This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:08/05/03 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NP IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR PLEDGES TO 
COORDINATE WITH THE US IN CONTACTS WITH NEPAL'S MAOISTS 
 
REF: A) KATHMANDU 1461 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified by: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for 
reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  According to the Indian Ambassador to 
Nepal, India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra 
has reaffirmed the Indian Government's (GOI's) policy of 
synchronizing with the U.S. its tough talking points for 
Nepal's Maoist leaders.  Mishra reportedly also pledged 
that his Government, in its dialogue with the Maoists, 
has never encouraged the militants to attack or to 
threaten US interests in Nepal.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) Shyam Saran, Indian Ambassador to Nepal, called on 
the Ambassador on August 4 to report on the results of 
his promised efforts (reftel) to ensure that no agency of 
the GOI was giving Nepal's Maoists the impression that it 
condoned attacks or threats on US interests here.  Saran 
said that in order to ensure that he received an 
authoritative statement of GOI policy, undistorted by 
possibly conflicting agendas of different foreign affairs 
agencies, he went right to the top--talking by phone to 
Principal Secretary and National Security Advisor Brajesh 
Mishra. 
 
¶3. (S) With evident satisfaction Saran reported that 
Mishra had confirmed unequivocally that no agency of the 
GOI has ever been authorized to make any statement 
encouraging Nepal's Maoists to attack or to threaten US 
interests in Nepal.  Mishra reportedly went on to say 
that he had never felt that the US and India are 
operating at cross purposes in our respective policies 
toward Nepal and the Maoists.  Mishra said he had made 
this point repeatedly in his candid discussions at higher 
levels of the USG, including with his counterpart, Dr. 
Rice.  Ranjit Rae, Joint Secretary for Nepal and Bhutan 
in the Foreign Ministry, would be underscoring this point 
to the US Embassy in New Delhi on behalf of Mishra, Saran 
said. 
 
¶4. (S) Saran went on to explain that the GOI would 
continue to adhere to the basic talking points with the 
Maoists to which he and the Ambassador had agreed.  As he 
expressed them, these points are the following: 
 
-- The nature of the GOI's relations with the Maoists 
would be determined by the actions of the Maoists 
themselves.  If the Maoists wanted to be treated by the 
GOI as a legitimate political party they would have to 
give up violence and terrorism. 
 
-- If, as all Indian intelligence now indicates, the 
Maoists continue to engage in such criminal behavior on 
Indian soil as gun running and cooperation with Indian 
Naxalites, the Indian Government may attack them. 
 
-- If the Maoists are truly committed, as they say, to 
multiparty democracy, they must end threats of violence 
against their political opponents and provide a level 
playing field for other parties to operate in areas where 
the Maoists are active militarily.  In particular, no 
election to a constituent assembly (a persistent Maoist 
demand) or any other body would be possible under the 
threat of Maoist guns. 
 
¶5. (S) Saran caveated the foregoing points by asserting 
that his government had had no direct contact with the 
Maoists in New Delhi.  He said that reports that the 
Maoist leadership, now in India, had sent a letter to the 
GOI requesting its support for going back to war against 
the Nepal Government had not been substantiated; no such 
letter had been received by the GOI.  He confirmed that 
his DCM had had a single meeting with Baburam Bhatterai 
in Kathmandu and "some of his folks" h 
ad met with Maoist 
spokesman Mahara.  He added that Indian officials have 
met on occasion with Maoist surrogates or "go betweens." 
 
¶6. (S) Comment.  Amb Saran's quick response to the issues 
that the Ambassador had raised with him just three days 
earlier (reftel) strengthens our high regard for him as a 
sincere and cooperative colleague.  However disingenuous, 
his denial that his government has established a 
continuing dialogue with the Maoist leadership is not 
surprising given the sensitive nature of that dialogue. 
The clear affirmation by the National Security Advisor 
that the GOI wants to coordinate with the U.S. its overt 
policy toward Nepal and the Maoists is good news, as is 
his statement that the GOI is not encouraging the Maoists 
to oppose US interests here.  It is still possible, of 
course, that lower-ranking officers of the Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW) have encouraged the Maoists to oppose 
US activities and influence in Nepal without 
authorization and without reporting these comments to 
senior GOI officials.  All this underscores how far we 
have come in establishing a constructive dialogue with 
the Indians on Nepal, and how far we have yet to go to 
gain their full cooperation. 
 
Malinowski