This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 FRANKFURT 006409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR HADDA 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EUN
SUBJECT: Stability and Growth Pact: Listerine Syndrome; 
Striving to Do Good, Good Enough? Key Word - 
Flexibility 
 
 
T-IA-F-03-0040 
 
 
  ¶1.   Summary:  "The taste people hate, twice a day." 
     Wretchedly-tasking Listerine's old advertising slogan 
     is akin to the criticism of the EU Stability and Growth 
     Pact (SGP): we don't like these rules, but we need 
     rules at least twice a year when budget results are 
     issued.  When Europe was growing, budgets were not 
     under strain.  The rules were tolerable.  Slow growth 
     has changed all that.  Calls for the SGP to be 
     suspended or modified, however, are likely to go 
     unheeded.  Where does that leave this debate? 
 
  ¶2.   One way to approach the debate would be to 
     distinguish between the "letter" of the SGP and its 
     "spirit."  The letter of the Pact is popularly 
     distilled into one number, the reference value that 
     deficits exceeding 3% of GDP are "excessive."  If an 
     excessive deficit were not corrected in the year after 
     which it was identified, the member state concerned 
     could be subject to sanctions.  The spirit of the Pact 
     essentially is that governments should work hard to 
     avoid any excessive deficit and, once it occurs, work 
     hard to get it back under control.  Economies and 
     budgets, being less than clock-work like in their 
     predictability, often incur surprises or "exceptional" 
     or "special circumstances." Bad things happen. 
 
  ¶3.   At this writing, the outlook seems rather clear 
     that Portugal, Germany and France will not abide by 
     Ecofin's recommendations to bring their budgets under 
     3% value (for Germany and France in 2004) or keep them 
     there (Portugal in 2003).  Sanctions, however, are not 
     automatic.  Instead, a question EU Finance Ministers 
     will collectively decide is whether the member state 
     concerned is failing to take necessary corrective 
     action. This, necessarily, is a political as well as an 
     economic question. 
 
  ¶4.   Flexibility is the word of the day in the SGP 
     debate.  Flexibility exists in the rules.  Exercising 
     this flexibility responsibility will be a challenge for 
     the European Commission and Ecofin.  Being flexible by 
     ignoring the rules is one thing.  Being flexible by 
     taking into account measurable efforts to get the 
     structural deficit under control, including through 
     structural reforms, would be quite another.  Such 
     efforts could mean brighter growth and budget 
     performance.  That, after all, is the point of the SGP. 
     End Summary 
 
  SGP:  Storm and Drang Amounting to Very Little 
 
  ¶5.   The SGP is getting its share of hits in the press. 
     As the euro area slogs through its third year of 
     sluggish economic growth, government budget deficits 
     are rising.  Goldman Sachs estimates that for the euro 
     area these deficits will increase from 2.2% of GDP in 
     2002 to 2.7% in 2003.  Portugal, Germany and France 
     have been found to have "excessive deficits," well 
     above the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty. 
     Ecofin has issued all three recommendations to reduce 
     their deficits below 3% and keep them there.  Pro- 
     cyclical budget policy seems counter-intuitive. 
     Wouldn't tightening fiscal policy risk slowing an 
     already crawling economy?  Calls for suspending the 
     SGP, revising it, or abolishing it seem to be a steady 
     diet of some financial journalists.  They are likely to 
     amount to nothing. 
 
