This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TEGUCIGALPA 001581 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/ESPC, DRL/IL, EB/IFD/OMA 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CEN 
STATE PASS USTR FOR ANDREA GASH DURKIN 
TREASURY FOR C. KUSHLIS 
DOL FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2013 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV EAID ETRD ELAB HO EAGER
SUBJECT: IMF PROGRAM APPEARS IN REACH IF/IF GOH ADOPTS 
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM;  IS USG PUSH POSSIBLE? 
 
REF: A. (A) TEGUZ 865 
     ¶B. (B) TEGUZ 1141 
     ¶C. (C) TEGUZ 494 
     ¶D. (D) TEGUZ 10 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR L. PALMER FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D) 
 
-------------------------- 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) For its entire year and a half in office, the Maduro 
administration has struggled to reach agreement with the 
IMF on a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
program that will put Honduras back on a growth track and 
allow badly-needed permanent debt relief to resume.   With 
the April adoption of a second tax package that should 
increase tax receipts by USD 300 million annually, the GOH 
made a major step toward an IMF agreement.  World Bank and 
IDB approval of projects to strengthen the Honduran banking 
system is another important milestone.  In the context of 
work on the banking sector, the GOH has issued a long 
analytical report on the new agricultural credit program 
laying out a persuasive case that the law limits and 
rationalizes (rather than expands) subsidies provided for 
agricultural financing.  The most important requirement now 
for an IMF program is enactment of a Civil Service 
Framework Law that will put a brake on the unsustainable 
growth in the central government's wage bill.  The IMF 
 
is urging measures that, as part of the creation of a 
professional civil service, would fold in the public sector 
teachers and medical workers into a single civil service 
pay structure.   However, President Ricardo Maduro and his 
top political advisors fear that change to the special 
statutes governing teacher and doctor compensation will 
provoke a strong, adverse political reaction; the President 
has not yet approved the submission of the bill to Congress 
(where it would indeed face a stiff fight).  In the 
meantime, Honduras' failure to reach an IMF agreement has 
ended the technical deferral of Paris Club debt service 
payments, once again putting overdue loan payments to the 
U.S. into active status.  In late June, ExIm Bank took 
Honduras off-cover for public sector loans.  Lack of 
payment on overdue U.S. Department of Defense Loans in mid 
July and early September could trigger Brooke Amendment 
sanctions.  However, the GOH is not at liberty to pay only 
one official creditor under Paris Club rules. 
 
¶2. (C) Action Request: Maduro badly needs reassurance that 
(1) the civil service reforms (and the ensuing political 
fight) are indispensable, (2) the international community 
will support him if he does take this move, and (3) that an 
IMF agreement would likely be forthcoming quickly after 
passage of the law even if all IMF targets for reduction of 
the public sector wage bill are not completely met.  Given 
the importance of reaching an IMF agreement this summer, 
the critical nature of this long-awaited structural reform 
and the advances made in other areas, Post recommends a 
full court press by the Embassy and Washington agencies to 
provide this reassurance and urge that the Civil Service 
Framework Law (and the related elimination of the 
compensation provisions in the teachers and medical workers 
laws) be introduced to Congress immediately.  End Summary 
and Action Request. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Projections Show that Second Tax Bill Will Deliver Promised 
Revenue Increases 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶3. (C) As reported in ref A, on April 2, the Honduran 
Congress adopted a second fiscal package (the first was 
adopted in May 2002) designed to broaden the tax base, help 
reduce chronic budget deficits and move the government on 
the road to an IMF agreement.  Congress modified some 
politically difficult provisions in the government-proposal 
but increased taxes on tobacco and alcohol in order to 
replace the foregone income.  The target had been an annual 
increase of 3.5 billion lempiras (USD 202 million) - of 
which about 2 billion lempiras (USD 116 million) would be 
collected in the remaining months of 2003, but at the time 
of passage IMF staff were skeptical that these targets 
would be met by the revised bill. 
 
¶4. (C) Current GOH projections show that in fact the second 
tax bill should almost exactly meet its targets.  Tax 
revenue in 2003 is projected to rise from the baseline 
level of USD 1.1 billion (16. 0 percent of GDP) to the 
current 2003 projection of USD 1.23 billion  (17.5 percent 
of GDP) and then to USD 1.43 billion in 2004 (18.6 percent 
of GDP). 
 
