This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2013 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  DUTCH MFA ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. STATE 245961 
     ¶B. DEAN-FITZPATRICK EMAIL 08/27/03 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 1888 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B AND D). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  PolMilOff delivered ref A demarche to Dutch 
MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27.  The 
Dutch believe a noncompliance resolution on Iran is merited, 
but are concerned this may not be achievable as Dir. 
ElBaradei's latest report is not final, so some board members 
may support waiting until the next report in November.  In 
addition, they think key European players such as France and 
Germany may favor a more "quiet" approach.  The Dutch believe 
going for a resolution now will be difficult, but waiting 
will give Iran more time to "whitewash" details of its 
nuclear program.  In general, Wilke thought only a package of 
significant political and economic pressure as well as 
certain incentives might get the Iranians to abandon their 
program, and he rated the chances of success as "fairly 
slim."  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) PolMilOff made ref A points to Dutch MFA 
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27.  Wilke said 
the Dutch agree that a noncompliance resolution on Iran is 
warranted -- "there's no room for misunderstanding, they're 
lying."  Wilke was struck by the Iranian claim they had 
commenced development of a heavy water facility to produce 
isotopes for medical and industrial purposes because they did 
not know if their uranium enrichment program would work. 
"Now that the enrichment program has been shown to be 
successful, why are they still pursuing heavy water?"  Wilke 
expressed interest in obtaining a U.S. technical assessment 
as to how useful the heavy water reactor is for isotope 
reductions as opposed to HEU and LEU facilities (ref B). 
 
¶3. (C)  Wilke provided his take on internal EU discussions 
about the Iranian nuclear program.  He said that the Italians 
as EU president had initially only wanted to make an EU 
demarche to Malaysia as head of the NAM, but were persuaded 
to broaden the approach to include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Egypt, India, Morocco, Panama, South Africa and Sudan.  That 
demarche was made prior to ElBaradei's latest report and did 
not seek a non-compliance finding but rather to "push up the 
base line" on the Iranians and urge their signing of an 
Additional Protocol.  Wilke said the EU is trying to make the 
argument to the NAM that the Iranian program lacks an 
economic rationale; one he thinks might resonate with some 
NAM states.  Concerning major EU players, Wilke thought 
significant economic interests in Iran might influence Italy, 
and that the French and the Germans were likely to favor 
"quiet diplomacy," even though he thought that French 
intelligence and technical experts shared our concerns about 
the Iranian program. 
 
¶4. (C) In Wilke's view, the only chance of persuading the 
Iranians to abandon their program would be to employ 
significant political and economic pressure (threatening 
sanctions) and incentives (e.g., guaranteed fuel for Bushehr, 
U.S. diplomatic recognition).  Even so, he was pessimistic 
about the chances of success in that he thinks the Iranians 
may have decided the pressure is worth taking, and that the 
more public the issue becomes, the less likely they will 
retreat. 
RUSSEL