  SGP Rules: The Basics, Revisited 
 
  ¶6.   Many economists of the euro area agree that fiscal 
     rules are necessary for the European Monetary Union. 
     The basic argument is to contain the "spillover" 
     effects from a country with a high deficit and growing 
     debt on interest rates and, consequently, on the 
     financing costs of other countries in the union. 
     Higher interest rates could put pressure on the 
     European Central Bank (ECB) to lower rates, potentially 
     conflicting with its primary objective of maintaining 
     price stability.  A framework of rules to coordinate 
     and discipline 12 national fiscal policies with a 
     single monetary policy is designed to avoid such 
     spillover effects. 
  ¶7.   Even Belgian economist Paul De Grauwe, often a 
     critic of the EMU, admits that some rules are 
     necessary.  Nonetheless, in his "Economics of Monetary 
     Union" published in 2000 he criticized the SGP as being 
     "unbalanced" imposing strict rules at the expense of 
     flexibility.  He points out that during the 1991-93 
     recession six EU countries had government deficits of 
     over 3% of GDP.  So why impose such a strict rule if it 
     is bound to be broken? To do so risks breaking the 
     rules and diminishing the value of the pact. 
  ¶8.   Such criticism is, at least to date, misplaced. 
     This is the first time the excessive deficit procedures 
     (EDP) have been invoked.  It is difficult to know 
     beforehand how they will be applied, particularly 
     during this period of prolonged economic slowdown. 
     Commented a senior Finance Ministry official who 
     participated in the drafting of the SGP, the authors 
     did not foresee such a long period of stagnation. 
 
  Why 3%? 
 
  ¶9.   3% of GDP reference value seems to be a bit of a 
     rough rule.  Yet it does have its logic. If trend real 
     economic growth were 3% (the high side of the euro 
     area's growth potential), inflation were 2% (the 
     European Central Bank's definition of price stability) 
     this would imply nominal growth trend of 5% per year 
     (which was the average nominal growth rate for the Eu- 
     15 during 1991-2000).  If the stock of Euro area debt 
     were 60% of GDP (which it was for the Euro area 11 
     years ago when the basic rules were being written), 
     then a 3% of GDP government deficit would imply no 
     increase in the debt relative to GDP.  That is, a 
     steady state. 
 
  ¶10.  The rough rule is even a bit rougher in reality. 
     As of 2002 the Euro 12 have a debt stock of 69% of GDP. 
     Nominal growth has been trending below 4%, likely to be 
     closer to 3% this year.  The higher debt stock and 
     lower growth imply a deficit of around 2.7% to avoid a 
     further increase in debt as a share of GDP.  For 
     countries with higher than average debt (Italy) and 
     average or below average growth (German), surpluses 
     would be in order to reach a sustainable level.  Not 
     doing so can put pressure on interest rates and strain 
     on monetary policy, as noted above.  No wonder small 
     countries that have moved close to budget surplus 
     during the cyclical upswing are displeased with the 
     larger countries that did not (France, Germany) or who 
     did not bring down their overall debt levels (Italy). 
     France is a special case: debt level around 60% and 
     growth rates around average. 
 
  ¶11.  The 3% reference value also is attractive because 
     it is relatively easy to explain and as transparent as 
     Eurostat can make it.  More sophisticated measurements 
     of cyclically adjusted numbers are used by the 
     Commission to monitor trends.  These lack clarity 
     (assumptions could vary) and simplicity. 
 
  ¶12.  The rules are unlikely to change.  The recent 
     draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
     incorporated the SGP rules, without substantive change. 
     Similarly, in its May 2003 Concluding Statement of its 
     Article IV consultations on the Euro Area Policies, the 
     IMF mission stated that the 3% limit "is and must 
     remain one of the key references values of the monetary 
     union."  "An Agenda for a Growing Europe" issued by an 
     Independent High-Level Study Group chaired by Belgian 
     economist Andre Sapir in July 2003, argued that the 3% 
     of GDP upper limit should be kept to "steer fiscal 
     discipline." Nonetheless, there is another way to 
     approach the issue, namely, flexibly. 
 
  Need for Flexibility 
 
  ¶13.  De Grauwe's view on flexibility has become the 
     keyword of the day.  Sapir's High Level Study Group 
     pleas for more differentiation in applying the SGP, 
     taking into account a country's debt level, and for 
     more flexibility in the case of severe cyclical 
     downturns.  For the latter, the High Level Study Group 
     recommended changing the definition of the term 
     "exceptional circumstances" to be defined as simply a 
     negative annual growth rate rather than a 2 percent 
     decline.  This would require a change in the Treaty. 
     Others, such as the ECB, argue that the SGP already has 
     sufficient flexibility.  Which is correct? 
 
