This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, DRL, INR/NESA, INR/B 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PTER EFIN EAID KDEM PHUM PINR KU OVIP SABAH SABAH AL AHMED AL JABER AL
SUBJECT: (C) SHAYKH SABAH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 3358 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 3316 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 3589 
 
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON: 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) INTRODUCTION:  This message is intended to assist 
preparations for Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed 
al-Jaber al-Sabah's visit to Washington, where he is due to 
meet with President Bush on September 10.  We recommend that 
he be invited to meet (separately) with the Secretaries of 
State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce. 
 
¶2.  (C) CONGRATULATIONS...:  Every meeting with Shaykh Sabah 
should begin with congratulations on his elevation to Prime 
Minister in July, which strengthened his ability to run the 
government and explicitly enhanced his personal prestige (he 
is now addressed as "Highness" rather than "Excellency"; 
previously, only the Amir and Crown Prince merited that 
honorific).  In his mid-seventies and fitted with a 
pacemaker, Shaykh Sabah is nonetheless far more energetic and 
mentally alert than his brother the Amir, let alone the Crown 
Prince.  Always smiling, he speaks passable English but 
sometimes prefers to use an interpreter in official meetings. 
 
¶3.  (C) ...AND THANKS:  Shaykh Sabah will welcome sincere 
thanks for Kuwait's extraordinary support to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Indeed, as we have reported previously, Kuwait was 
the one absolutely indispensable ally, providing the main 
platform for the ground campaign (and a good portion of the 
air strikes) and giving its all to facilitate our activities: 
 the GOK closed more than half the country's territory to 
civilians in order to accommodate our troop buildup, allowed 
us to take over a major seaport and much of the only 
international airport, gave us extensive use of all three of 
its military airbases, and contributed hundreds of millions 
of dollars' worth of Assistance-In-Kind, including unlimited 
fuel for US forces operating through or from Kuwait. 
Kuwait's government and people were unique in the Arab world 
for their forthright united support of OIF.  The GOK has also 
been a key partner in OEF and has gone to the very limit of 
its resources to ensure the security of Americans in Kuwait, 
especially since the October 2002 terrorist attack on Failaka 
island in which a US Marine was killed. 
 
¶4.  (C) R-E-S-P-E-C-T:  The intense cooperation between 
Kuwait and the US in the buildup to and execution of OIF was 
almost bound to be followed by an anti-climax.  The Kuwaitis 
now feel underappreciated, taken for granted.  Two main 
reasons:  disappointment that President Bush did not visit 
here while in the Gulf region, and unfulfilled (unrealistic) 
expectations of being handed lucrative contracts for Iraqi 
reconstruction.  The most important message Shaykh Sabah will 
be looking for is assurance that we remain committed to the 
strategic partnership with Kuwait and that we value it as a 
more than a cash cow for funding international commitments or 
as a regional parking lot for military forces. 
 
¶5.  (C) A STRATEGIC PARTNER:  The next most important message 
he will be looking for is that we will stay the course in 
Iraq, even if the price is high in blood and treasure.  The 
Kuwaitis know they are strategically bound to us; they want 
us to be seen as steadfast masters of events.  This small 
country's most strategic value for us is its location and its 
willingness to place itself at our disposal in defense of 
regional stability and in the Global War On Terrorism.  At 
the same time, now that Saddam's regime is gone, Kuwait hopes 
for a peace dividend.  It will want to maintain a robust 
mil-mil relationship with us, but it will be less willing to 
spend as much in support of an enduring large US military 
presence.  We are working to arrange a visit to Washington by 
Defense Minister Shaykh Jaber Mubarak in early CY 2004 to 
coincide with the first US-Kuwait Joint Military Commission 
meeting since 1999. The Defense Review Group, a joint process 
lasting several months starting in September, will assess 
Kuwait's military needs in light of the new reality in the 
region and help set the stage for the JMC. 
 
¶6.  (C) The GOK has cooperated actively against terrorist 
financing.  Although there have been no direct hits, some 
asset freezes have hit uncomfortably close to home.  Foreign 
branches of two Islamic charities of international scope 
based here have been subject to freeze orders.  We have an 
interest in strengthening the GOK's -- and the major 
charities' -- capacity to exert strict control over funds, to 
ensure they are not diverted to terrorist or other criminal 
ends.  So far the GOK has been good on this issue, despite 
occasional sharp criticism from Islamists, but progress has 
not been rapid. 
 
(U) REFORM 
---------- 
¶7.  (C) It is reasonable to assume (a) that Shaykh Sabah will 
try to gauge how hard we intend to push his Government to 
enact political, educational and economic reforms, and (b) 
that he we will argue that we not push destabilizingly hard. 
After all, Kuwait is a prosperous country with a basically 
contented citizenry; it ranked first in the UNDP's Arab Human 
Development Report.  In Washington, Shaykh Sabah may decide 
to take the initiative and present himself as a reformer. 
This would be out of keeping with his longstanding 
personality, but then, he has never before wielded so much 
authority.  So far it looks like he is treating (or at least 
portraying) his elevation to Prime Minister -- which pundits 
had openly called for, due to the Crown Prince's incapacity 
-- as a mandate from the Amir to enact long-overdue economic 
reforms.  Indeed, with Shaykh Sabah's blessing, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah 
has organized a high-level interagency working group for 
economic reform predicated on a heavy Kuwaiti participation 
in Iraqi reconstruction (ref B). 
 
