This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  08-14-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  No breakthroughs in meeting with Tigers, but 
Norwegian facilitators emerge with some confidence 
 
Refs:  (A) Oslo 1645 (Notal) 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1419, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge' 
d'Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.   (C) SUMMARY:  In an August 13 meeting with the 
Charge', Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim and Norwegian 
Ambassador Brattskar said the atmospherics of their 
meeting with the Tigers earlier that day had been 
positive.  They said they had discussed the Tigers' 
upcoming meeting in Paris.  Re contentious matters, the 
Tigers reiterated that they had no plans to vacate a 
base in the east and denied involvement in a spate of 
killings of Tamil opponents.  Queried by Charge' about a 
Japanese MFA document setting out possible next steps 
post-Tokyo, the GoN side said they continued to review 
it, but saw some problems.  Although the meeting with 
the Tigers did not lead to any breakthroughs, the 
Norwegians seemed relatively optimistic about the state 
of the peace track.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Norwegians meet with the Tigers 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Late August 13, the Charge' (accompanied by 
polchief) met with Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim, 
who is on an August 12-15 visit to Sri Lanka, and 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka Hans Brattskar.  The focus of 
the discussion was the Norwegians' meeting earlier in 
the day with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the political chief of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Solheim 
said the atmospherics of the two hour meeting, which had 
taken place in the LTTE administrative center of 
Kilinochchi in the north, had been quite positive. 
Thamilchelvam, as is his customary style, had been 
professional and polite, listening keenly to the 
Norwegians.  He seemed serious and businesslike, even 
when the GoN team raised contentious issues.  Based on 
what he had heard, Solheim said he felt that the LTTE 
appeared committed to cooperating with the facilitation 
effort and moving forward with the peace process. 
Solheim confirmed he would travel to Batticaloa District 
in the east on August 14 to assess the situation there. 
 
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Upcoming meeting in Paris 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) With respect to the substance of the discussions 
with Thamilchelvam, Solheim related that the first item 
on the agenda was the Tigers' upcoming meeting in Paris 
(see Reftels).  The meeting was slated to begin on or 
about August 20 (there are reports the dates could slip 
by a week or so) and would continue for about 10 days. 
About 20 Tamils were scheduled to attend, with 
participants roughly split between those from the LTTE, 
led by Thamilchelvam himself, and those from outside Sri 
Lanka, including one from the U.S.  (Note:  We think 
this was a reference to V. Rudrakumar, a pro-LTTE lawyer 
based in the U.S.)  The French government, Solheim said, 
was only providing visas for the meeting and nothing 
else.  The Norwegian embassy in Paris was still scouting 
for a suitable venue for the meeting and it would 
probably take place in the city's suburbs.  Solheim said 
he might participate in the latter stages of the meeting 
per a request he had received from the LTTE.  Brattskar 
said he might also travel to Paris if his schedule 
allowed it. 
 
¶4.  (C) Solheim and Brattskar confirmed that the Paris 
meeting's focus would be on constitutional/legal issues. 
Specifically, the participants in the meeting were 
supposed to come up with ideas on how the LTTE should 
respond to the GSL's recent proposal setting out 
possible modalities of forming a Tiger-dominated interim 
administration in the north/east.  Counter-proposals 
agreed to at the meeting would then be taken to the LTTE 
leadership in northern Sri Lanka for review.  The LTTE 
would then get in touch with the Norwegians who, in 
turn, would pass the finally agreed on LTTE set of 
counter-proposals to the government.  Solheim expressed 
confidence that the LTTE would put forward a written 
document rather than just rejecting or finding fault 
with the government's proposal.  Brattskar, who said the 
LTTE's counter-proposals would probably be "tough, but 
manageable," estimated that this whole process could 
take several weeks.  While there were no guarantees and 
many things could happen, Brattskar continued, it was 
possible that GSL-LTTE talks could resume in the October 
timeframe. 
 
