This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/13 
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PHUM LI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ECOWAS EXSEC CHAMBAS SAYS OBASANJO 
IS FIRM ON TAYLOR DEPARTURE 
 
Classified By Charge Dawn Liberi. Reasons 1.5 (b) AND (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During an August 5 conversation with 
Charge, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed Chambas 
said President Obasanjo affirmed that Charles Taylor 
would be evicted from Liberia if he refused to leave 
willingly.  However, Chambas characterized Taylor as 
conflicted, pulled by his expansive ambitions and a 
chorus of bellegerent hardliners on one hand versus 
the pragmatic tones of the small band of GOL moderates 
on the other.  Although still voicing a commitment to 
leave Liberia, Taylor had recently raised concern that 
details of his departure-accommodation, size of his 
coterie, and the fate of his personal effects-needed 
to be finalized before he embarked on his last flight 
from Liberia.  Chambas planned to travel to Conakry on 
August 7 to asked President Conte to make sure LURD 
remained on its best behavior, given the ongoing 
ECOMIL deployment.  The process of finalizing a peace 
agreement was moving forward; LURD and MODEL seemed to 
be approaching the realization that control of the 
transitional arrangement will be beyond their grasp. 
His August 5 letter to Secretary Powell was not asking 
for significant deployment of American troops but only 
a small number of troops to Robertsfield Airport and 
Freeport to show that America supported ECOMIL.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
-------------- 
TAYLOR MUST GO 
-------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Weathering the rigors of his job and the 
Liberia crisis, a relaxed ExecSec Chambas told Charge 
that he had met President Obasanjo August 5. 
President Obasanjo iterated that Taylor would leave 
Liberia voluntarily or involuntarily, but go he must. 
Although Obasanjo had not given Taylor a specific 
time, Chambas felt Obasanjo would give him a deadline 
soon.  Becoming uncharacteristically stern, Chambas 
asserted ECOWAS realized that its troops would be in 
an uncommodious position if Taylor did not leave. 
LURD and MODEL would suspect the ECOWAS deployment was 
a guise for protecting Taylor and they would be 
itching to assault Monrovia once again.  If Taylor put 
ECOWAS in this vise, Obasanjo would retract the asylum 
offer and Taylor would be left to his fate, Chambas 
sounded. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
TAYLOR: TALKING WITH TWO TONGUES 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Recounting his meeting in Monrovia with Taylor 
and the Ghanaian and Nigerian Foreign Ministers, 
Chambas recalled Taylor confirming that he would 
announce his intent to resign an August 7 and promised 
to fulfill that intention in an August 11 handover to 
Vice President Blah.  Chambas stressed, however, that 
Taylor failed to state he would leave by August 11. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Instead, Taylor raised logistical concerns 
about the quality of accommodation awaiting him, the 
number of people he could take and the disposition of 
his vast inventory of personal property.  Neither 
Chambas nor the two foreign ministers could assure 
Taylor but they got the distinct impression that they 
had just witnessed a masterful display of 
procrastination. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Chambas surmised that internal conflict within 
Taylor's inner circle as well as Taylor's inflated 
powerlust were the main ingredients in his 
temporizing.  While moderates were warning that the 
clock was soon to strike twelve, hardliners such as 
Benjamin Yeates and J.T. Richardson were warning 
Taylor that he should not leave them in Liberia. 
Chambas was warned that if Taylor remained in Liberia 
after the final handover to Blah, the hardliners would 
increase their influence over Taylor, convincing him 
to try to remain. 
 
