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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU1674, NEPAL: POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS SEEKING US MEDIATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KATHMANDU1674 2003-08-29 10:48 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS SEEKING US MEDIATION 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1612 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 1565 
     C. KATHMANDU 1648 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
Summary 
======== 
 
1.  (S)  Mainstream political parties are reassessing plans 
for a large joint demonstration to be held in the capital on 
September 4 in light of the Maoists' unilateral decision to 
break the ceasefire and return to violence.  Party leaders 
have indicated that they are seeking an overture from King 
Gyanendra--currently in the UK for a medical checkup--toward 
establishing an all-party interim government and/or reviving 
Parliament.  The parties have quietly asked the Embassy to 
urge its influence with the Palace.  A royal confidant 
indicated to the Ambassador on August 28 that the Palace may 
be contemplating such a move.  At the same time, however, 
some in the parties advocate continuing with plans for the 
rally to demonstrate to their "mass appeal" and to 
"pressurize" the Palace into accepting an all-party 
government.  We continue to urge the parties and the 
Governent of Nepal (GON) to work together against the Maoist 
threat.  We also have strongly expressed our growing concern 
that the Maoists may infiltrate the protest, virtually 
ensuring it will turn violent, and have asked the parties to 
reconsider the program.  End summary. 
 
Inertia or Compromise: 
Nepali Congress Seeks Ambassador's Advice 
========================================== 
 
2.  (C) On August 29 Sujata Koirala, daughter of Nepali 
Congress President and former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala, 
and NC Central Committee member Dr. Suresh Chalise told the 
Ambassador that the Central Committee will meet on August 29 
to decide the agenda for a massive joint party protest 
planned for September 4 (Ref A).  The two said they had been 
deputed by G.P. Koirala to seek the Ambassador's opinion. 
The Ambassador asked them to reconsider the program and to 
work with the security forces to ensure that the Maoists did 
not utilize the protest as cover for violent acts.  Providing 
security for such a massive rally would, moreover, tax the 
already over-stretched resources of the police and Army when 
their full attention and manpower are needed to safeguard the 
streets against possible acts of terrorism (like the August 
25 assassination attempt against former Prime Minister Deuba 
or the August 28 killing of an Army colonel) by the Maoists. 
 The parties want to hold a peaceful rally, Koirala and 
Chalise replied, but are fearful that the Palace may use the 
threat of Maoist violence as a pretext to suppress the 
demonstration.  They undertook to report the Ambassador's 
concerns to the Central Committee. 
 
3.  (C)  Chalise then pressed the Ambassador for his advice 
on how to "reactivate" the Constitution.  The Ambassador 
replied that the most obvious choice was for the parties to 
work with the King.  Despite the mistrust on both sides, the 
parties and the King have the most in common and the most to 
lose should the Maoists come to power militarily.  Now is the 
time for the parties to come together with the King under a 
common agenda that should include the principles of 
multiparty democracy, constitutional monarchy, rule by 
constitutional processes, national integrity, and empowerment 
of the people.  The NC representatives agreed with the 
principles but said they suspect that the King does not share 
the same values.  Koirala, echoing her father and others in 
her party, alleged that the King is in league with the 
Maoists against democracy.  The Ambassador replied that in 
his meetings with the King, he warns the King not to ignore 
the political parties.  The parties are essential for 
political support, ideas, and to mobilize the people. 
 
4.  (S) The Ambassador, drawing on an August 28 conversation 
with the King's confidant, reported that the King may now be 
willing to compromise.  If Parliament were restored for a 
limited period, the reform proposals tabled by the GoN at the 
third round of negotiations (Ref B) could form the basis of 
the Parliament's agenda.  The Ambassador suggested that the 
end point of the Parliament could be to lay the groundwork 
for elections.  Koirala and Chalise agreed but stated that 
they will not talk to the King and cannot negotiate with the 
"illegitimate" Government.  Chalise requested the Ambassador 
use his good offices to convince the Palace to make an 
overture toward the parties.  He predicted that the September 
4 protest will draw party workers from around the country to 
Kathmandu who will demand a "signal" from the Palace that the 
consitution will be reactivated.  (Note:  The King is away in 
London for an unofficial trip and will not be present for the 
protests. End note.)  Koirala requested the Ambassador to 
play the role of "facilitator," as a trusted friend.  Picking 
up on the "facilitator" theme, Koirala then asked the 
Ambassador to try to get the corruption case filed against 
her by the Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of 
Authority (CIAA) dismissed.  The case was no more than a 
politically motivated ploy by the King to undermine the 
democratic parties, she alleged.  The Ambassador did not 
respond.  (Comment:  In a country plagued by a corruption 
pandemic, Sujata's close involvement in a ticketing scam that 
helped bankrupt the national airline is particularly 
egregious.  End comment.) 
 