  Rules of the Game:  Economists As Wanna-be Lawyers 
 
  ¶14.  To understand the debate, familiarity with the 
     rules of the game is helpful.  This can be a chore. 
     The SGP is not one tidy document, but is composed of 
     Treaty Articles and Protocols and Council Regulations 
     and Resolutions.  Article 104(2) of the Treaty states 
     that the Commission is to monitor member states' 
     budgetary situation and whether they comply with the 3% 
     reference value unless the excess over 3% is declining 
     close toward 3% or is "only exceptional and temporary." 
     Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 
     ("the Council Regulation") defines "exceptional and 
     temporary" as resulting from an unusual event outside 
     the control of the member state concerned and which has 
     a major impact on the financial position of the general 
     government or when resulting from a severe economic 
     downturn.  A severe economic downturn is exceptional 
     only if there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 
     2%, according to Article 2(2). 
 
  ¶15.  Article 2(3) refines the point by allowing the 
     Commission to examine "other supporting evidence" that 
     would suggest an exceptional circumstance, even if the 
     decline is less than 2%.  Such evidence includes the 
     abruptness of the downturn or the accumulated loss of 
     output relative to past trends.  The Resolution of the 
     European Council on the SGP ("the Council Resolution") 
     further commits member states not to invoke the 
     benefits of Article 2(3) unless they are in a "severe 
     recession," further defined as an annual fall in real 
     GDP of at least 0.75%. 
 
  ¶16.  For Portugal, Germany and France, the Commission 
     considered whether exceptional circumstances were at 
     play and, at the time it was preparing its report, 
     decided in the negative.  Thus, it issued a report that 
     these countries' deficits were excessive.  Ecofin 
     agreed and issued recommendations to each of these 
     countries to "bring the situation to an end."  As 
     provided for under the Council Regulation, Ecofin gave 
     the Member country concerned four months to take 
     effective action.  Article 3(4) of the Council 
     Regulation states that the deadline for the correction 
     of the excessive deficit "should be completed in the 
     year following its identification unless there are 
     special circumstances."  Under the Council Resolution, 
     member states have committed themselves to this action. 
     The phrase "special circumstances" is not defined 
     either in the Council Regulation or Council Resolution. 
 
  ¶17.  What happens if the deficit is not corrected? 
     Article 104(9) of the Treaty states that: "If a Member 
     State persists in failing to put into practice the 
     recommendations of the Council, the Council may decide 
     to give notice to the Member State to take, within a 
     specified time-limit, measures for the deficit 
     reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in 
     order to remedy the situation."  If the Member State is 
     not implementing the recommendations or the measures 
     are inadequate, Ecofin is to take action, on the basis 
     of a recommendation from the Commission, either under 
     Article 104(9), that is give a (or another) notice or 
     under Article 104(11), resort to sanctions.  Or if the 
     excessive deficit has not been corrected within the 
     time limits specified either in the initial EDP or a 
     notice issued under 104(9), Ecofin can again issue 
     another notice under 104(9) or move to sanctions. 
 
  ¶18.  Sanctions can be invoked "as long as a Member 
     State fails to comply with a decision taken in 
     accordance with" 104(9).  Thus, a Member State would 
     have to "fail to put into practice the recommendations" 
     of Ecofin and would have to fail to comply with 
     recommendations in any follow-up notice.  In short, be 
     incorrigible. 
  Sanctions:  Deterrent or Admission of Failure? 
 
  ¶19.  For the record, sanctions themselves are also a 
     drawn out affair.  When Ecofin takes a decision under 
     104(11) a non-interest-bearing deposit is to be 
     required.  This would consist of a 0.2% of GDP fixed 
     component and a variable component of one-tenth of the 
     difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP 
     and the 3% reference value.  The total deposit cannot 
     exceed 0.5% of GDP. 
 
