This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 08-20-13 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER PHUM CE NO FR LTTE
SUBJECT:  No movement regarding Tiger camp, as GSL 
reviews next steps; Tensions spike in the east 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1425, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge' 
d'Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  There has been no movement regarding 
the unauthorized Tiger camp in the east.  As the 
Norwegian facilitators continue to work on the issue, 
key ministers are giving us differing views on the 
possibility that the GSL may use force to try to resolve 
matters.  In other peace track developments, tensions 
have spiked in the east with Muslims blaming the Tigers 
for a rash of recent killings.  As the Tigers head to 
Paris to review the government's proposal for governing 
the north/east, the on-the-ground situation is growing 
increasingly fractious.  END SUMMARY. 
 
=================== 
No Movement on Camp 
=================== 
 
¶2.  (C) There has been no movement regarding the 
unauthorized Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
camp located in Trincomalee District in the east. 
According to reports from the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM), which has ruled that the LTTE's presence 
in the area violates the February 2002 ceasefire accord 
(see Reftels), the "Wan Ela" camp is still occupied by 
LTTE personnel.  The SLMM regularly sends patrols to the 
area of the camp, which is located in Kinniya near 
Trincomalee city, but has detected no change in the 
camp's setup.  Tomas Stangeland, a Norwegian Embassy 
poloff, told us on August 20 that the GoN continues to 
raise the issue with the LTTE, urging the group to 
comply fully with the SLMM's ruling.  Stangeland related 
that his embassy's latest communication with the Tigers 
had taken place on August 19 and had not yielded any 
sign that the group planned to dismantle the camp 
anytime soon.  Stangeland exhibited a high degree of 
exasperation with the LTTE's intransigence over the 
issue, but said he hoped the Tigers would reconsider 
their hard-line stance at their upcoming meeting in 
Paris (see Para five). 
 
==================== 
GSL Mulls Next Steps 
==================== 
 
¶3.  (C) As the camp issue continues to simmer, key 
ministers involved in peace process issues are giving us 
differing views on the possibility that the Sri Lankan 
government may use force to try to resolve matters.  In 
an August 18 meeting, Milinda Moragoda, Minister of 
Economic Reforms, told the Charge' that the government 
is losing patience with the LTTE's refusal to vacate the 
camp.  Moragoda stated that the GSL "reserved the right 
for military action," but that any move would not take 
place until September, if then.  He went on to state 
that if any action was taken it would be a "police 
action," with the military in a supporting role if 
needed.  Moragoda described himself as somewhat 
"hawkish" on the issue, much more, he said, than Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe.  With Moragoda's threat to use 
force still ringing in his ears, the Charge' heard a 
contrary view of the issue in a conversation with 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs G.L. Peiris later on 
August 18.  When queried about the camp issue and the 
GSL's reaction, Peiris -- who generally takes a "soft" 
stance re the LTTE -- replied that there was "no way" 
the government would undertake a police or military 
action to expel the LTTE from the camp since such a move 
could trigger a quick return to general hostilities. 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked about the GSL's somewhat confused stance 
on the camp, Stangeland remarked that his impression was 
that the government was seriously mulling over what to 
do, but had taken no decision to use force.  Stangeland 
said he hoped the GSL abstained from force as "the 
situation could really get out of hand if there was a 
land confrontation" between the two sides. 
(Note:  Since the peace process began in December 2001, 
there has been no serious military confrontation between 
the two sides on land.  There have been several deadly 
confrontations at sea, however.) 
 
=============== 
Tigers to Paris 
=============== 
 
¶5.  (C) Amid the continuing tensions over the camp, a 
Tiger delegation left Colombo for Paris early August 20 
to attend a Norwegian-facilitated conference focusing on 
the government's recent north/east interim arrangement 
proposal.  Stangeland confirmed that S.P. Thamilchelvam, 
the LTTE's political chief, was the head of the Tiger 
delegation.  Karuna, the LTTE military chief in the 
east, was also on the delegation.  In Paris, the LTTE 
team will meet up with pro-LTTE Tamils from Canada, the 
UK, Australia, the U.S., etc., who are also attending 
the conference.  It is not certain whether chief LTTE 
negotiator Anton Balasingham will participate. 
Stangeland said the meeting was slated to begin on 
August 21 and last for about a week.  Norwegian 
facilitators were set to participate in the last couple 
of days of the conference, he noted. 
 
========================== 
Tensions Spike in the East 
========================== 
 
¶6.  (C) In other peace track developments, tensions have 
spiked in the east, with Muslims blaming the Tigers for 
four recent killings.  The Tigers have not accepted 
responsibility for the slayings of the Muslims, although 
most observers believe they are to blame.  Details of 
the killings follow: 
 
-- On August 13, two Muslim postal workers were shot and 
killed near Trincomalee city.  In protest, Muslims 
sponsored hartals (work stoppages) throughout the 
Eastern Province and the situation was described by 
contacts as "very tense."  Following the killings, two 
Muslims were abducted near Trincomalee city by suspected 
LTTE militants on August 16, but were later released. 
 
-- On August 17, two Muslim farmers were shot and killed 
in Samanthurai town in Ampara district.  In protest, 
Muslims sponsored more hartals, as well as rallies and 
demonstrations throughout the east. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Reacting to the spike in communal tensions, 
the GSL sent additional military units to the east. 
Police units were also dispatched following an incident 
on August 16 in which four police officers were injured 
as they tried to disperse an angry mob near Mutur, a 
Muslim-dominated town in the east.  Police imposed a 
dusk-to-dawn curfew in Mutur and at some other sites 
along the eastern coast. 
 
¶8.  (C) Muslim politicians have expressed outrage about 
the killings.  Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader 
and Minister of Ports Rauf Hakeem rushed to the east on 
August 18 to assess the situation.  Hakeem said the 
government was not doing enough to protect Muslims and 
urged it to do more to restrain the LTTE.  Addressing 
reporters on August 19, Hakeem stated that "the LTTE is 
trying to intimidate Muslims and make them servile." 
Hakeem further noted that his future support for the 
governing coalition would be conditional on Muslim 
representation as a separate participant in any peace 
talks with the LTTE that take place.  (In the past, 
Muslims participated in the talks as members of the 
government's delegation.)  In other Muslim reaction, 
Ferial Ashraff, head of the National Unity Alliance 
(NUA) party and a MP with close links to President 
Kumaratunga, ominously demanded that the government take 
action before Muslim youths were compelled to take up 
arms against the LTTE. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶9.  (C) It is encouraging news that the Tigers are 
meeting in Paris at such a high level to review the 
government's north/east administration proposal.  The 
Tigers have seemed to go out of their way to flag their 
interest in the proposal and their possible interest in 
returning to the face-to-face talks.  All of this seems 
to be a net positive for the peace process.  As 
witnessed by the unresolved camp issue, the killings of 
the Muslims in the east, and the larger issues of LTTE 
assassinations of Tamil opponents, however, the on-the- 
ground situation is growing increasingly fractious, with 
the cumulative weight of the Tigers' nasty behavior 
steadily adding up.  Although support for the peace 
track remains strong among the general public, patience 
with the Tigers will inevitably sail downward if they 
fail to curb the violence and aggressive behavior.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE