This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR GLUM ON PROSPECTS 
FOR PEACE, MULTI-PARTY COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1586 
 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1577 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 0860 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  In an August 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Kamal 
Thapa, Information Minister and a Government of Nepal's (GON) 
negotiator with the Maoists, appeared pessimistic about 
prospects for dialogue after the August 17-19 round of talks 
(Refs A-B).  The Maoists rejected, among other things, a GON 
suggestion to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism at 
the district level.  Thapa also expressed trepidation that 
the mainstream political parties' plans for a joint protest 
against the GON, scheduled to begin on September 4, could 
turn violent.  End summary. 
 
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PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE: 
"ALMOST FINISHED" 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 25 the Ambassador met with Information 
Minister Kamal Thapa, a member of the Government of Nepal 
(GON) two-man negotiating team, for a read-out on the August 
17-19 round of talks (Refs A-B).  The Maoist negotiators 
seemed to come to the talks with "a predetermined notion" of 
their outcome, Thapa said, and rejected the GON's political 
proposals "outright."  Given the Maoists' flat refusal to 
discuss anything other than GON acceptance of the constituent 
assembly--which the GON is not prepared to do--Thapa said he 
has "concluded that the prospects for dialogue are almost 
finished." 
 
¶3.  (C)  Thapa described the GON negotiators' frustration at 
being unable to identify any middle ground for discussion 
during the two sessions.  The GON side tried to persuade its 
Maoist counterparts first to draft an agenda for subsequent 
talks and then find some common ground for initial 
discussions, he said, but the Maoists refused to entertain 
the suggestion.  The Maoist talk team seemed to have no 
mandate to talk about anything beside the constituent 
assembly, Thapa commented, and responded to each GON overture 
with the same mantra.  For example, the GON side offered to 
address Maoist concerns about the 13-man monitoring committee 
appointed during the May 9 round under the previous 
government (Ref C), Thapa said, and had prepared draft 
guidelines that provided for monitoring at the district and 
local levels.  Their insurgent interlocutors dismissed the 
idea, saying the monitors are irrelevant in the present 
situation.  Thapa quoted Maoist negotiator Bhattarai as 
declaring that GON rejection of the proposed constituent 
assembly would mean war--thereby precluding the need for 
monitors--while GON acceptance would mean an immediate end to 
the conflict--and thus no need for monitors.  The GON team 
then proposed a referendum on the constituent assembly, a 
suggestion that the insurgents rejected as a royalist ploy. 
 
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MAOISTS TERM PARTIES IRRELEVANT; 
1990-STYLE DEMOCRACY TO BE DESTROYED 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Maoist negotiators demanded to know if the GON talk 
team had been empowered to discuss the future of the 
monarchy, Thapa reported.  The GON talk team, noting that the 
Maoists had not included that topic on the agenda, 
nonetheless asked the insurgents to elaborate on their vision 
of the role of the constitutional monarchy and the political 
parties.  According to Thapa, the Maoist negotiators scoffed 
at the notion of giving the parties a role, claiming that 
they are unable to influence the outcome of the talks and 
that they would have to abide by whatever the Maoists decide 
to do.  As for the monarch, the Maoists reportedly committed 
to giving him a "place" according to the "level of his 
sacrifice" in ceding authority.  When asked about the 
sovereignty of the Nepali people, which the GON team 
described as one of the gains of the 1990 democracy movement, 
the Maoists would only answer that the goal of their movement 
was to destroy the old regime to create a new one that would 
not be based on the 1990 "people's movement." 
¶5.  (C)  Bhattarai ended the talks by issuing an ultimatum, 
Thapa said:  Unless the GON comes up with a new proposal (to 
consider the constituent assembly), "we'll consider the 
ceasefire over."  Given the Maoists' uncompromising stance, 
Thapa concluded, prospects for dialogue are not good.  The 
GON has no problem with the constituent assembly per se, 
Thapa stressed.  The important question is to identify the 
Maoists' motives and objectives behind their demand.  Because 
their interpretation of multi-party democracy is not the same 
as the GON's, the Maoists will use the constituent assembly 
to sideline legal political forces, he predicted.  The 
Maoists want to use the proposed constituent assembly only as 
a way to grab power for themselves, he continued, while the 
GON is trying to incorporate all political forces in a 
negotiated political accord.  Why are the Maoists so 
confident? he wondered.  Who is backing them?  The Ambassador 
noted the August 20 arrest of Maoist Central Committee member 
Chandra Gajurel by Indian authorities in Chennai as a 
positive sign.  Thapa thanked the U.S. Embassy for its August 
23 press statement urging the peace process to continue, 
adding that the Indians, EU, and Japanese had also made 
recent helpful statements. 
 