¶5. (C) Combined with earlier austerity measures taken in 
2002 and 2003, the tax reforms should bring the central 
government's fiscal deficit down from 5.6 percent in 2002 
to an estimated 3.5 percent of GDP in 2003, as predicted. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Civil Service Law and Modification of Estatutos Still Key 
Sticking Point 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The most problematic issue remains: getting public 
sector wages under control.  The IMF mission has emphasized 
repeatedly the importance of enactment of a new civil 
service framework law that will provide the GOH with 
control over wage policy for all central government workers 
by superseding the salary provisions in the 
profession-specific laws (called estatutos) that were 
adopted in the mid-1980s.  The Fund has also urged the GOH 
to reduce the central government wage bill from 10.7 
percent to 10.1 percent of GDP in 2003 and reduce the wage 
bill of the entire public sector by one percent of GDP 
annually in 2004 and 2005. 
 
¶7. (C) Enactment of civil service reform was a key 
(unfulfilled) condition in the previous three-year PRGF 
agreement with the IMF, and has taken center stage in the 
negotiations that have been going on between the Fund and 
the GOH since early 2002.   Under the current regime, 
doctors and teachers have received high salary increases 
each year while non-unionized public sector workers have 
seen their salaries frozen.  The salary provisions in the 
teacher "estatuto" are particularly complex, with the 
various provisions on salary and benefits resulting in 
compensation increases at rates far above inflation.  This 
issue took on added saliency in July 2002 when the GOH 
reached an agreement with the majority of teachers to 
provide a 44 percent salary increase over four years 
(2002-2005), without affecting the concomitant increase in 
the benefits (called colaterales).   Among other aspects 
that rankled the IMF staff to no end, this agreement 
provided the teachers with two separate wage increases in 
¶2005. 
 
¶8. (C) As seen in previous Embassy reporting, the Maduro 
Administration has been promising to introduce the civil 
service bill for many months, but kept breaking that 
promise.  Behind the scenes, an intense debate was 
occurring over the extent to which teacher, doctor and 
nurse compensation would be covered by the new civil 
service rules.  The GOH wanted to include only the basic 
salary, while the IMF was adamant that all salary and 
benefits provisions in the "estatutos" would need to be 
eliminated if the law was to have its intended effect of 
reining in the growth of the wage bill.  The Fund staff 
also pushed for elimination of one of the scheduled teacher 
raises in 2005.  At the same time, the GOH was negotiating 
with the doctors to accept the revised pay structure. 
Although doctor and nurse salaries comprise only a small 
percentage of the government wage bill, their salary 
demands are so obviously out of line with regional norms 
that the GOH hoped they could be pressured (or shamed) into 
an agreement.  This strategy was not successful and the GOH has 
suspended negotiations for now. 
 
¶9. (C) Post understands that the IMF and the Finance 
Ministry have now worked out language for the Civil Service 
law that would eliminate all salary provisions in the 
teacher and medical worker statutes except for the hardship 
locality differential (called the zonaje) and the June and 
Christmas bonuses.  Teachers would be covered by the new 
law starting in June 2005 (allowing the government to avoid 
that second pay increase for 2005).  The law would call for 
establishment of civil service grades and pay scales within 
six months of enactment of the law.  Those government 
employees whose current salary exceeds the pay scale of 
their new civil service grade would forego future raises 
until such time as their salary was no longer above the 
cap. 
 
¶10. (C) This formulation for teacher compensation will be 
politically difficult to sell, but at least allows the 
government to avoid reducing any teacher salaries below 
their current level (almost inconceivable in the Honduran 
political climate).  The flip side is that maintenance of 
current teacher salary levels means that the government 
would have no room to provide any increases for other 
government workers in 2004.  This could mean a third year 
of a wage freeze for these other public sector workers, an 
unpalatable but probably necessary result of the current 
fiscal situation.  Low public sector salaries are one 
important cause of corruption and incompetence in GOH 
agencies. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
The Financial Sector and the Agricultural  Credits Law 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11. (C) In its Article IV review of Honduras, the IMF Board 
noted the importance of addressing the extreme fragility of 
the Honduran financial system.  In late June 2003, the 
World Bank adopted an USD 11 million loan to address the 
weaknesses identified in the recently concluded Financial 
Sector review (FSAP).   Comment:  This push to analyze and 
address the deep problems in the financial sector is a GOH 
initiative (specifically by the current Banking and 
Insurance Commission President Ana Cristina de Pereira). 
It is a complicated task, and the difficulty of the task 
should not be underestimated.  But, the Maduro 
administration is making a far more serious attempt than 
any previous Honduran government.  End Comment. 
 
