This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051032Z Aug 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAIN COMMUNIST PARTY WILL NOT JOIN THE 
GOVERNMENT OR THE PEACE TALKS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1419 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a meeting on August 4 with the leader of 
Nepal's largest legal communist party, Madhav Kumar Nepal, 
the Ambassador expressed concern that the Government's 
cease-fire with the Maoists might not continue for long and 
emphasized the need for the political parties and the King to 
unite against the Maoist threat.  Nepal agreed that the 
cease-fire might not last, suggesting that the Thapa 
government's negotiating position was weak and, therefore, 
resumption of violence would be necessary to alter the 
balance of power against the Maoists.  Nepal stated that his 
party would not participate in either the peace talks or the 
current government until both the Maoists and the King had 
demonstrated a commitment to multiparty democracy and 
recognized the independence and sovereignty of the political 
parties.  According to Nepal, UML will only participate in 
government either under a reconstituted parliament or an 
all-party government chosen by the parties without the King's 
interference.  Nepal accepted that foreign governments and 
international organizations might have a role to play in 
promoting the peace process by pressuring the King to empower 
the parties as well as the Maoists to abandon violence.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On August 4, Ambassador Malinowski met with the 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UMLN) 
Chairman Madhav Kumar Nepal to convey reftel message and to 
gauge the party's interest in joining Prime Minister Thapa's 
government.  DCM and PolOff also attended the meeting.  The 
Ambassador said he was glad that the Maoists had agreed to a 
third round of talks, but was worried that the current 
entente would not hold for long.  He credited Maoist 
supporters who pressured the insurgent leaders to return to 
the negotiating table and expressed gratitude for the actions 
by UML in this regard.   He mentioned that the major foreign 
governments represented in Kathmandu, including the U.S., UK 
and India, had agreed to send a common message to the Maoists 
condemning the insurgents' flagrant violations of the 
cease-fire code of conduct and pressing them to return to the 
peace talks.  The Ambassador emphasized the need for the 
King, government and the political parties to unite against 
the Maoist threat for the good of the nation.  He noted that 
the Maoists had called for the parties to join the peace 
talks and questioned the UML chairman on whether this was a 
possibility. 
 
¶3. (C) Nepal replied that UML would not participate in the 
peace talks until the Maoists demonstrated a commitment to 
multiparty democracy and recognized the independence and 
sovereignty of the political parties.  Ongoing Maoist 
activities, such as extortion, kidnapping and forced 
recruitment have proven that the insurgents' philosophy does 
not embrace democracy, he said.  The Maoists have also shown 
their lack of commitment to democracy by declining to sign a 
code of conduct prepared by the UML to protect local-level 
party cadres, he said.  Nepal noted that the Maoist supreme 
leader, Prachanda, had called for the political parties' 
involvement in the peace talks, but had qualified the offer 
by demanding that the parties choose sides, which they 
refused to do. 
 
¶4. (C) Nepal believed that there are philosophical 
differences within the Maoist leadership.  He said that "we 
should encourage and promote the flexible and reasonable 
people within the Maoist organization while the diehards and 
those who want to return to violence should be isolated and 
disgraced."  Despite these differences, Nepal opined that the 
Maoists continue to fight from what, they believe, is a 
position of power.  Only after the Maoists realize they are 
weak, he said, will they compromise on their political 
demands. 
 
¶5. (C) Nepal said that the talks between the Thapa government 
and the Maoists would not succeed since the government 
appeared weak and lacked political legitimacy.   Moreover, 
Nepal explained, the political parties would regard any 
agreement between the King and the Maoists as a conspiracy 
against their interests.  He believed that, by conceding to 
demands to release three Maoist Central Committee leaders and 
one of the major Maoist extortionists, the Thapa government 
had shown its weakness and given an advantage to the Maoists. 
 Nepal reported that the Maoists have claimed that their 
cadre has grown to 150,000 combatants.  Although many 
so-called Maoists will likely flee at the onset of 
hostilities, many others "will be bold enough to risk their 
lives," he said. (Comment.  Post does not agree with Nepal's 
assessment that the Maoists are negotiating from a position 
of strength.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) Nepal agreed that foreign governments, international 
organizations and human rights groups all have a role to play 
in the peace process.  Foreign governments, he said, should 
exert pressure through persuasion to convince the Maoists 
that they cannot win through violence.  Nepal argued that the 
Government of India in particular should be concerned about 
Maoist activities in its own country.  The insurgents in 
northern India have become stronger, he said, and therefore 
the human and financial costs of dealing with the problem 
have increased. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted the reaction within the Indian 
media in recent days criticizing offers by the United Nations 
to assist in the peace negotiations.  Nepal replied that 
although neither the government nor the Maoists were ready 
for a direct U.N. role in the talks, the U.N. could train 
facilitors, bring in negotiators from other countries, and 
assist in laying the groundwork for a post-conflict 
reconciliation plan.  However, Nepal also acknowledged the 
Indian government's unhappiness with U.N. and other agencies' 
offers of assistance. 
 
¶8. (C) Nepal agreed with the Ambassador that the Maoists are 
the sole beneficiaries of the ongoing conflict between King 
Gyanendra and the political parties.  The constitutional 
forces should not undermine one another's efforts against the 
unconstitutional forces, he said.  However, he placed 
responsibility for bringing the two sides together on the 
King's shoulders.  "If he shows flexibility, then we will 
show flexibility," he said.  Nepal criticized the King for 
not demonstrating a commitment to democracy, calling his rule 
a "one-party dictatorship."   Nepal emphasized that the 
King's actions have effectively "paralyzed" the consitution, 
noting the King's abrogation of constitutional provisions 
regarding the National Assembly and the budget.  He suggested 
that the King should stay out of politics completely and 
become a "noncontroversial, but dignified, constitutional 
monarch." 
 
¶9. (C) When asked whether he had a formula to bring the 
democratic forces together, Nepal stated that restoration of 
the parliament could bring the political parties into the 
government.  Alternatively, Prime Minister Thapa's government 
must resign and the King must allow the political parties to 
choose an all-party cabinet without interference.  Nepal 
hinted that, of course, the political party leaders would 
consult informally with the King, but that the King should 
remove himself from public political life.  Under no 
conditions could the UML participate in the current 
government, he said. 
 
¶10. (C) An interim government, Nepal stated, would first 
focus on reaching an agreement with the Maoists.  However, he 
suggested that the two sides would first need to return to 
war.  Only after the national army delivers firm set backs to 
the Maoists in the field and puts greater pressure on them 
can peace talks succeed, he said.  Nepal agreed that 
elections could not be held until the threat of violence is 
gone from the countryside.  When asked whether he believed 
the political parties could agree upon an all-party cabinet, 
Nepal said "there is no way to say now."  However, Nepal's 
international affairs advisor opined that the parties could 
reach an agreement, although the "window of opportunity" 
might soon disappear."  Nepal suggested that the seven 
parties that had been elected to the last parliament would 
need to participate in an interim government. 
MALINOWSKI