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Tigers hold the line on base in east 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to an issue that has raised tensions in 
recent weeks, Solheim confirmed that he had urged the 
LTTE to dismantle its "Wan Ela" base near Trincomalee in 
the Eastern Province.  Solheim said he had underlined 
that the situation was proving an embarrassment for the 
facilitation effort and the monitors.  In response, 
Thamilchelvam said the Tigers were fully committed to 
adhering to the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM).  The Tigers, however, felt strongly that 
the SLMM's ruling regarding the base was wrong.  The 
base, in fact, had not been constructed in government- 
held territory recently and thus did not violate the 
February 2002 ceasefire accord as the SLMM had ruled. 
The base, Thamilchelvam asserted, had actually been 
there for many years and LTTE "martyrs'" graves were 
located in the vicinity of the site.  For these reasons, 
Thamilchelvam said, the LTTE's local commanders did not 
want to give up the base. 
 
¶6.  (C) Reflecting on Thamilchelvam's comments, Solheim 
remarked that he thought the Tigers' stance on the base 
issue was a hard one.  That said, Thamilchelvam had 
indicated that he would take the Norwegians' request for 
the LTTE to dismantle the base back to LTTE leader V. 
Prabhakaran for further review.  Solheim told the 
Charge' that there did not seem to be any "strategic" 
reason the Tigers had to hold onto the site.  This might 
mean that maybe there was some way the LTTE could 
gradually climb down from its hard-line stance and find 
a "creative way" to vacate the base in the near-term. 
In any case, he commented, the Norwegians would continue 
to work on the issue with the LTTE, hoping that 
continuous interventions would have some constructive 
effect on Tiger thinking. 
 
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Issue of Killings 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The two Norwegians told the Charge' they also 
had bearded Thamilchelvam on the dozens of killings of 
Tamils perpetrated by the LTTE over the past year.  As 
the group has on multiple occasions, Brattskar said 
Thamilchelvam denied any Tiger culpability in the 
killings.  He blamed other anti-LTTE Tamil groups for 
what had transpired and said the government needed to do 
a better job of investigating the crimes.  Brattskar 
said the Norwegian side had underlined that the killings 
were doing serious damage to the Tigers' reputation in 
the international community and raising distrust of the 
peace track in the south.  Solheim added that the LTTE 
had stopped other forms of terrorist activities in the 
past two years, such as suicide bombings, so there was 
hope that the group would eventually abandon the 
practice of assassinating its opponents.  Norway would 
continue to raise the issue with the LTTE every time it 
could, he stressed. 
--------------------- 
Japanese MFA Document 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Shifting gears, the Charge' asked Solheim and 
Brattskar for the GoN's view of a document drafted by 
the Japanese MFA setting out possible next steps post- 
Tokyo donors conference.  (Note:  This document was 
class e-mailed to SA/INS and analyzed in Ref B.) 
Brattskar stated that Oslo had not yet finished its 
review of the document.  Brattskar noted that he had 
expressed unhappiness with a clause mentioning 
"monitoring and review" of the progress of the peace 
process when he was provided the document by Japanese 
MFA official Takio Yamada last week.  Such a review did 
not seem necessary, he said.  Other aspects of the 
document also needed to be better defined.  Brattskar 
went on to indicate that he thought the Japanese were 
being a bit clumsy, and there needed to be further 
clarification of the exact responsibilities of Norway 
and Japan on peace process issues.  Nonetheless, 
Brattskar and Solheim emphasized that the GoN 
appreciated Japan's efforts and its desire to take on a 
more important role internationally.  Norway also 
understood that Japan was the largest donor to Sri Lanka 
and deserved a special role.  Brattskar said he planned 
to speak to Japanese Ambassador Seiichiro Otsuka about 
the document once the latter returned from vacation. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Although the meeting with the Tigers did not lead 
to any breakthroughs, the Norwegians seemed relatively 
optimistic about the state of the peace track.  Their 
basic focus, which seems sensible to us, is to work all 
the angles possible to try to get the LTTE back to the 
direct talks.  Without the talks, there is little doubt 
that tensions on-the-ground, such as over the base in 
the east, become that much harder to deal with. 
Solheim, who has a lot of experience with the LTTE, 
seemed to think that the group still wanted to play ball 
despite its stance on the base and the killings of Tamil 
opponents.  That is good news, though the Norwegians -- 
correctly in our view -- underscored that the situation 
remained fragile.  The Charge' expressed our support for 
the Norwegian facilitation effort, noting that we were 
committed to helping anyway we could.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE