This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MAPUTO 001007 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/S, AF/RSA 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EINV MZ HIV AIDS PEPFAR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S END-OF-TOUR REPORT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Sharon P. Wilkinson, for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary. Bilateral political and economic relations 
between the U.S. and Mozambique have improved and deepened. 
At a political level, bilateral cooperation is excellent, 
with Washington acknowledging the impressive transition to 
democracy and the GRM willing to cooperate with the U.S., for 
example on Article 98. The Mozambican profile will rise with 
the assumption of the AU Presidency in July. On the economic 
front, Mozambique is one of the continent's best performers, 
albeit from a low base, with the U.S. now poised to take a 
larger role in trade and investment. The recent "B" 
sovereign credit rating and OPIC engagement enhance the 
potential. The country remains dependent on donor support, 
where the U.S. takes a leading role. Reduction of absolute 
poverty is the priority, and our efforts are focused on 
economic growth, limiting the effects of HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases, and strengthening governance. The U.S. has also 
successfully led the effort to address the landmine problem. 
Corruption is one of the greatest threats to continued 
progress on the economic and political fronts. The GRM has 
taken encouraging action to address the problem, and the U.S. 
actively supports these efforts with inter-agency assistance. 
Key areas where we need to maintain focus are corruption, 
HIV/AIDS, further consolidation of democracy, education and 
counter terrorism. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary continued. 2003 municipal and 2004 national 
elections when President Chissano will step down will change 
the political landscape. RENAMO will have at least moderate 
success in the municipal elections, assuming governing 
responsibilities for the first time; the party is not well 
prepared for this eventuality. The 2004 races are too 
distant to predict, however, both Presidential candidates 
face significant hurdles. FRELIMO candidate Armando Guebuza 
has credible experience, but must address negative public 
association in the perceptions of past corruption and tough 
policies during the Samora Machel administration. Voters may 
also make the emotional decision that after 30 years of 
FRELIMO rule, it is time for a change. The perennial 
opposition leader and Presidential candidate, RENAMO Afonso 
Dhlakama, lacks credibility, experience, and financing. 
Likely third-party candidate Raul Domingos will not win but 
could be the swing vote. Regardless of the outcome, the U.S. 
will have no difficulty in maintaining the positive 
engagement with the government and people of Mozambique that 
we have enjoyed to date. End summary. 
 
POLITICAL RELATIONS 
=================== 
¶3. (U) Political relations between the U.S. and Mozambique 
improved and deepened over the last three years. The U.S. 
has appropriately acknowledged President Chissano's vision 
and personal efforts which have been instrumental in the 
transition to a stable multi-party, free-market oriented 
democracy. The GRM greatly values this recognition and 
high-level attention from Washington, including last year's 
Southern African Mini Summit and President Bush's 
participation with President Chissano in last month's 
Corporate Council on Africa Washington Summit. Examples of 
the GRM's commitment to our bilateral relationship include 
our recent conclusion of an Article 98 Agreement and GRM 
ratification of all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the regional stage, Mozambique has played an 
increasingly visible role. Maputo has just successfully 
hosted the second African Union (AU) Summit and President 
Chissano assumed the AU Presidency for the next year. We 
expect the GRM to expand on the active role played during its 
chairmanship of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and 
Security, where Chissano and FM Simao placed Mozambique at 
the center of diplomatic efforts in Zimbabwe, Burundi, DROC, 
and the Comoros. The AU Presidency will be an ideal forum 
for President Chissano to bolster his already high stature as 
one of the continent's elder statesman, before retiring from 
office in 2004. We expect Chissano will be a forceful 
advocate for NEPAD with its inherent focus on good 
governance, peer review, and African solutions for African 
problems. He is unlikely to speak out publicly against 
President Mugabe's policies, leaving that to President Mbeki 
and President Obasanjo. 
 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND INVESTMENT 
=================================== 
¶5. (U) The economy grew at 8 percent in 2002 and is poised 
to remain between seven and ten percent over the next few 
years. Inflation fell from over 20 percent in 2001 to nine 
percent in 2003 due to a tightening of monetary policy and 
the gradual recovery from the devastating 2000 floods. This 
growth, the result of sustained reforms and sound 
macroeconomic management, as mandated by the IMF and World 
Bank, have made Mozambique a viable destination for foreign 
direct investment (FDI), particularly in sectors exploiting 
the country's vast but largely untapped natural resources. 
Confirmation of this positive picture is the "B/B " credit 
rating assigned to Mozambique by Fitch Ratings in July 2003 
 
