This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA BM
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR URGES DEPUTIES TO ADDRESS BURMA 
 
REF: A. STATE 236768 
 
     ¶B. TOKYO 5714 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5(D). 
 
¶1.  (C)   Summary:  The Japanese Ambassador to Burma says 
that he will urge his Deputy Foreign Minister to address next 
steps in Burma during a September meeting with Deputy 
Secretary Armitage.  He advocates that the U.S. and Japan 
 
SIPDIS 
quietly collaborate in developing a package of carrots and 
sticks to entice and prod the SPDC toward political reform. 
The Ambassador, known for his pro-engagement stance, does not 
appear to be in sync with Tokyo's evolving Burma policy.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)   On August 14, the Japanese Ambassador to Burma, 
Yuji Miyamoto met with the COM to discuss views on next steps 
in Burma.  Miyamoto said that Japanese Deputy Foreign 
Minister Takeuchi would meet with Deputy Secretary Armitage 
in Washington on September 5 and he, the Ambassador, was 
hopeful that the two senior officials would discuss 
developments in Burma (note: the Japanese here do not appear 
to be aware of SE Asia Division Director Yamanouchi's 
tentatively scheduled meeting with EAP DAS Daley on September 
3, per reftel A). 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ambassador Miyamoto said that he would propose to 
his headquarters that Tokyo and Washington talk in secret to 
"form a grand design" for supervising constructive change in 
Burma.  He would urge that a package of "carrots" be 
developed to balance existing sticks (sanctions, suspended 
assistance, etc.) aimed at Burma's military regime.  Miyamoto 
said he was frustrated with the lack of progress in Rangoon 
and offered his view that U.N. special envoy Razali needed to 
be in a position to offer more to the SPDC in exchange for a 
return to dialogue and transition to democracy. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Miyamoto said that the GOJ supported the Thai 
roadmap in principle, but that ownership of the plan had to 
shift to Razali and/or ASEAN because the Burmese would never 
trust the Thais or accept the possibility that Thailand could 
one day claim responsibility for democratizing Burma.  He 
criticized Thai politicians for pandering to their own 
constituencies and using public venues, rather than discrete 
diplomacy, to advance the roadmap. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Ambassador Miyamoto affirmed that Japan would not 
undertake new assistance programs in Burma, nor would it 
renew programs that expire or run their natural course.  He 
noted, however, that he had yet to receive an official 
directive from Tokyo on GOJ assistance policy and added that 
Deputy Foreign Minister Takeuchi, a hardliner on Burma 
policy, might be "shuffled" away from his current portfolio 
following party elections in late September. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Miyamoto said that he meets regularly with SPDC 
ministers, and generally writes SPDC Secretary One General 
Khin Nyunt every two or three weeks.  He said his consistent 
message to the Burmese was that Burma-Japan relations had 
entered a new, and unwelcome, phase following the May 30 
attack against Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and her NLD convoy. 
The generals must endeavor to restore the dialogue process, 
he tells the GOB, and they should also avoid the trap of 
counting on India and China for moral and financial support. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Miyamoto concluded with his view that, despite 
rumors to the contrary, the SPDC would not release ASSK 
before the ASEAN summit in October.  He said that the 
generals would not risk being viewed domestically as 
responsive to international pressure.  Furthermore, he added, 
the SPDC would only release ASSK in the short term if she 
made political concessions, which Miyamoto quickly 
acknowledged the opposition leader would never do. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment:  Ambassador Miyamoto, prior to May 30, was 
well known for his articulate defense of unconditional 
engagement with the SPDC as a means of effecting political 
change in Burma.  He has changed his tune in the aftermath of 
the premeditated attack, but does not yet appear to have 
caught up with Tokyo's view that the first priority is to 
seek the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.  The COM told Miyamoto 
that we have not seen the Thai roadmap, nor endorsed the 
concept, but agreed that such an approach must be 
multilateral and not bilateral. 
Martinez