This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PPD, INR/NESA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 
TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM KU
SUBJECT: ISLAMIST COMMENTATORS TAKE AIM AT EMBASSY 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM John G. Moran, for reasons 1.5 b,d 
 
 (C) Summary:  Criticism by Kuwaiti Islamists of the 
US-Kuwait bilateral relationship and of the US Embassy has 
increased significantly over the past weeks.  In a series of 
vitriolic op/eds, a local Islamist (and known al-Qaeda 
sympathizer) has harshly criticized the ambassador and the 
embassy public affairs section for "interfering" in Kuwaiti 
affairs and darkly cautioned the ambassador to keep a low 
profile lest he become a victim of terrorist attack. 
Commentary by another Islamist also falsely accuses the 
Ambassador of inappropriate intervention, while a recently 
elected Islamist member of parliament argues that the US has 
"marginalized" Kuwait's role in the reconstruction of 
post-Saddam Iraq.  While Islamist broadsides are nothing new 
in Kuwait, the frequency of these pieces and their ad hominem 
nature has the air of a media campaign.  Also noteworthy has 
been the absence of a strong counter-attack in defense of the 
embassy by Kuwaiti liberals.  While we attribute this largely 
to summer leave and post-war/post-election fatigue, we are 
monitoring this trend and will report as appropriate. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a series of op/eds in leading Kuwaiti Arabic daily 
"Al Rai al-Amm," Islamist commentator and occasional 
al-Jazeera talking head Mohammed al-Awadi has sharply 
criticized Ambassador Jones' presence at diwaniyas (Kuwaiti 
social events) and accused the ambassador of the "criminal 
project" of seeking Kuwaiti concurrence in a plan to turn 
Mecca and Medina into an "international zone like the 
Vatican": an absurd canard that some credulous Kuwaitis are 
nonetheless likely to accept.  Al-Awadi, who is alleged by 
one PAS contact to have traveled to Afghanistan to meet with 
Osama bin Ladin before September 11, 2001, also cautioned the 
ambassador to lower his profile as "Kuwait cannot afford the 
(political) cost" if the ambassador were to be attacked by 
"someone who lost control" after being angered by the 
Ambassador's attempts to influence those opposed to women's 
rights.  Post has learned that the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry 
was incensed by al-Awadi's veiled threat and considered 
calling him in for questioning, but apparently concluded that 
such a move would only serve to raise his media profile. 
Al-Awadi has since published several other op/eds that among 
other things criticize the embassy public affairs section for 
allegedly attempting to push Islamist students into an 
unwanted dialogue.  In typical fashion, his version of events 
surrounding our Ramadan outreach programs turned the facts on 
their head. 
 
¶3. (U) Other Islamists have also written editorials 
criticizing the ambassador and the embassy.  In an op/ed in 
leading Kuwaiti Arabic daily "Al Rai al-Amm," Islamist writer 
Sami Nasser asks rhetorically, "Why is the MFA not doing 
anything about the US ambassador's interference and 
undesirable presence in every Diwaniya in Kuwait?"  (Note: 
There has been no change in the ambassador's public profile. 
End note.)  In a July 19 interview in local Arabic daily "Al 
Siyassa," Islamist MP Yousef Zalzalleh argues that American 
hubris and interventionist tendencies have led the U.S. to 
"marginalize" Kuwait's role in the reconstruction of 
post-Saddam Iraq. 
 
¶4.  (C) Although it comes as no surprise that Islamists would 
take the offensive once the threat from Saddam was ended, the 
evolving dynamic of Kuwaiti domestic politics might be a 
factor in this sudden late-summer offensive.  While the 
recent Kuwaiti National Assembly elections were widely 
interpreted by Western journalists as a defeat for liberalism 
in Kuwait, the fact remains that the principal Islamist bloc 
in Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored Islamic 
Constitutional Movement (ICM), suffered devastating setbacks, 
losing four of its six seats, including that of its leader. 
While newly elected conservatives filled the void, these new 
members come chiefly from the tribal and Bedouin areas south 
and west of Kuwait City and are not members of the ICM or 
Salafis of the Popular Islamic Grouping, the two best 
organized Islamist political blocs in Kuwait.  In the days 
following the elections, Kuwaiti media reported meetings by 
ICM and Salafi leaders urgently seeking a strategy to 
reconstitute a united Islamist presence in the National 
Assembly.  While it is unclear to what extent their efforts 
will be successful, we conjecture that the ambiguity of the 
elections came as something of a surprise for Islamists in 
Kuwait, and that the current campaign might be related to a 
general strategy to foster unity among widely disparate 
conservative constituencies by rallying them against a 
supposedly common American foe. 
 
