent, and perhaps 
best summed up in the words of Crown Prince 
Khalifa: "It is imperative for us to support the 
Iraqi people and the Governing Council's efforts 
out of a desire to see Iraq overcome the present 
state of affairs and build a better future for its 
sons." 
 
Al Arabiya TV - Out of bounds 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Al Arabiya, the Dubai-based Arabic 
satellite news station competing with Al Jazeera 
for viewers, has stirred up controversy with 
sensationalistic broadcasts of Coalition POWs and 
dead Iraqis during OIF, and more recently, because 
of a broadcast by hooded terrorists threatening to 
kill GC members and their supporters.  We have 
expressed our concern to both the UAE and Saudi 
governments and the director of the Dubai Media 
City where Al Arabiya is located.  (King Fahd's 
brother-in-law Walid Al Ibrahim is the principal 
owner of Al Arabiya.) 
 
WAHBA