¶6. (U) Mozambique receives substantial FDI, but, so far, 
the U.S. has not been one of the major players. (By 2001 
revenues, Mobil Oil is the 12th largest firm in country, 
Coca-Cola 13th, with four others in the top 100.) This 
situation is set to change. OPIC is providing nearly $30 
million for a U.S.-led consortium rehabilitation of the port 
and rail facilities and acquisition of the concessions to run 
the operations in the Nacala Corridor, a crucial 
transportation route linking Northern Mozambique, Malawi, and 
Zambia. The efficient operation of the route should engender 
substantial investments in areas such as mining and 
agriculture. OPIC is also involved in a major eco-tourism 
project; eco-tourism is an industry set to boom in Mozambique 
and it is a USAID focus area for export-led growth and job 
creation. A U.S. construction firm has been contracted to 
build a $200million mineral sands project in Nampula 
province and a U.S./Norwegian partnership just signed an 
agreement to prospect for natural gas in Sofala province. 
Several other U.S. investments are also in the pipeline. 
 
¶7. (U) Mozambique has had moderate success in taking 
advantage of AGOA. In 2002, 750,000 garments were exported, 
up from a base of none the year before. Last month, the 
first-ever exports of top-quality Mozambican prawns arrived 
in the U.S. We recently learned of new legislative 
initiatives to remove import duties for certain categories of 
components for products made in Mozambique. 
 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND DONOR PARTNERS 
========================================= 
¶8. (U) Donor partners fund approximately 60 percent of the 
national budget through either direct budget support or 
through programs and projects designed to supplement 
GRM-provided services. About 23 bilateral donors and a 
string of smaller partners contribute to the disbursed aid 
funds. In addition, 25 multilateral agencies and up to 150 
international NGOs/PVOs offer grants, loans, or technical 
assistance. 
 
¶9. (U) USAID and the other donor partners do not operate in 
a vacuum in Mozambique. There is a clear trend among donors 
in Mozambique to move toward harmonized forms of aid, whether 
through budget support or through pooling and sector-wide 
approaches. Donor funding for 2002 included budget support 
($100 million); sector and pooled support ($100 million) and 
other projects ($500 million). Apart from pooling funding 
and technical assistance, organized dialogue between donors 
and between government and donors illustrates another form of 
harmonization and coordination. USAID is an integral part of 
this process. With our donor partners, we are encouraging a 
greater focus on corruption, and support for conditionality 
of assistance in return for policy reform. 
 
¶10. (U) As the role of USAID has expanded over the last 
nearly 20 years, our strategies have been fine-tuned. 
USAID's Country Strategic Plan from 1996 to present focused 
on increasing rural incomes, making government accountable to 
citizens, improving health, and creating a better business 
environment. The new strategic plan for 2004-2010 will build 
on this experience to create broad-based, rapid economic 
growth sustained through expanded capacities and 
opportunities. The five strategic objects that will be 
utilized to achieve this are increasing rural economic 
growth, focusing on labor intensive exports, helping local 
government become more democratic, improving health services 
for children and reproductive health, and finally working 
towards behavior changes which will result in preventing new 
cases of HIV/AIDS while also caring for those already 
suffering from this disease. With this central and strategic 
objectives in mind, USAID stays true to its support of the 
GRM PARPA (Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty) 
as each objective contributes to at least one of the PARPA's 
priorities. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The GRM is, of course, anxiously awaiting 
appropriation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
funds. We fully expect Mozambique to qualify; failure to do 
so would be a major blow, given the country's impressive and 
sustained policy strides of the last ten years. 
 