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PEACE SECRETARIAT HELPFUL; 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCORD EXTRANEOUS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The newly established Peace Secretariat played a 
useful role during the August 17-19 round, Thapa said, adding 
that it helped produce, for the first time, signed minutes 
and signed press statements for both sessions.  The GON has 
no objection to signing the human rights accord proposed by 
the National Human Rights Commission (along with the UNHRC), 
Thapa said, especially since the GON is already legally bound 
to observe a number of international human rights treaties 
that it has signed in the past.  The GON does object, 
however, to signing an agreement at the same nominal 
political level as the Maoists, he said, adding that the GON 
has already told the National Human Rights Commission that it 
is prepared to sign a separate, stand-alone document.  "We 
still want to save the process.  We don't want to be seen as 
blocking it," he concluded. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
RECALCITRANT PARTIES TO RESUME AGITATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The GON remains unable to persuade leaders of the 
mainstream political parties to join it, Thapa  said.  He 
reported having just met with Madhav Kumar Nepal, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist 
 
SIPDIS 
Leninist (UML), to try to forestall an anti-GON protest the 
parties have planned to begin on September 4.  (Note:  The 
King, who left Nepal for medical treatment in the UK on Auust 
24, is not scheduled to return until o/a September 7.  End 
note.) The parties have threatened to bring workers from all 
over the country into the capital to "paralyze the state 
machinery," Thapa noted, and have promised that the upcoming 
agitation (presumably in contrast to earlier, less 
enthusiastically received demonstrations) will be of 
indefinite duration and "final and decisive."  He said that 
Nepal did not listen to his arguments that the protest would 
serve only to benefit the Maoists by keeping the legal, 
pro-democracy forces divided, even though Nepal has "even 
less faith" in the Maoists than the GON.  He expressed fear 
that the agitation could turn violent, especially if the 
Maoists infiltrate the protesters.  The GON must take a stand 
if the protests turn unruly or it will risk appearing weak, 
he stated, adding that the parties and the GON seem headed 
for a confrontation. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Ambassador emphasized that the GON must respect 
the parties' right to free and peaceful assembly.  Given the 
very real possibility of Maoist infiltration--and thus 
violence--he said the Embassy will engage with the democratic 
political leaders to urge prudence and restraint.  The GON 
must be careful not to over-react, he cautioned; that could 
only make matters worse.  Noting that the parties and the GON 
stand for the same principles (constitutional monarchy, 
multi-party democracy, popular sovereignty, human rights), he 
asked why the parties could not endorse a common statement 
with the GON to uphold such values.  Despite these common 
aims, the parties are "not ready" to be seen as supporting 
the GON, Thapa said, preferring instead to subvert it through 
street protests.  The parties maintain the current government 
is illegitimate because the King appointed it, even though in 
practice the King has granted the GON full executive 
authority, Thapa asserted.  For example, the GON itself 
drafted the political reform proposals presented to the 
Maoists during the last round; the King only approved the 
final draft. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (C) In private, all of the political party leaders we 
contact admit that they and the GON share the same main 
principles, as well as a common adversary--the Maoists. 
Sadly, however, having common interests is not enough to 
secure unity of purpose in Nepal's contentious political 
environment.  The parties' decision to resume protests 
against the GON, following so quickly on the disappointing 
third round of talks and increasing violations of the 
ceasefire (septel), seems intentionally designed to put 
additional pressure on a government already under the gun. 
We will continue our efforts to persuade political party 
leaders to direct their democratic energies toward acting in 
the best interests of the country. 
 
MALINOWSKI