 
¶6. (C) To lessen the influence of these elements, 
Chambas hoped that Taylor could be convinced to leave 
immediately after the planned August 11 resignation 
ceremony.  Presidents Chissano (as AU Chairman), 
Kufuor and Eyadema planned to attend.  With these 
Heads of State present, the extremists in Taylor's 
camp will be on their best behavior; this would be the 
best chance to escort Taylor out with a modicum of 
difficulty.  Chambas added that Taylor's reluctance to 
leave was reinforced by his lack of desire to settle 
in Nigeria.  At one point, Taylor had suggested 
Burkina Faso as a better site but President Kufuor, as 
ECOWAS Chairman, quickly stuck a pin in that idea. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
DEPLOYMENT - ALL WELL SO FAR 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Chambas remarked Nibatt I's deployment was 
proceeding smooothly.  The LURD had not raised any 
obstacles.  Rumors that the GOL had contrived some 
incidents proved to be unfounded.  Still, Chambas was 
warried that LURD might misbehave.  Thus, he planned 
to visit Conakry to ask Conte to use his avuncular 
suasion to keep the LURD behaving responsibly. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Chambas added that current ECOWAS thinking was 
to deploy a force of only 2300 instead of 3000.  The 
make-up would be the two Nigerian battalions and a 
composite battalion from Ghana, Mali and Senegal. 
Regarding per diem for the force, Chambas explained 
that ECOWAS would be hardpressed to ask ECOMIL troops 
to accept less than their brother effectives in 
ECOMICI (Cote d'Ivoire) who were receiving 20 dollars 
a day plus 4 dollars for food.  He mentioned that the 
UN had expressed willingness to foot the soldiers' 
food bill.  Meanwhile, the UK had indicated it might 
give up to 3 million pounds to pay the per diem and 
for other soldier sustenance.  (Comment: In separate 
conversation between Charge and British High 
Commissioner, the latter indicated amount was more 
likely to be 1 million pounds.  End Comment).  Chambas 
mentioned the need for logistical support as well. 
ECOWAS was establishing a special account in EKO Bank 
in Ghana for donor contributions.  Additionally, 
Chambas stated ECOWAS would soon request the United 
States and perhaps the U.K. to second military 
procurement experts to help manage the use of proceeds 
from this fund. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
PEACE AGREEMENT ON TRACK, HOPEFULLY 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) Chambas was sanguine about the negotiations in 
Accra, commenting that the rival delegation has shown 
signs of increasing trust and compromise.  The GOL 
team had dropped its objections to the draft 
agreement, he noted.  LURD and MODEL were starting to 
soften their opposition to being excluded from the 
interim presidency or vice presidential slots(s). 
Another reason for going to Conakry was to persuade 
LURD Chairman Sekou Conneh to drop completely the 
LURD's official stance against the draft agreement. 
Chambas said that he might bring Conneh to Nigeria to 
confer with Obasanjo in hopes of convincing him that 
no one was against his political aspirations but that 
he must pursue them via elections and not as a down- 
payment for being a factional leader.  However, 
Chambas admitted that ECOWAS was still searching for a 
candidate, acceptable to all sides, to lead the 
interim government after October. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
ONLY A FEW GOOD AMERICAN MRN 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) Regarding his August 5 letter to Secretary 
Powell, ECOWAS believed an American presence at 
Robertsfield Airport and Monrovia's Freeport would 
help secure those important transportation facilities, 
easing the deployment of more peacekeepers and of 
humanitarian assistance.  Moreover, a visible American 
presence would sober the factions.  The LURD would be 
more willing to withdraw and the GOL less willing to 
exploit that withdrawal by trying to retake the 
facility.  Chambas elaborated that ECOWAS was not 
seeking a large American footprint in either location. 
He felt a noticeable yet minimal presence at both 
sites would serve the desired function, particularly 
if accompanied by regular fly-over by US military air 
assets. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Chambas was generally upbeat about the recent 
trajectory of events in Liberia.  The cease-fire was 
mostly holding, the deployment was finally underway 
and factional opposition to the peace process was 
diminishing.  However, Taylor's departure remained 
uncertain and Chambas is not under any illusion as to 
why.  He knows that the only time Taylor is not lying 
is when he is not talking.  Chambas realizes that 
ECOWAS must keep the diplomatic pressure, backed by 
the threat of arrest, on Taylor. 
 
 
LIBERI