¶8.  (C) Shaykh Sabah announced before the July National 
Assembly elections that he would work with the new Assembly 
to extend political rights to women.  If he does present 
himself as a reformer, the Prime Minister may emphasize that 
overt US advocacy in this area would be counter-productive. 
There is more than a grain of truth to this:  last December, 
the then-Minister of Education tried to reform the school 
curricula and met a torrent of resistance from Islamists in 
parliament who sought to discredit his initiative as a US 
imposition (even though we had no direct involvement). 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMERCIAL ISSUES:  As noted ref A, we have won 
several contracts for American companies recently, and US 
firms are well positioned to be big players in the 
development of Kuwait's northern oil fields, though the terms 
offered thus far need improvement.  Fulfillment of the Amir's 
1996 commitment on the long-delayed Al-Zour North power 
project remains elusive as it finally appears poised to move 
to tendering.  Secretary of Commerce Evans recently wrote the 
Prime Minister asking for reaffirmation of this commitment. 
 
¶10. (C) POTENTIAL IRRITANTS:  Now that the unifying threat of 
Saddam is gone, Kuwaitis are turning to domestic issues and 
losing some of their sense of needing to accommodate the 
United States as the ultimate guarantor of their country's 
security.  This frees them to notice and speak up about 
perceived slights or irritants in the relationship, and there 
are some: 
 
- Guantanamo:  The detention of twelve Kuwaitis at Guantanamo 
is an issue that periodically nags at the relationship 
(inevitably, as time passes with no indication of movement 
towards disposing of their cases one way or another).  We 
should expect that Shaykh Sabah will make passing reference 
to it.  Recently, after several Islamists picked up the issue 
again, the President of the National Assembly dutifully made 
a strong public statement against their continued detention 
without due process, and Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed 
al-Sabah expressed the Government's agreement with his view, 
albeit it considerably milder terms.  A proposed visit by an 
MOI delegation to Guantanamo could help take some steam out 
of the issue, particularly if it were seen as a result of 
Shaykh Sabah's visit. 
 
- Mogas:  The GOK's belief that KBR (on behalf of the CPA, 
and under the direction of the US Army Corps of Engineers) is 
increasingly buying mogas from Turkey instead of Kuwait (ref 
C), feeds the Kuwaitis' sense of being ill-rewarded for being 
a steadfast ally.  A promise to continue buying fuel 
(including LPG) from Kuwait as long as foreign purchases by 
ACE/KBR are necessary would help salve their wounds. 
 
- Missing Persons:  Significant progress is being made in the 
search for the remains of Kuwaitis missing since the Iraqi 
occupation, and there is strong cooperation between the GOK 
and the Coalition.  Even so, the issue of the missing is a 
deeply emotional one here, and some Kuwaitis feel that we did 
not do enough to find their kin immediately following 
liberation. 
 
- UN Compensation Commission:  The GOK understands that we 
played a constructive role in safeguarding in UNSCR 1483 the 
principle of Iraq's obligation to pay compensation, but it 
felt let down when we departed from agreed language and 
substituted new text at the last minute that, it fears, 
copuld make it easier to eliminate compensation in the 
future.  Given the huge volume of outstanding claims, 
including from private citizens and companies, this has the 
potential to become a huge negative.  Assurances that it will 
not would be music to Shaykh Sabah's ears. 
 
- TIP:  The Secretary got the GOK's attention when he raised 
Trafficking In Persons with then-Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs (now Foreign Minister) Shaykh Dr. Mohammed 
Sabah in April.  Kuwait was ranked in Tier 2 this year, but 
will need sustained progress to stay off Tier 3 next year. 
The GOK's acute sensitivity to its international reputation 
will motivate it to address concerns that it considers valid, 
but prevailing attitudes towards foreign laborers -- 
especially domestic servants -- make for some big blind 
spots; as a result, Kuwaitis are not always prepared to 
acknowledge that they have a problem.  Shaykh Sabah should 
hear directly how important an issue this is for the US.  The 
best step would be to extend the Labor Law to cover 
domestics. 
 
- Visas:  This is actually two issues; both have been 
manageable thus far: 
 
-- Getting a US visa has become a much less pleasant 
experience for Kuwaitis than it used to be, alienating some 
who would otherwise choose to travel to the US for study, 
business or tourism. 
 
-- Since the start of OIF, a flood of Americans -- and others 
traveling under our auspices, including Iraqis -- into and 
out of Kuwait, all too often without proper documentation, or 
without proper entry/exit formalities.  The GOK has been very 
flexible, but has nonetheless suffered snide criticism in the 
US media for attempting to reassert sovereign control over 
its borders -- something we continually ask it to ensure, for 
our own safety. 
 
- Terrorist Financing:  The GOK has cooperated fully in 
asset-freezes including some involving foreign branches of 
Kuwait-based Islamic charities that are considered reputable 
here, without seeing evidence that it would consider 
compelling.  It has also taken steps to get better control of 
local fundraising activities.  This has exposed the 
Government to complaints that it is blindly abetting Western 
hostility towards Islam. 
 
- IPR:  This is our nickel.  Shaykh Sabah should be politely 
warned that barring significant progress in enforcing 
intellectual property rights, Kuwait is headed for elevation 
to the Special 301 Priority Watch List.  The copyright law 
needs revision and more needs to be done to run street 
vendors of pirated electronic media out of business. 
Penalities for piracy must be strengthened dramatically and 
enforcement needs to move from the Ministry of Information to 
the Ministry of Interior. 
JONES