All a Royal "Strategem"? 
======================== 
 
5.  (C)  Poloff met with Nepali Congress Central Committee 
member Govinda Raj Joshi on August 28 to ask if the parties 
were altering their plans for September 4 in light of the 
Maoist decision to break the ceasefire.  While the Embassy 
supports the right of democratic parties to peaceful 
assembly, the Maoists' successful assassination of an Army 
colonel in the capital (Ref C) proves that the insurgents are 
prepared to unleash their violence on the streets of 
Kathmandu, she noted.  The party leadership has a 
responsibility to its workers not to put them in harm's way. 
A crisis of this nature calls for national unity, rather than 
political divisiveness, by all legal, democratic forces, she 
said.  Is there some way the parties could work with the GON 
against the Maoists?  Joshi countered by asking why the 
Maoists decided to break the ceasefire so close to the date 
of the parties' rally.  Perhaps it was all a royal 
"strategem," he suggested, to give the GON/Palace an excuse 
to suppress the rally.  The parties have to hold the 
September 4 rally to disprove royalist rumors that they have 
no popular support, he said, and cannot accept the potential 
for Maoist violence as a justification for being "sidelined 
forever."  The interim government of Prime Minister Surya 
Bahadur Thapa, appointed with a mandate to bring peace to the 
country and to hold elections, has proven unable to do 
either, he charged. 
 
6.  (C)  Poloff pointed out that the parties and the 
GON/Palace share the same principles.  These common values 
should help them cooperate against the Maoists, rather than 
divide them.  The Nepali Congress supports the institution of 
the monarchy, Joshi responded, but this King has soured the 
political atmosphere and fanned mistrust by his "personal 
behavior," encouraging rivalries and dissension within the 
middle ranks of the party leadership.  Now no one in the 
parties trusts him, Joshi said bluntly.  He hinted that a 
Palace emissary had recently approached party representatives 
to sound them out once again about participation in an 
all-party government, but Joshi expressed strong suspicion of 
the King's actual motives.  Noting that the party has had no 
direct contact with the King since he solicited (and then 
rejected) the parties' consensus nomination for Prime 
Minister in June, he urged the Embassy to use its influence 
with the King to make an overture toward the parties.  The 
US, as a democratic country, should support the Nepali 
Congress more openly as the only truly democratic party in 
Nepal, he argued.  The UML, for all its democratic 
pretensions, is still a Communist party and thus undeserving 
of US support, he concluded.  Poloff responded that while the 
Embassy supports the idea of an all-party government and has 
long maintained friendly relations with the Nepali Congress, 
it cannot promote one candidate or party over others. 
 
 
UML Mulling It Over 
==================== 
 
7.  (C) In an August 29 meeting, Communist Party of Nepal - 
United Marxist Leninist (UML) Central Committee member Bharat 
Mohan Adhikari said that his party is reassessing holding the 
rally in light of the break in the ceasefire.  The main 
problem facing the nation is the Maoists, he agreed; the 
parties and the Palace ought to be able to work together to 
confront the insurgency.  But even before the Maoists broke 
the ceasefire, the GON was attempting to suppress the rally, 
he charged, limiting the number of buses and other vehicles 
allowed to enter the capital.  The parties want to use the 
rally to prove to both the King and the Maoists the extent of 
their grass-roots support.  That said, they do not want 
violence, he said, and thus will review the situation and 
make a final decision over the next few days. 
 
8.  (C) Adhikari reported a recent meeting with an 
unidentified Palace emissary who intimated that the King 
might once again ask the parties for a consensus nomination 
for a Prime Minister to head an all-party government.  If 
that were the case, Adhikari asked, and the parties once 
again chose UML General Secretary Madhav Nepal, what would be 
the US reaction?  Poloff replied that an all-party government 
seems the best solution, but the US has no preference for an 
individual candidate or party to lead such a government. 
Adhikari brushed aside suggestions that the Indians might not 
accept Nepal as a candidate. 
 
Comment 
======= 
 
9.  (S)  Despite their bombast against "royal regression," 
the parties recognize the Maoists pose a greater, more 
immediate threat to their viability than the Palace.  Maoist 
violence over the past month has targeted UML and Nepali 
Congress party workers as well as members of the security 
forces.  In the parties' view, they have pumped up the hype 
about the September 4 rally too much to back down now.  That 
said, they seem to appreciate the clear danger that the rally 
could turn violent and uncontrollable--thereby further 
discrediting their "popular" image.  We suspect they would 
welcome a deus ex machina that would preclude holding the 
rally without making them lose face by canceling it.  Another 
Palace overture to form an all-party government might provide 
just such an out.  We, along with other friendly missions, 
will urge the Palace to consider such a move and the parties 
to accept it. 
MALINOWSKI