This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) 
DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) 
DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 
T...

SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL 
TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE 
 
REF: USNATO 00777 
 
Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. 

¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco 
Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still 
believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute 
over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal 
overlay of the M-code.  Aragona recognized US security 
concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the 
EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. 
 The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. 
and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the 
event of warfare.  Aragona did not completely reject the 
delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to 
avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the 
dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. 
Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge 
unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a 
good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. 
Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable 
venue for classified discussions.  He suggested they could 
take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he 
participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC.  See 
Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. 

¶2.  (U)  On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA 
Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC 
dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) 
signal overlay of the GPS M-code.  The U.S. delegation was 
led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced 
Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Technical Affairs and 
included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic 
Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy 
Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST 
Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and 
representatives from the political and science sections of 
Embassy Rome.  Those joining Aragona included Giovanni 
Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro 
Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, 
Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto 
Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense 
General Staff, Ministry of Defense. 
 
U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed 

¶3.  (C)  Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is 
important to hold informal consultations with key EU member 
States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a 
decision.  He recalled that the President raised M-Code 
overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit.  In reviewing the USG 
position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. 
accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the 
security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated 
Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both 
the U.S. and NATO.  so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive 
battle with the European Commission (EC).  Braibanti allowed 
that some progress has been made in convincing European 
officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad 
idea.  However, consideration being given by the EC to use 
BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay 
of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. 
The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed 
to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some 
flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be 
difficult.  The U.S. has proposed several technical options 
for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all 
stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo 
services.  Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's 
timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member 
states may find that the Commission has locked in technical 
solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct 
navigational warfare.  To avoid this eventuality, which could 
put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear 
political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal 
structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. 
 
But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks 

¶5.  (C)  Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. 
concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that 
Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC.  He 
assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security 
issues at stake.  "Given our NATO membership it would be 
crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona 
declared.  These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, 
but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and 
operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and 
reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly 
throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End 
Note). 

¶6.  (C)  Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical 
negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the 
integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security 
concerns.  Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted 
that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with 
technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a 
"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be 
intensified.   Italy and the EC are ready to take into 
account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that 
technical solutions, which protect them, are available. 

¶7.  (C)  Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready 
to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood 
included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in 
the prejudices of the past."  The EC was ready to sit and 
discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution.  As for 
political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission 
is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed 
while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo 
system. 

¶8.  (C)  Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC 
technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a 
formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate 
the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, 
and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS 
signals.  In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not 
rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its 
technical experts to analyze them carefully.  Now that he had 
seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with 
some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of 
these options will work.  Summing up this portion of the 
discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: 
We may well reach a situation in September where we will have 
analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide 
a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to 
conduct NAVWAR.  Our concern is that if EC technical experts 
continue to operate within their current frame of reference, 
we will arrive at a technical impasse.  To avoid this 
impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from 
member States that they should focus on options that do not 
negatively impact NAVWAR.  (Note: on the margins of the 
meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC 
negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU 
member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach 
a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so 
Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate 
with the U.S.  Aragona discounted this possibility, 
suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS 
interoperability.  (End Note) 
 
NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks 
 
¶9.  (C)  Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical 
problem over where to hold classified discussions and that 
this problem should be easily resolvable.  Italy expects the 
U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator 
Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). 
Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a 
classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO.  He 
underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt 
language.  Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission 
to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC 
rather than NATO-EC discussions.  The issue under discussion 
is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, 
moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. 
Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG 
was considering the issue of additional classified 
discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. 
 
Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... 

¶10.  (C)  Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to 
hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will 
work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to 
review technical and trade issues  He suggested folding the 
technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. 
This could help to ensure transparency and avoid 
misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the 
available technical options.  Aragona acknowledged that 
Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could 
be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to 
proceed along these lines. 
 
Still Talking Past Each Other on substance 

¶11.  (C)  The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France 
might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the 
interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO.  Mel 
Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion 
that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could 
guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might 
seek to sell to third countries. 
 
¶12.  (C)  "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. 
actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona 
told the delegation.  "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe 
that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular 
country or the EC."  Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a 
commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was 
selected according to well established criteria based on the 
belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. 
"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in 
a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in 
mind that Galileo service must be sold.  The problem of 
selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects 
are also involved."  When Aragona stated it would not be 
acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less 
robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable 
for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in 
order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for 
Galileo. 

¶13.  (C)  Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but 
moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation.  He 
suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to 
hold classified discussions.  He claimed there is flexibility 
and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable 
to both sides.  Braibanti emphasized that after the September 
discussions the USG would like to hold another set of 
bilateral consultations with Italy.  Aragona was 
noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September 
plenary session and then decide on a way forward.  In terms 
of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions 
would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. 
and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by 
which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another 
frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution.  He 
noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and 
industrial interests to defend. 
 
Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries 

¶14.  (C)  Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice 
Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15.  Possa is 
responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for 
Italian participation in ESA.  After a brief explanation of 
the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa 
immediately understood that a political, and not a technical 
approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems.  Possa 
suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, 
and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose 
commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. 
were well known.  On the margins of a July 28 
representational event,  ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised 
briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino.  Martino 
said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary 
and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough.  He 
was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. 
Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security 
implications of the overlay, but observed that he was 
perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much 
assistance.  He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for 
moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to 
approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM 
Berlusconi's closest political advisor. 
 
¶15.  (C)  ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 
with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to 
discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of 
the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo 
at the December Transport Council.  Maraini told us that he 
believed that Galileo was now principally a political 
problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport 
Ministry and Transport Council.  In a candid appraisal of 
Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the 
Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was 
beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. 
Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very 
little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and 
that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the 
EU was likely.  Maraini is worried about the outcome.  He 
undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent 
to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. 

¶16.  (C)  Embassy Comment:  The U.S. delegation made the trip 
to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during 
his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing 
to carry some water for us with the EC and member states.  We 
were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead 
decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the 
script of the EC briefing book on Galileo.  Despite 
understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, 
peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position 
will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that 
"technical solutions" still offer a way forward.  He threw us 
a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top 
cover to the expert level technical discussions.  However, 
Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial 
viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to 
"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to 
French arguments. 
 
¶17.  (U)  This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. 
Sembler