R 221843Z AUG 03
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2646
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
NSC WASHDC
USCINCSO MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002865 
 
 
NSC FOR TSHANNON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER VE
SUBJECT: WILL THE REAL FBL PLEASE STAND UP? 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 01261 
     ¶B. CARACAS 02520 
     ¶C. CARACAS 02233 
     ¶D. CARACAS 01567 
     ¶E. CARACAS 02586 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES S. SHAPIRO FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) An August 8 Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL) press 
release asserted that the group defended Venezuela's 
sovereignty by attacking the Colombian National Liberation 
Army (ELN) July 31. Tachira state media, ranchers, and law 
enforcement officials told poloff August 5 and 6 that the 
expanding FBL are mostly to blame for an increase in 
kidnappings, which are becoming more violent, political, and 
urban, while opposition leaders allege links between the GOV 
and the FBL. Pro-GOV National Assembly Deputy Luis Tascon 
denied any GOV/FBL connection to poloff August 13. End 
Summary. 
 
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Where's the love? ELN Feuding with FBL 
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¶2. (C) In an August 8 press release, the Bolivarian 
Liberation Forces (FBL) confirmed that its troops battled an 
ELN column July 31 to "defend Venezuelan territory" in 
western Apure state. They claimed the battle resulted in one 
wounded FBL fighter and five ELN casualties. The FBL rejected 
the allegation by unidentified military sources in an August 
10 La Nacion story that "this battle is a product of a 
territorial dispute (for) extortion fees from Apure, Tachira, 
and Barinas ranchers." The release also claimed the ELN is 
blaming their kidnappings on the FBL and making alliances 
with "enemies of the Bolivarian revolutionary process," such 
as Apure Governor Luis Lippa, San Cristobal Mayor William 
Mendez, and Guasdualito Mayor Jesus Rojas. The accused 
officials have denied the claim. Lippa told all-news channel 
Globovision August 11 that he suspected the charges were 
"smoke and mirrors." 
 
¶3. (C) San Cristobal Police Chief Leonardo Iribarren told 
poloff August 6 that terrorist groups had previously 
respected each others turf as "leftist brothers," but this 
respect is breaking down, largely the fault of the FBL's 
"disregard for business." La Nacion newspaper president Max 
Vasquez asserted the animosity springs from an increasingly 
cozy FBL relationship with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and FBL intrusion into the ELN's extortion, 
kidnapping, and black market ventures. Vasquez claimed 
Colombian groups resent the attention the FBL's increased and 
sloppy kidnappings are generating. Tachira Businessman and 
Democratic Coordinating Committee (DCC) leader David Rubio 
told poloff August 5 that trouble has been brewing between 
the ELN and FBL at least since December. The assassination of 
GOV-aligned Fatherland For All (PPT) party and alleged FBL 
leader Jorge Nieves April 26 was payback for cutting into the 
ELN's black market gasoline trade, according to Rubio (ref 
A). 
 
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The FBL's Expanding Network 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Vasquez said conflicts among terrorist groups are 
inevitable as the FBL grows in strength and operational area. 
He estimated the core group of 2,000 to 3,000 based in south 
Tachira and west Apure states is being augmented by a new 
group of at least 30 to 40 around the La Fria/La Grita area. 
(Note: FBL size is wildly speculated. DAO sources have 
estimates ranging from 200 to 2,000.) Machiques Mayor Alfonso 
Marquez told poloff August 6 the FARC and a new FBL group are 
in the early stages of partnership to transport drugs across 
the border near Machiques, Zulia state. He said the FARC 
established a cocaine laboratory last year on the Venezuelan 
side of the border that is operated at least partially by the 
FBL. He explained that Colombian military success was 
beginning to force a small amount of the FARC's narcotic 
refinement and production across the border. 
 
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FBL: New Kidnappers on the Block 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Vasquez said more kidnappings had occurred in Tachira 
by August 4 (32) than all of 2003 (29). He claimed the FBL is 
rightfully receiving the blame for the increase, adding that 
troubling trends in kidnapping methods have accompanied the 
new group's three year ascent: 
--Political motives. The highly publicized July 25 kidnapping 
of former Tachira Governor and Christian Democrat (COPEI) 
leader Sergio Omar Calderon was a political, not an economic, 
crime, he asserted (ref B). Vasquez said at least three other 
kidnappings during the past year may also be politically 
motivated because victims had political connections and owned 
only small farms, not the large estate ranches that are 
typical targets. He suspected a deliberate attempt to "send a 
signal" that no member of old order is safe. 
--Proximity to cities. Most kidnappings still occur in remote 
locations, but an increasing number are occurring closer to 
cities, even within city limits. 
--Disguised. Dario Brillenburg was kidnapped from Zulia July 
31 after his driver stopped for a police check. Terrorists 
disguised as National Guardsmen beat the driver and took 
Brillenburg. Police uniforms have also been used. 
 
¶6. (C) Association of Tachira Ranchers (ASOGATA) President 
Genaro Mendez told poloff August 6 that ranchers used to pay 
extortion to a single group, but now many pay multiple groups 
and still get kidnapped. Another kidnapping trend is for 
common criminals to impersonate terrorist groups (Similar to 
an alleged scam in Apure, ref C). The National Guard and 
CICPC uncovered a ploy masterminded by a rancher's secretary 
to extort 12 million Bolivars using the name of fictitious 
FARC commander, according to Mendez. Police Chief Iribarren 
said extortions and kidnappings were largely confined to 
large ranchers out of his jurisdiction, but over the past 
three years San Cristobal businesses had been increasingly 
targeted with the advent of the FBL. 
 
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Alleged Links to GOV 
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¶7. (C) Vasquez and Tachira DCC leaders asserted that the GOV 
has links with the FBL. They claimed, for example, that the 
FBL is using a farm between Coloncito and La Tendida that is 
allegedly visited by high-ranking GOV officials as a training 
camp. DCC leader Jose Luis Rincon alleged that Infrastructure 
Minister Diosdado Cabello purchased the farm with state funds 
from Banco Industrial de Venezuela through an intermediary 
two years ago. GOV-aligned National Assembly Deputy Luis 
Tascon (MVR) vehemently denied any government support of the 
FBL to poloff August 13. He demanded "liars trying to provoke 
a coup" produce evidence of supposed FBL connections. He said 
if any links exist with individual GOV officials, they are 
not reflective of the GOV or President Chavez's Fifth 
Republic Movement (MVR) party, which "do not recognize or 
respect any irregular military group." Tascon said he could 
not speak for the pro-GOV PPT party. 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (C) Increasingly active and publicized, the FBL is making 
it difficult for GOV officials to deny its existence. It is, 
however, a group whose nascent and illicit character make it 
difficult to define from basics as to its size to definition 
of alleged links to the GOV of the FARC. 
Shapiro 
 
 
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