HIV/AIDS AND HEALTH 
=================== 
¶12. (SBU) The Mozambican Government has been an outspoken 
advocate in the battle against HIV/AIDS, led by Prime 
Minister Mocumbi who heads the National AIDS Council. 
(Comment. A European trained physician, Mocumbi last year 
ran a strong but ultimately unsuccessful campaign for the 
World Health Organization Director Generalship. It is an 
open secret that Mocumbi, at ease in the international arena, 
is interested in exploring outside job possibilities and 
could well end up elsewhere in the international health 
field. End Comment.) The GRM is committed to forceful 
action and outspoken advocacy as essential to contain and 
diminish the infection rate, which is currently 12 percent. 
 
¶13. (U) The U.S. is actively engaged in the health sector, 
both through growing USG programs as well as private 
organizations, including the Gates Foundation, Clinton 
Foundation, and numerous NGOs. USAID direct assistance has 
provided technical assistance, training, and commodities to 
improve the public health system and enable key Mozambican 
organizations to lead HIV/AIDS prevention. This assistance 
has been successful in shifting health service delivery from 
international to local institutions, including a revitalized 
Ministry of Health (MOH). Similarly, CDC has enjoyed success 
in its dealings with the MOH in the implementation of 
surveillance of HIV, voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), 
and planning, monitoring and evaluation of HIV/AIDS 
activities. In calendar year 2004, the CDC Global AIDS 
Program (GAP) will begin support to the MOH in the 
implementation of prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
activities, including the treatment of AIDS patients. The 
Department of Labor is funding $900,000 to address HIV/AIDS 
in the workplace and Peace Corps works actively in HIV 
prevention through classroom instruction and other outreach 
programs. In calendar year 2004 they will welcome the first 
group of volunteers in the health sector. For all the 
efforts and success needs remain high and Mozambique is 
poised and eager to participate in President Bush's $15 
million Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 
 
DEMINING 
======== 
¶14. (U) Landmines, both from the colonial struggle and the 
civil war, have taken an enormous toll on Mozambique, both 
economically and socially. The USG, first through DOD ($11.5 
million) and for the last 3-4 years primarily through PM/HDP 
($10.5 million), has been one of the leading donors helping 
the GRM to demine. We have supported numerous demining 
projects implemented by RONCO, based in Beira, Sofala 
province. Support has also included capacity-building of the 
National Demining Institute (IND) and the Mozambican Armed 
Forces (FADM) Demining Brigade in the form of training and 
equipment. This year, at the request of the GRM, RONCO 
completed demining the Sena rail line, a once flourishing 
transportation route linking Dondo (near Beira port) to the 
Malawi border, which now can be refurbished. This year our 
focus shifted from the central provinces to the north, with 
$2.5 million in PM/HDP funds going to clear Portuguese-laid 
minefields along the border with Tanzania. After more than 
ten years of effort, Mozambique is approaching, but not yet 
at, the point where the high-impact mine problem will have 
been sufficiently overcome. Though we expect funding levels 
for Mozambican demining to decrease due to the obvious need 
to deal with new mine hotspots like Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Angola, we need to stay the course to ensure the completion 
of this task, essential for Mozambican development. 
 
¶15. (U) We are particularly pleased with the work of the 
Department of State-funded Quick Reaction Demining Force 
(QRDF), also operated by RONCO; we have worked actively to 
publicize its successes. QRDF teams, with virtually all 
Mozambican deminers, have been successfully deployed to 
Sudan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and, now, Iraq. While not 
deployed, QRDF teams have completed high-priority tasks 
inside Mozambique, such as recent power line demining work 
that was requested by the Governor of Sofala province. The 
effectiveness of the Mozambican teams in challenging 
international environments is on source of pride for 
Mozambique and an example of our bilateral cooperation. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS 
======================= 
¶16. (SBU) Corruption is pervasive in Mozambique. It not 
only hampers development of trade and investment, but has a 
nexus with money-laundering and trafficking in narcotics and 
persons. A 2001 survey, funded by USAID and carried out by 
the local civil society organization, ETICA, showed that 66 
percent of respondents had paid or been solicited for a bribe 
by a public official in the prior six-month period. This 
had never been done before in Mozambique, and was a useful 
tool for opening public discussion of corruption. Conflicts 
of interest for senior public officials are common, where 
they use public office to benefit private business interests. 
Prosecutions for corruption-related offenses are still rare. 
The assassinations of investigative journalist Carlos 
Cardoso and bank official Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua, both 
linked to corruption at failed banks in which the government 
exercised significant control, have galvanized public opinion 
against corruption. 
 