  ¶20.  The deposit is converted into a fine if two years 
     after the deposit was required the excessive deficit 
     had not been corrected. A German Finance Ministry 
     official admitted that just how the fine would be 
     imposed has not been thought through.  "You see, when 
     we drafted these provisions, they were not meant to be 
     used, but to serve as a deterrent. " 
 
  ¶21.  Article 104(11) includes other possible measures: 
     require the member state concerned to publish 
     additional information before issuing bonds and 
     securities or invite the European Investment Bank to 
     reconsider its lending policy to the Member State 
     concerned. 
 
  Now we turn to the application of the rules to the 
  "live cases" of Portugal, Germany and France. 
 
  Portugal: Brightness Before the Burn Out? 
 
  ¶22.  In November 2002, Ecofin decided that Portugal's 
     2001 deficit of 4.1% was excessive.  The Council's 
     recommendation called for (a) putting an end to the 
     excessive deficit as rapidly as possible (i.e. the year 
     following its identification, 2002); (b) implementing 
     budget plans for 2002 that would bring the deficit down 
     to 2.8%; and (c) implementing necessary measures to 
     ensure the 2003 budget is below 3%. 
 
  ¶23.  The GOP went through hell and high water to meet 
     (a) and (b).  In the event, the deficit came in at 
     2.8%.  In March 2003, however, the Council did not 
     "abrogate" their excessive deficit decision.  Rather, 
     they wanted to assess the sustainability of the deficit 
     remaining below 3%.  According to Commission officials, 
     prospects are not good. 
 
  ¶24.  Portugal's economy is contracting and the deficit 
     may well shoot up to 5% of GDP, according to Commission 
     experts. UBS Warburg suggests part of the contraction 
     was due to budget consolidation, between 0.7% to 1.3%. 
     In September Eurostat will give its assessment of the 
     budget outlook for 2003.  The Commission is likely to 
     make an assessment either in September or shortly after 
     the final 2003 budget numbers are published in March 
     ¶2004.  The Commission is likely to make a report with 
     recommendations to Ecofin. 
 
  ¶25.  How might this case be handled by the Commission 
     and Ecofin?  Under the "letter" of the rules, the 
     Commission is considering whether, in fact, there are 
     "special circumstances" given the decline in GDP.  As 
     noted above, the phrase "special circumstances" under 
     the Council Regulation regarding the correction of the 
     deficit (Article 3(4)) is not defined. This contrasts 
     with the phrase "exceptional" under Article 2(3) of the 
     Council Regulation when the Commission makes its 
     initial assessment of whether a deficit is excessive. 
 
  ¶26.  With regard to the "spirit" of the rules, the GOP 
     probably can make a good case that they have complied 
     as much as possible with the Ecofin recommendations. 
     They pushed the deficit below 3% in 2002, as 
     recommended, and are committed to achieve a sustainable 
     deficit under the 3% reference value.  Ecofin noted 
     that the GOP is moving to improve the collection and 
     processing of government data, reinforce mechanisms to 
     coordinate budgetary policy, and implement policies to 
     foster growth, employment and competitiveness. 
     Whatever the Commission and Ecofin do on Portugal will 
     set a precedent for the German and French cases to 
     follow. 
  Germany:  Miss America on Your Arm or Egg in Your 
  Face 
 
  ¶27.  In January 2003 Ecofin determined that Germany had 
     an excessive deficit.  They recommended that the German 
     government (a) put an end to the excessive deficit as 
     rapidly as possible in accordance with Council 
     Regulation Article 3(4) (i.e. the year after the 
     deficit was identified, 2004); and (b) implement their 
     budget plans for 2003 which, on the basis of German GDP 
     growth projections of 1.5% in 2003, aim at reducing the 
     deficit in 2003 to 2.75% of GDP by adopting budgetary 
     measures of 1% of GDP.   Ecofin "noted" the commitment 
     of German authorities to implement structural reforms 
     and to reduce the underlying budgetary deficit by more 
     that 0.5% of GDP per year, with the exception of 2005 
     due to the introduction of income tax reforms. 
 
  ¶28.  The German government's budget plan for 2003 
     achieves a budget deficit reduction of almost 1%, in 
     structural terms, at least on paper.  This plan passed 
     muster in the four month review of German budget 
     performance in May.  However, the decline in growth, 
     probably close to zero this year, will help push the 
     deficit close to 4% in 2003.  Under the "letter" of the 
     rules, the deficit need not be corrected until 2004. 
 
  ¶29.  Unfortunately, 2004 doesn't look much better. 
     Germany has announced that it will bring forward the 
     income tax cut scheduled for 2005 to January 2004, and 
     implement income tax cuts that had been postponed from 
     January 2003.  Combined this would amount to a revenue 
     loss of around 1.3% of GDP,  only part of which would 
     be financed through reduced expenditures.  Goldman 
     Sachs estimates that the deficit will linger around 4%. 
 
  ¶30.  The German Finance Ministry differs.  It hopes 
     that income tax cuts combined with structural reforms 
     and structural budget consolidation through subsidy 
     reductions will give a boost to economic growth to 
     around the Finance Ministry's assumption of 2%.  This 
     should help push the deficit toward the 3% level. 
 
  ¶31.  This strategy is risky, in the view of a senior 
     ECB official.  The income tax cuts may be pocketed by 
     politicians without making the important structural 
     reforms and subsidy cuts.  Finance Ministry officials 
     admit that there are risks.  It is a package deal - no 
     structural reforms or subsidy cuts - then no income tax 
     cuts in 2004.  Success would be a "great step forward." 
     Failure would be "catastrophic," in the words of a 
     senior Finance Ministry official.  Miss America on your 
     arm or egg on your face. 
 
  ¶32.  Under the SGP rules, German Finance Ministry 
     officials say they will argue "letter" and "spirit." 
     Like the case of the Portuguese, they will argue that 
     not realizing their assumed growth projections and the 
     prolonged economic stagnation are  "special 
     circumstances" that have prevented correction of the 
     deficit by 2004.  As noted above, this phrase is 
     undefined.  German Finance Ministry officials hope the 
     Commission will exercise some discretion.  German 
     Finance Ministry officials explain that they will keep 
     to the commitment of an average annual reduction of its 
     structural deficit of 0.5%, with a pause in 2004, due 
     to the income tax cuts, rather than in 2005 when these 
     cuts were originally scheduled to be implemented. 
 
  ¶33.  With respect to "spirit," Ministry officials say 
     they will point out that the government followed 
     Ecofin's recommendation to stick to their 2003 
     reduction plan, e.g. reduction of the structural 
     deficit by nearly 1%.  Rather than boosting confidence, 
     as the Commission and ECB had suggested it might, 
     confidence languished.  The announced program of 
     structural reforms and bringing forward the tax cuts 
     has provided the sweetener to push through subsidy cuts 
     envisaged in the budget consolidation program.  The 
     idea of advancing the income tax cuts, they will argue, 
     is to bolster confidence while keeping their 
     commitments to Ecofin to cut the deficit over time and 
     undertake structural reforms.  After all, getting below 
     the 3% reference value depends as much on the 
     denominator as the numerator, that is, on growth as 
     much as the absolute size of the deficit. 
 
  ¶34.  Commission officials privately are not convinced 
     by the "special circumstances" arguments.  In a speech 
     in Berlin on July 1 European Commissioner Solbes was 
     "quite clear": "the Commission expects that Germany 
     will respect the EMU policy framework.  A general 
     government deficit above 3% of GDP in 2004, for the 
     third year in a row, would be incompatible with our 
     common budgetary rules." 
  ¶35.  At the conclusion of the Fund's Article IV 
     Consultation with German authorities, the Fund mission 
     expressed support for the strategy of packaging 
     structural reforms, budget consolidation through 
     reduced expenditures, and advancing income tax cuts. 
     The mission conceded, however, that advancing the 
     income tax cuts "will make the fiscal arithmetic for 
     2004 difficult," and that getting below the 3% 
     reference value will "be a challenge" in 2004.  But 
     overall, the mission sensed that "the prospect for 
     meaningful structural change is finally in the air. If 
     proposed reforms are implemented and fiscal 
     consolidation put on firmer ground, we are optimistic 
     that Germany's economy can put a long period of weak 
     performance behind it."  Testimony on behalf of 
     Germany. 
 
