This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2013 
TAGS: BM PGOV PREL NLD
SUBJECT: JAPANESE OFFICIAL VISITS RANGOON, PURSUES SPDC-NLD 
"COMPROMISE" 
 
REF: RANGOON 993 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is quietly 
pursuing a proposal, apparently endorsed by a senior GOJ MOFA 
official who visited Burma on August 20, that would require 
Aung San Suu Kyi's commitment to turn a blind eye to the 
violent May 30 attack on her convoy in exchange for her 
release and a resumption of political dialogue.  We can 
appreciate the GOJ's frustration with the political stalemate 
in Burma, but we don't believe such a drastic compromise on 
the part of ASSK or the NLD is in the cards.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) According to Japanese Embassy Political Counselor 
Ichiro Maruyama, an unnamed senior official of MOFA's Asia 
Pacific Division made a quiet visit to Rangoon on August 20 
and met with Brigadier General Kyaw Thein (Chief of Staff for 
military intelligence) to discuss the current political 
crisis in Burma.  The MOFA official stopped off in Rangoon 
after a swing through SE Asia, including a meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur with U.N. Special Envoy Razali (Note: We believe the 
MOFA official may have been Asia Pacific Division Deputy DG 
Shinichi or SE Asia Division Director Yamanouchi.  End note). 
 
¶3. (C) Maruyama told the Pol/Econ chief that the Japanese 
Embassy has developed a proposal for the SPDC, apparently 
endorsed by the visiting MOFA official, which would involve 
an agreement between Burma's military regime and detained NLD 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi to make respective compromises aimed 
at resolving the current stalemate.  Under the Japanese 
proposal, ASSK would agree not to criticize the May 30 attack 
on her convoy in north central Burma, and in turn the SPDC 
would agree to release her from detention, resume a political 
dialogue, and produce a timeline for a transition to 
democracy. 
 
¶4. (C) Pol/Econ chief opined that ASSK and the NLD were 
unlikely to agree to turn a blind eye to a premeditated 
attack and subsequent crackdown that had resulted in scores 
of NLD members and supporters killed, for which the SPDC has 
offered no apology nor admitted any role.  Maruyama agreed 
and said the proposal was a long shot, but responded that the 
GOJ is eager to undertake any effort that can help resolve 
the current crisis.  Asked if the GOJ had pursued permission 
from the SPDC to see ASSK, Maruyama said the MOFA official 
had requested a visit, but military intelligence officials 
replied with an emphatic "no" and explained that SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe alone made all decisions related to ASSK's 
detention. 
 
¶5. (C) According to Maruyama, the Japanese Embassy will 
quietly pursue their proposal with the SPDC and if there is 
sufficient interest in the "compromise" scenario, PM Koizumi 
will phone SPDC Chairman Than Shwe to discuss details. 
Maruyama said that the GOJ believes a credible international 
mediator is necessary to carry out the proposal, but that 
Special Envoy Razali, the most likely candidate, is 
frustrated with the situation in Burma and has been 
repeatedly denied a visa for a return visit to Rangoon.  The 
GOJ is therefore giving consideration to consulting with the 
U.S. and ASEAN to identify a special mediator who would 
complement, or even replace, Razali and his dialogue efforts. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Maruyama, like his Ambassador (reftel), 
favors engaging the Burmese regime and is displeased with his 
government's decision to suspend new assistance from Japan to 
Burma.  He and his colleagues have excellent contacts with 
the Burmese military intelligence who report that the SPDC is 
looking for a face-saving opportunity to release ASSK. 
However, the Japanese Embassy does not have close ties to the 
NLD and we suspect that any effort to pursue such a drastic 
compromise -- one that would require ASSK to overlook to 
worst setback to the democracy movement in over a decade -- 
will fall flat. 
Martinez