¶12. (C) The GOH appears to have been sincerely puzzled and 
shocked by the controversy generated in the IMF and USG 
over the adoption of Decree 68-2003, which consolidated the 
agricultural loans, interest rate subsidies, amnesties and 
other measures in three previous laws adopted by Congress 
during 2000-2002.  The government believes that the new law 
actually lowers the cost of its assistance to the 
agriculture sector substantially and limits its exposure. 
As previously promised, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Banking and Insurance Commission have developed a 32-page 
analysis of the four laws and their implications for 
government finances.  During the week of June 23, this 
analysis was sent to the IMF along with a computer disk 
containing the names of all the beneficiaries.  A copy of 
the paper, written in Spanish, is being faxed to State 
(WHA/CEN/Brett Makens) and Treasury; a fuller summary will 
be provided septel. 
 
¶13. (C) The previous three laws, adopted starting in 2000, 
were motivated by a wish to help farmers and the banks to 
overcome the financial losses suffered during and in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in late 1998 and the ensuing 
stagnation in the sector.   According to the GOH report, 
the measures provided interest rate subsidies for loans 
totaling USD 252 million, loan forgiveness of USD 39.6 
million, financed by bonds, and commitments to extend these 
benefits to an additional USD 83 million worth of loans. 
The previous decrees also authorized automatic guarantees 
for ag loans (50-70 percent) that represented an additional 
contingent obligation for the government, estimated at USD 
144.5 million. 
 
¶14. (C) Decree 68-2003 was developed to consolidate the 
committed fiscal resources into one mechanism, in order to 
rationalize the credit programs, avoid additional 
contingent liabilities, relieve pressure on the banks with 
large outstanding agricultural portfolios and encourage the 
provision of new loans to the Honduran ag sector. 
Delinquency in loan repayment and other high risk factors 
have resulted in a rapid contraction of agricultural 
lending by the Honduran financial system.  The GOH report 
notes that new agriculture loans accounted for 8.3 percent 
of bank lending in 1999 and only 4.1 percent in 2002. 
 
¶15. (C) The IMF staff working on the Honduran program 
reacted strongly and adversely in April to the news of 
Decree 68-2003, terming it a new subsidy program that 
benefited large, politically influential landowners that 
would have an immediate negative impact on government 
finances and the IMF program under negotiation.   The GOH 
report is an attempt to demonstrate that this program is 
not at all new and that the costs are actually lower than 
would be the case under the previous system.  The 
beneficiaries are limited to those individuals who already 
were entitled under the previous three decrees.  Note: A 
modification made by Congress in April to the bill would 
have made the benefits available to additional (unlimited) 
beneficiaries now and in the future; Econoffs heard in May 
from members of the Bankers' Association that this news was 
resulting in widespread loan payment delinquency and new 
requests for debt forgiveness.  The government subsequently 
worked with the Congress to correct this issue in the final 
version of the law, before it was signed by the President 
and published.  End Note. 
 
¶16. (C) The tables below provide the government's estimates 
of the costs implicit in the earlier regime and the new 
one.   The cash cost of the various agricultural credit 
programs has been reduced slightly in nominal terms and 
significantly in present value terms. 
 
Financial Costs of Previous 
Scheme 
 
                       Nominal         Present Value 
                     -----------     ----------------- 
                    (USD million)      (USD million) 
 
Interest Subsidies         86                 65 
Interest on bonds          21                 13 
Transfers to BANADESA      33                 19 
Funding of FONGAC          28                 28 
Bond issue                 --                 17 
                       ------            ------- 
                          168                142 
 
Financial Costs of Current Scheme 
 
                       Nominal         Present Value 
                     -----------     ----------------- 
                    (USD million)      (USD million) 
 
Transfers to trust        98.0                 80.0 
Interest on bonds          9.6                  7.4 
Transfers to BANADESA     33.0                 19.6 
Funding of FONGAC         11.3                  -- 
Subsidies already paid    11.0                  -- 
                      --------             -------- 
                         162.9                107.0 
 
Note: The current exchange rate is 17.3 lempiras to the 
dollar. 
 