  ¶36.  The first indications of the budget for 2004 will 
     be in the budget plan to be agreed by the end of this 
     year in Germany.  If the budget plan has a deficit of 
     3% for 2004, perhaps with the help of "aggressive 
     assumptions" on growth and revenues, the first real 
     evidence of actual results will appear only in 
     September 2004 when Eurostat publishes its preliminary 
     estimates.  Final figures for 2004 will be available 
     only in March 2005.  On each of these dates, the 
     Commission could launch a report with recommendations 
     to Ecofin. 
 
  France:  Unique, naturalement 
 
  ¶37.  In June Ecofin determined that France had an 
     excessive deficit.  They recommended that the French 
     authorities (a) put an end to the excessive deficit as 
     rapidly as possible and by "2004 at the latest;" (b) 
     achieve a "significantly larger improvement in the 
     cyclically adjusted deficit in 2003 than currently 
     planned," and (c) implement measures to ensure that the 
     cumulative improvement in 2003-2004 is enough to bring 
     the nominal deficit "below 3% in 2004 at the latest." 
     Ecofin noted the commitment of French authorities to 
     ensure tighter control of expenditures and to achieve 
     pension reform. 
 
  ¶38.  As reported septel, this decision was not 
     supported unanimously, the Dutch and the Danes 
     dissenting.  Ecofin had issued an "early warning" to 
     the French in January calling for "at least 0.5 
     percentage point of GDP" improvement in its cyclically- 
     adjusted budgetary position.  In March the French 
     government's official forecast showed only a 0.1 
     percentage point improvement.  It seemed that the 
     French had not taken to heart Ecofin's earlier 
     recommendation. 
 
  ¶39.  Reiterating the call for a 0.5 percentage point 
     cut in June when half the budget year was over seemed 
     unrealistic, according to Commission experts.  Thus, 
     the formula was agreed that there should be an average 
     reduction of 0.5 percentage points annually over the 
     two years, 2003-2004.  This suggests a one percentage 
     point cut in 2004. Moreover, Commission experts expect 
     the French deficit to be close to 4% of GDP in 2003. 
     Thus, a percentage point reduction in the deficit would 
     be necessary in 2004 in any case.  Commission staff 
     consider such a deep cut problematic.  German Finance 
     officials consider it the maximum possible. 
 
  ¶40.  The next step for France will come on October 3. 
     Under the SGP rules, this will be the four month 
     deadline by which time French authorities must explain 
     the measures they will take to comply with Ecofin's 
     recommendations.  This will be a time of testing of 
     whether France is serious about respecting the SGP, at 
     least on paper. 
 
  ¶41.  German Finance Ministry officials, while quick to 
     emphasize their wonderful working relationship with 
     France, just as quickly distinguish their position on 
     the SGP from France's.  They assert that they are 
     sticking by the rules, if not the letter at least the 
     spirit.  In their view, France is doing neither. 
 
  ¶42.  The IMF also has supported the French Government's 
     basic economic strategy, in particular "the structural 
     orientation of policies and the intention to resume 
     fiscal adjustment." In its Article IV Consultation 
     Concluding Statement issued in June, the IMF mission 
     praised the legislation of the "key and difficult 
     milestone" of pension reform.  The Fund notes that the 
     2003 deficit will be more than one percentage point 
     higher than planned and supports the objective of 
     reducing the underlying general government budget 
     deficit by 0.5 percentage points in 2004.  Such a 
     modest reduction would not be in line with Ecofin's 
     recommendation. 
 
