This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI VM DPOL
SUBJECT:  KEEPING A FOCUS ON CORRUPTION 
 
 
¶A.  HCMC 0499  B. HCMC 0496  C. 02 HANOI 2913 
 
¶1.  (U)  Summary.  According to CPV officials and official 
media reports, corruption remains an endemic problem in 
Vietnam at all levels, but the GVN and CPV are actively 
taking steps to go after at least some officials.  Sweden is 
assisting with a grant for a "research" project on "root 
causes" and solutions.  Vietnam is unlikely to be very 
successful in these efforts, however, given the lack of 
genuinely independent investigatory mechanisms and a free 
press. End Summary. 
 
The Party tackles corruption 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  In a meeting with Pol/C, Dr. Nguyen Van Quyen -- 
concurrently Vice Chairman of the Internal Affairs 
Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam (CPV) and Director of the Steering Board of the 
"Anti-Corruption Project" -- confirmed that the CPV remained 
"very concerned" about corruption, which has spread to "all 
levels" of the party and government.  He admitted that it 
was "vitally important" for the future of the party to take 
even more active measures to confront this "social ill," 
which affects the authority and legitimacy of the CPV 
itself.  He nonetheless claimed that corruption was already 
on the decline, thanks mostly to the steps already taken by 
the CPV, which he said had more "comprehensive coverage" 
than the governmental Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Dr. Quyen attributed the pervasiveness of 
corruption more to "low developmental levels" within Vietnam 
as well as a lack of adequate legislation than to the 
problem of low salaries.  He noted, however, that the salary 
issue nonetheless needed to be rectified as well, as 
discussed at the 8th plenum of the CPV's Central Committee 
in June.  He added that so far "administrative punishments" 
had been used more often against corrupt officials, but that 
increasingly provisions of the Criminal Law would be invoked 
against wrongdoers.  He also expressed a hope that the 
National Assembly would add to or strengthen existing 
legislation, much of which now takes the form of 
"ordinances" or "resolutions" passed by the NA's Standing 
Committee, rather than formal laws passed by the entire 
Assembly.  He claimed no knowledge about whether the number 
of corruption cases was on the rise or not. 
 
¶4.  (U)  High-level corruption was the "most dangerous" to 
Vietnam, Dr. Quyen opined, while admitting the bad morale 
impact at the local levels of day-to-day grassroots 
corruption.  He confirmed that the two Central Committee 
members implicated in the Nam Cam trial (refs a and b) had 
been the most senior CPV or GVN officials ever convicted on 
corruption-related charges.  He added that, apart from 
somewhat higher levels of corruption in the more affluent Ho 
Chi Minh City, there were no noticeable differences among 
regions in terms of corruption; in particular, ethnic 
minorities in the Central or Northwest Highlands were no 
worse off than anywhere else in the country, he claimed.  He 
expressed a hope that recent requirements for declaration of 
assets by National Assembly candidates and even for Party 
delegates would be a brake on corruption.  (Note:  While the 
requirement for the 11th NA election in May 2002 was well- 
publicized, Embassy records do not include any references to 
a similar requirement for the 9th Party Congress in spring 
2001, although Dr. Quyen claimed a similar requirement was 
in place then.  end note) 
 
Sweden to the rescue 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  The Government of Sweden in 2002 provided a grant 
to the CPV of about US$800,000 to "research" the nature of 
corruption over a 3 year program, Dr. Quyen confirmed.  Much 
of the program will involve comparative studies, including 
"study tours" to Sweden, South Korea, Malaysia, and China, 
as well as several conferences to be held in Vietnam 
involving both Vietnamese and international experts.  The 
goal will be to determine "more effective measures" to 
combat corruption based on a "better understanding of root 
causes," he noted.  Dr. Quyen added that the steering board 
had considered study trips to the U.S. but ruled them out as 
"too expensive."  He said that the CPV also maintained links 
with official anti-corruption groups elsewhere, such as ICAC 
in Hong Kong.  Separately, a Swedish diplomat welcomed the 
CPV's willingness to cooperate bilaterally on such a 
potentially sensitive subject and to include a formal role 
for a Swedish adviser, as well as Vietnam's own monetary and 
in-kind contributions to the project. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Dr. Quyen highlighted that other foreign-funded 
projects had included corruption-related foci, such as UNDP 
programs with the Ministry of Home Affairs, but that the 
Swedish project was the first to concentrate exclusively on 
corruption.  He added that the CPV and GVN were discussing a 
similar project with the EU. 
 
Public campaigns 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  Vietnamese media reported on a two-day seminar 
organized by the CPV in Ho Chi Minh City August 20-21 
focused on suppressing corruption.  Addressing the seminar 
were, inter alia, Politburo members Ngueyn Minh Triet (also 
HCMC party chief) and Pham Dien (standing member of the CPV 
secretariat and former Danang party chief) as well as CPV 
 
SIPDIS 
Central Committee Internal Affairs Commission chief Truong 
Vinh Trong.  Triet admitted ongoing corruption but predicted 
"fruitful results" against this "bad practice."  Dien noted 
that the campaign against corruption -- as well as against 
"negativism and wastefulness" -- was under the "close 
supervision of the Party leadership."  Trong emphasized the 
need to "clean up the Party and State workforce," while 
citing a particular focus on the education and training 
sector.  He promised a new anti-corruption task force to 
help law enforcement officials go after corrupt officials, 
while urging the mass media to "maintain public support" for 
anti-corruption efforts.  (Comment:  likely an indirect 
reminder not to overstep CPV guidelines by being overly 
aggressively in tracking down cases the CPV would rather not 
expose, as began to happen during the Nam Cam 
investigations.  End comment) 
 
¶8.  (U)  The media has also reported on some recent cases of 
punishment for official corruption (following provincial- 
level cases reported ref c), including: 
--  disciplinary punishment and early retirement of Quang 
Tri provincial People's Committee Chairman Nguyen Minh Ky in 
August and September, respectively; 
--  execution in July of Pham Nhat Hong, deputy director of 
the Ho Chi Minh branch of the state-owned Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of Vietnam, as well as businessman Tang Minh 
Phung, for defrauding the government of more than $350 
million (a 1999 case that found another 75 people also 
guilty; two other death sentences were commuted to life in 
January 2000); 
--  life sentence in June for Le Quang Toan, former director 
of Transport Import-Export and Construction Co. 502 for 
embezzlement of US$142,000, along with varied sentences for 
another nine accomplices; and, 
--  sentences of seven and four and a half years in Binh 
Dinh province for Cat Hung People's Committee accountants 
Nguyen Huu Truc and Do Van Nhan, along with four suspended 
sentences for other commune officials for embezzlement of 
$13,800 between 1994 and 2000. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  The CPV and GVN take seriously the threat posed by 
corruption, not only for their legitimacy but also as to its 
international reputation as a place to do business.  These 
campaigns are designed in large part for public consumption, 
to reassure that something is being done on this front and 
well as genuinely to punish some officials.  Given the CPV's 
own worries about the most dangerous nature of high-level 
corruption, however, the small-fry nature of most of these 
cases belies the seriousness of these campaigns.  In the 
absence of genuinely independent investigatory mechanisms 
and a truly free press, Vietnam's efforts to curb corruption 
are apt to fall behind the growth of this problem throughout 
the country. 
BURGHARDT