¶17. (U) The appointment of a new Attorney General, Joaquim 
Madeira, a former Supreme Court Justice, signaled a 
noticeably stronger official stance against corruption. 
Madeira shocked the political establishment in his 2001 
parliamentary address, promising to take strong action 
against corruption. He fired members of his own staff, 
forced the removal of judges, and created a specialized 
anti-corruption unit to pursue corruption cases. With USAID, 
INL and other funding, we have actively supported this unit, 
renovating offices, donating equipment, and providing 
extensive training, FBI courses and OPDAT advisor visits. 
This unit is an increasingly important anti-corruption 
player. Its resources are dwarfed by the scale of the 
problem, and we plan continued and expanded support for it. 
In addition to the work with the anti-corruption unit, we 
have built a constructive relationship with the National 
Police Academy (ACIPOL), supported by INL funds, where we 
expect that enhancing law enforcement capacity, beginning 
with fresh recruits, will in the long run strengthen 
anti-corruption efforts. A measure of success is the request 
for training from the Director of Customs, one of the most 
corrupt organizations in Mozambique. 
 
¶18. (C) The highly publicized Cardoso trial, which many 
thought would never happen, was a watershed in the fight 
against corruption, but it was only an initial step. Those 
implicated in ordering the assassination, including President 
Chissano's son, have yet to be brought to justice. Other 
high-profile cases are also pending. Perception of 
widespread corruption among the political elite in Maputo is 
one of the areas where FRELIMO is most vulnerable heading 
into upcoming elections. RENAMO and the smaller opposition 
parties harp constantly on corruption, but many sanguine 
observers believe that, if in power, RENAMO would also be 
plagued by corruption. 
 
THE POLITICAL FUTURE 
==================== 
¶19. (C) Municipal elections, scheduled to be held in 
November 2003, will mark a new phase in Mozambican democracy 
when, for the first time, some RENAMO candidates should find 
themselves in governance positions. No scientific polling 
exists in Mozambique, but based on our own up-country travel 
and 1999 election results, we expect RENAMO to win 
approximately 15 of the 33 races. FRELIMO should retain all 
10 municipalities in the three southern provinces and most in 
the traditional northern strongholds of Cabo Delgado as well 
as Niassa. However, RENAMO should have a strong showing in 
the central provinces of Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, and Tete, 
as well as the five municipalities in Nampula. Though 
municipalities do not yet play a large political or economic 
role in a still very centralized Mozambique, RENAMO gaining 
at least some power will have the symbolic importance of 
shattering the myth of FRELIMO invincibility. 
¶20. (C) To some extent, the municipal election outcomes 
will be harbingers of the December 2004 national elections. 
While we believe the 2004 elections are FRELIMO's to lose, we 
are not yet ready to call the winner. With only one year 
between the contests, a particularly strong showing by RENAMO 
in the municipal contests, perhaps a better than expected 
showing in the north and central and/or a win in a 
traditionally FRELIMO stronghold in the south, would be a 
strong indicator of Mozambicans' desire for change at a 
national level. Conversely, FRELIMO holding RENAMO to ten or 
fewer municipalities in their traditional central strongholds 
would bode well for FRELIMO's chances in 2004. 
 
PARTY LEADERSHIP 
================ 
¶21. (C) FRELIMO Secretary General and Presidential 
candidate Armando Guebuza is known as a decisive, capable 
leader. He has impressive government credentials as a former 
Minister of Interior, Minister of Transportation, and 
parliamentary leader. He has been one of FRELIMO's most 
forceful backers of free market structural reforms and in the 
90s became one of the country's wealthiest and most 
successful businessmen. However, Guebuza faces several 
electoral challenges. Foremost are the rumors of corruption, 
both from shenanigans during the privatization of government 
companies as well alleged involvement in other illicit 
activities. We expect Guebuza will make cracking down on 
corruption a top campaign priority to counter this image. He 
has already given indications of this in public and private 
gatherings. Though engaging on a personal level, Guebuza is 
less charismatic than Chissano. Also, regional equities may 
work against him. Though born in Nampula to a northern Makua 
mother, Guebuza is much more closely associated with the 
south, having a southern father and having been raised in 
Maputo. The perception in the central and northern regions 
is that the south has received the lion's share of 
development resources, and another southerner (like Chissano 
and Machel) would only continue this pattern. 
 