  ¶43.  The Fund mission goes on to point out that the 
     "credibility of the government's fiscal and economic 
     policy strategy hinges crucially on its ability to 
     reduce the share of public spending in GDP."  Notably, 
     it points out that priority structural areas identified 
     by the government for reform (pension, health care, 
     reform of the state, and decentralization) will help 
     reduce expenditures as a share of GDP and "illustrate 
     the synergies between budgetary reform and possible 
     increases in potential growth."  Here, as in the case 
     of Germany and Portugal, is the connection between 
     fiscal discipline, structural reforms and growth.  An 
     argument that France is operating within the "spirit" 
     of the SGP.  Moreover, France could argue that its past 
     growth rates and debt position suggest that its deficit 
     is sustainable - at least for a while - and not putting 
     pressure on the euro system. 
 
  Growth and the SGP 
 
  ¶44.  The stated objective of the SGP is "sound 
     government finances as a means of strengthening the 
     conditions for price stability and for strong 
     sustainable growth conducive to employment creation." 
     This suggests that discretionary fiscal policies should 
     be avoided so as not to burden monetary policy, and 
     foster low interest rates that are conducive to long- 
     term planning and investment.  For most EU countries 
     this means cutting expenditures to achieve a more 
     sustainable level of debt or to avoid increased in debt 
     in order to ensure its sustainability when increased 
     expenditures become unavoidable due to aging 
     populations. 
 
  ¶45.  In its June 2003 report on "Public Finances in the 
     EMU," the Commission notes that budgetary consolidation 
     "often acts as a catalyst for structural reforms." 
     Structural reforms can boost growth and growth 
     potential.  As the Commission notes in that report, 
     "the effect of budgetary consolidation on output could 
     be reinforced, and even positive, in the short-run if 
     fiscal consolidation is combined with structural reform 
     of factor and product markets and accompanied with an 
     accommodating monetary stance." 
 
  ¶46.  So that's the deal for growth: budget 
     consolidation, structural reform, accommodative 
     monetary policy.  Interest rates are at record lows. 
     Pressure has grown for structural reforms due to budget 
     pressures.  It would be more than a pity to relieve 
     that pressure now.   No wonder Dutch Finance Minister 
     Zalm, noted for his tough stance on deficits, has 
     called for fines for France and Germany if they fail to 
     get their finances in order next year. 
 
  ¶47.  How could flexibility be applied without 
     sacrificing the rules? One point is that when Ecofin 
     made its recommendations for all three countries, the 
     Commission's and ECB's forecast was for much more 
     robust growth than has occurred.  Thus, the rising 
     deficits could be due, in part, to cyclical factors. 
     In November 2002 the European Commission agreed to give 
     importance to cyclically adjusted budget balances in 
     its surveillance and ensure a cyclically-adjusted 
     budget position of at least 0.5% of GDP and more 
     emphasis on the quality of public expenditures that are 
     conducive to growth and employment. 
 
  ¶48.  The IMF Mission on Euro Area policies has praised 
     these measures.  Specifically the Fund staff liked the 
     notion that countries with excessive deficits make 
     adjustments of at least 0.5% of GDP per year in 
     cyclically adjusted terms and that multi-year 
     consolidation plans should aim at curbing expenditures. 
     The Fund staff admits, however, that these steps will 
     not ensure deficits drop immediately below 3%. 
     Nonetheless, they argue that those countries that 
     follow these guidelines of "0.5 percent high quality 
     multi-year adjustment" should be "considered on a 
     sustainable path toward compliance with the Pact." 
     Striving to do good should be good enough. 
 
  ¶49.  Maintaining a judicious balance between enforcing 
     the letter of the SGP while safeguarding the spirit 
     will be the next challenge for the Commission and 
     Ecofin.  No one said that coordinating 12 national 
     budgets during a prolonged economic downturn would be 
     easy. 
 
 
  ¶50.  This cable coordinated with Embassies Berlin, 
     Lisbon, Paris, Rome, the Hague and USEU Brussels. 
 
(U) POC: James Wallar, Treasury Representative, e-mail 
wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49-(69)-7535-2431, fax 49- 
(69)-7535-2238. 
 
  Herrman