¶5.  (C) If the current campaign is indeed related to an 
effort by Islamists to recoup lost political capital after 
the elections, they could not have chosen a better time.  A 
plateau period in relations usually follows any great 
bilateral effort in a joint cause, and Kuwait is no exception 
to this rule.  In the period since President Bush announced 
the end of formal hostilities in Iraq, Kuwaitis have begun to 
grumble that they have not received their "fair share" of 
contracts for the rebuilding of Iraq or otherwise have not 
benefited in a manner that proportionately reflects the 
enormous size of their contributions to the war effort. 
(Note: Our reminders to them that their guaranteed continued 
national existence for the foreseeable future should be 
considered a significant benefit has not gained traction, and 
we are currently in the process of putting together a list of 
more tangible benefits that Kuwait has or will accrue as a 
result of OIF. End Note.) 
 
¶6.  (U) There has also been an increase in public concern 
over the fate of Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo.  National 
Assembly Speaker Jassim al-Khorafi recently issued a public 
rebuke of the U.S. on this issue, accusing us of violating 
international law and arguing that Kuwaiti prisoners at 
Guantanamo be either brought to trial immediately or 
released, and his remarks have struck a chord here, forcing 
the FM to issue a statement referencing "secret meetings" 
between Kuwait and the U.S. to urge us to "solve" the 
Guantanamo detention issue out of humanitarian 
considerations.  Reports of alleged mistreatment of Kuwaiti 
students who were returned to Kuwait after being turned away 
at US ports of entry by the INS have also generated 
resentment (Note: Septel report on our consular and public 
affairs sections efforts on this issue is in the works.  End 
note.)  An editorial in the August 3 edition of liberal 
"al-Qabas" expresses anger over U.S. pressure on Gulf 
governments to monitor charities, asking if the U.S. now 
views the feeding of orphans and the needy as a threat to 
national security. 
 
¶7. (C) This critical reportage and commentary has not yet 
elicited the normally spirited counter-attack by liberal 
Kuwaitis, who in the past have usually wasted little time in 
taking on the conservatives.  Only a handful of op/eds from 
well-known stalwarts have stood up for the U.S.  Summer leave 
plans and post-war/post-election fatigue have undoubtedly 
played a part, as well as the calculation that responding to 
somebody like al-Awadi would be counter-productive.  Yet 
there does seem to be something missing in our conversations 
with Kuwaiti liberals these days.  Our PAS section reports 
that meetings with liberal NGO leaders and other progressives 
appear to be marked by a general lassitude and lack of 
interest in US Speakers, American studies initiatives and 
other joint programs.  One women's rights leader expanded on 
this, telling us that Kuwaiti liberals excel at denouncing 
Islamist youth programs and other conservative initiatives, 
but never manage to translate their indignation into action 
by putting together programs of their own. Again, this is 
clearly at least in part the result of collective burnout 
after a year that has seen terrorist attacks, Iraqi missile 
launches and governmental inaction and gridlock, but this 
lack of progressive dynamism, when contrasted with the energy 
with which Islamists are framing issues in Kuwaiti society, 
is a source of concern. 
 
¶8. (C) At this point we would agree with our friends at the 
MOI that a direct response to obvious fictions by the embassy 
would only serve to raise the profile of Islamist windbags 
like al-Awadi.  Our strategy so far has involved media 
interviews with Ambassador Jones and embassy officers 
(al-Qabas published last week a two-page interview with the 
Ambassador in which he addressed the economic benefits for 
Kuwait from OIF, visa issues, the Guantanamo detainees and 
other high profile issues), op-eds, receptions for students 
and our continued presence on the Diwaniyah circuit.  We are 
looking to MEPI programs for help with high-profile youth 
exchanges, essay contests and support for programs focusing 
on women's political empowerment in Kuwait.  Over time we 
will see the Kuwaitis playing a more active, successful role 
in Iraqi reconstruction, and we will look at ways to 
publicize US/Kuwaiti cooperation.  These initiatives should 
help to remind Kuwaitis of the depth of the bilateral 
relationship and will hopefully put the histrionics of 
conservatives seeking to drive a wedge between the U.S. and 
Kuwait into perspective.  However, we should continue to 
monitor the situation and not hesitate to take more active 
measures if circumstances warrant. 
 
Jones 
JONES