¶22. (C) RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama also faces 
challenges. First, there is a credibility issue, as both he 
and his party lack any governing experience. Also, RENAMO 
lacks the financial resources to wage an effective campaign. 
FRELIMO controls the government apparatus and patronage which 
it will fully use to its advantage. RENAMO has yet to 
articulate an election strategy or platform. After more than 
ten years in Maputo, Dhlakama has earned an image of 
perennial opposition leader, living the life of leisure in 
Maputo, increasingly out of touch with his rural base in the 
central region. Nevertheless, he has enormous name 
recognition and will draw support not only from diehard 
RENAMO backers, but also from disenchanted FRELIMO members 
and, potentially, new voters. 
 
¶23. (C) A huge unknown for the 2004 presidential and 
legislative contest is what role former RENAMO number two 
Raul Domingos will play. Domingos, on track with what he has 
told us over the last year, is on his way to forming his own 
political party. Still a member of the National Assembly, 
Domingos remains in the public spotlight, and he has been 
traveling extensively throughout the country. Based on our 
travels, the presence of the NGO Domingos founded, IPADE, 
particularly in Tete and Manica provinces, has been notable. 
However, IPADE is very weak or non-existent in other parts of 
the country. How much support Domingos and his party would 
have at a national level is unclear, but we do not seeing him 
getting more than 5-10 percent of the vote. A Domingos 
candidacy is likely to play a spoiler function. Though 
Domingos could conceivably take some votes from FRELIMO 
members unhappy with corruption and other problems, Dhlakama 
is the more likely victim of a Domingos run. Dhlakama's 
autocratic style and perceived distancing from his rural, 
grassroots support could cost him votes. Also, an ethnic 
split is conceivable, with Senas abandoning Ndau Dhlakama for 
fellow Sena Domingos. The source of Domingos' funding, for 
IPADE and his future party, is unclear. RENAMO leadership 
and media outlets have insinuated that FRELIMO is backing 
Domingos in order to split the opposition, a charge not 
without some plausibility. 
 
PLAYERS IN A GUEBUZA OR DHLAKAMA ADMINISTRATION 
============================================= == 
¶24. (C) Regardless of who wins in 2004, most of the 
interlocutors Washington and the Mission have come to know 
well will change. Under Guebuza, we would expect to see most 
Chissano-appointed ministers gone, certainly Prime Minister 
Mocumbi, Foreign Minister Simao, Finance Minister Diogo, 
Transport Minister Salomao, Health Minister Songane and 
Agriculture Minister Muteia, and possibly Industry and 
Commerce Minister Morgado. Possible holdovers are Mineral 
Resources and Energy Minister Langa and Defense Minister Dai, 
Guebuza's brother-in-law, though with different portfolios. 
Prominent governors from Sofala, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado 
could also turn up as ministers. 
 
¶25. (C) Though they are unlikely to take a cabinet or 
otherwise public position, influential FRELIMO members will 
continue to play crucial policy roles behind the scenes. 
First on this list is President Chissano, who will remain 
head of FRELIMO. Other major players in FRELIMO's central 
committee, including Alberto Chipande and Rafael Maguni 
(respectively Ministers of Defense and Information under 
Samora Machel), will likewise continue behind the scenes. 
Another major player, and a potential 2009 Presidential 
candidate, is Graca Machel, Samora Machel's widow and the 
current wife of Nelson Mandela. 
 