¶17.  (C) Why wasn't there better consultation with the IMF 
and USG?  The GOH explanation is that they did consult, but 
they really didn't see it as a new program with new fiscal 
costs.  The law was mentioned in passing by the Finance 
Minister to IMF Mission chief and IMF permanent rep early 
in the year.  Banking Commission President Ana Cristina 
Pereira indicates she had discussed it with members of the 
IMF-World Bank FSAP team, but the resident director of the 
World Bank program is not aware of these discussions (the 
FSAP included a large number of small teams working on 
different aspects of the financial sector).  President 
Maduro did not raise the issue during his meeting with US 
Treasury Secretary Snow, probably for the same reasons.  In 
response to complaints from Washington about the lack of 
consultation, the GOH is now doing its best to put as much 
information on the table as possible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
The Implications for Debt Deferrals and Forgiveness 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶18.  (C) In the meantime, Honduras' failure to reach an IMF 
agreement has ended the deferral of Paris Club debt service 
payments, once again putting overdue loan payments to the 
U.S. into active status.  In late June, ExIm Bank took 
Honduras off-cover for public sector loans.  The Embassy 
has informed the GOH that lack of payment on overdue 
Department of Defense Loans -- USD 12,187 in mid July 2003 
and USD 1,762,150 in early September 2003 -- could trigger 
Brooke Amendment sanctions.  Embassy also is exploring 
whether other overdue loans could trigger 620Q sanctions. 
The GOH is not at liberty to pay only one official creditor 
under Paris Club rules.  According to the GOH's accounts, 
outstanding debt service owed to the USG (Department of 
Defense, Eximbank and AID) totals USD 17.7 million   Of 
this amount, 8.1 million is over 6 months overdue and could 
trigger Brooke or 620Q sanctions. 
-------------------------------------- 
Can the USG Help Push This to A Close? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) In candid conversations with the Ambassador and 
other USG officials, President Maduro and Minister of the 
Presidency Luis Cosenza (and their political advisors) have 
repeatedly emphasized (1) how difficult politically it 
would be to change the teacher and medical worker statutes 
and (2) how unfairly the IMF has treated the Maduro team, 
when the very policies that have caused the underlying 
fiscal problems were enacted by the two previous 
administrations without protest from the IMF at the time. 
For the last year and a half, while the macroeconomic team 
has conducted the difficult negotiations with the Fund, the 
top level of government has flailed around trying to get 
high-level donor pressure on the Fund to back down on some 
of its conditionality.  Many in the donor community 
(including members of the EU and international financial 
institutions) have expressed sympathy for the position. 
But none of these urgent requests for flexibility have 
helped soften the IMF position (recently confirmed during 
 
the Article IV consultations).  In addition, some have 
suggested that it might be best for the GOH to request a 
change in the IMF mission staff so that past differences of 
opinion do not continue to color future negotiations.  The 
GOH has asked the Embassy for its recommendations on this 
rather sensitive suggestion. 
 
¶20. (C) Comment: There is a lot of truth to the GOH claims 
that the underlying macroeconomic problems (such as the 
statutes, the web of special tax exemptions and the ag debt 
forgiveness programs, to name three) were inherited from 
previous administrations and that the IMF perhaps should 
have stood stronger against these policy lapses at the 
time.  However, the problems are real and, if left 
unaddressed, will continue to prevent the achievement of 
macroeconomic stability and growth.  President Maduro needs 
to get control over the public sector wage bill for the 
good of the country, as well as for the purposes of an IMF 
agreement.  Deep down, he knows this.  In addition to the 
harm caused to efforts to balance the budget and invest in 
the country's future, the statutes put the teachers and 
doctors in a privileged class of public servants, to the 
detriment of other public workers.  They must be changed at 
some point. 
 
¶21. (C) And, finally, the GOH has come a long way.  Post 
believes strongly that now is the time for the USG to give 
a little push.   Maduro badly needs reassurance from high 
level USG officials that (1) the IMF-suggested civil 
service reforms (and the ensuing political fight) are 
indispensable, (2) the international community will support 
him if he does take this move, and (3) that an IMF 
agreement would likely be forthcoming quickly after passage 
of the law even if all IMF targets for reduction of the 
public sector wage bill are not completely met.  Post seeks 
Washington agencies' input and advice on whether this is 
appropriate and how best to achieve it.  End Comment. 
 
Palmer