¶26. (C) A Dhlakama victory would bring many challenges for 
RENAMO. One of the first would be coming up with capable, if 
not experienced, personalities for key positions. Dhlakama's 
autocratic style has driven out major players such as 
Domingos and former RENAMO Secretary General Joaquim Vaz. 
Dhlakama has continually given us the encouraging message 
that technocratic-level public workers would be retained. 
But the sheer number of political-level appointments required 
- Minister, Vice Minister, National Directors at 22 
ministries, governors, and Ambassadors - dwarfs such 
assurances. In their meeting following his May 2003 U.S. 
visit, Dhlakama told the Ambassador that a committee of 44 
individuals already existed, drawn from business and 
academia. Presumably, political appointees would be drawn 
from this group. RENAMO's relationship with its Electoral 
Union (UE) coalition partners remains fractious. However, 
ultimately we would expect to see small party leaders, many 
of whom provide the intellectual backbone of the opposition, 
take on important portfolios. Attorney Maximo Dias of MONAMO 
and engineer Lutero Simango of PCN fall into this category. 
We would expect no current FRELIMO ministers to participate 
in a Dhlakama administration in any way. 
 
¶27. (C) Should RENAMO win in 2004, an orderly political 
transition would demonstrate the solidity of Mozambican 
democracy, specifically FRELIMO's commitment to it. A 
graceful loss would confirm its own self-proclaimed 
commitment to democracy and peace. While a RENAMO win might 
be a good democracy story, it would certainly make for 
difficult times in Mozambique. On policy, RENAMO would 
likely continue the positive reforms of FRELIMO and perhaps 
move closer to U.S. position in other areas (e.g., allowing 
land ownership, support for the U.S. in Iraq, a harder line 
on Mugabe, etc.). However, the expected disarray of a 
Dhlakama administration, at least initially, would require 
not only patience but significant additional support. 
Implementation of our myriad assistance programs would be 
extremely challenging, especially if FRELIMO-aligned 
technocrats were replaced with less experienced or 
unqualified RENAMO functionaries. 
 
WHAT THE USG SHOULD FOCUS ON 
============================ 
¶28. (U) The FY-05 MPP lays out the Mission's overall key 
objectives. There are several areas in particular the USG 
should concentrate its efforts. One is elevating the policy 
dialogue on corruption. Failure to win this battle could 
derail all the other important economic reforms Mozambique 
has implemented, and reduce foreign investment incentives 
needed to generate economic growth. For significant poverty 
reduction, Mozambique must reduce red tape and other 
barriers. Continued USG support for the HIV/AIDS battle is 
crucial to staunch, then reverse, the ravages of the 
pandemic. Finally, though Mozambique has been a model for 
the transition to democracy, we should not lose sight of just 
how young the democracy is. Beyond just election monitoring, 
we should continue efforts to consolidate the gains made. A 
foreseeable need is governance training for new RENAMO 
leaders. 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD FOCUS ON IF WE HAD EXTRA $$$ 
=========================================== 
¶29. (C) Needs in Mozambique are enormous, but there are two 
areas where additional resources could mostly usefully be 
applied. The first area is counter-terrorism. The GRM is 
fully cooperative at the political level, and the Mission 
actively engages with police, military, banking, and 
diplomatic contacts. We fully participate in training 
opportunities such as ILEA. However, major resources are 
needed to help the GRM address the many weaknesses that 
include a large Muslim population that is extremely poor and 
vulnerable to outside influence, notoriously porous borders 
with all its neighbors, a 1500-mile unpatrolled coastline for 
which the GRM has zero monitoring capacity, and a severely 
limited response ability in the event of a terrorist attack. 
The GRM's heavy dependence upon South Africa and the Indian 
navy for security during the AU Summit bore witness to these 
weaknesses. 
 
¶30. (U) The second is education, which, though part of 
Peace Corps' stock and trade, has not been a major focus of 
the USG. The lack of human capacity is a serious limiting 
factor we consistently encounter in all sectors. Many 
Mozambicans, in and out of government, are well-trained, 
English-speaking and competent, but that expertise is 
extremely thin. While we have successfully cultivated 
Mozambican institutions of higher education through linkages, 
Fulbright, etc., there remain innumerable opportunities for 
meaningful assistance in secondary and university education, 
in addition to girls' education at the primary level. 
WILKINSON