This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 001039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DHS/FEMA - JANET KENNEDY, AID/OFDA, US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV PGOV ECON EAID TK
SUBJECT: WAITING FOR THE BIG ONE... IS ISTANBUL PREPARED 
FOR AN EARTHQUAKE? 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Despite continued public awareness about 
the likelihood of a major earthquake in the next 30 years, 
Istanbul remains ill-prepared for a major natural disaster. 
To the extent that municipal and state officials have begun 
to focus on this critical issue, the bulk of their attention 
has been on response efforts and not the more difficult 
mitigation efforts.  End Summary. 
 
 
Waiting for the Big One... 
-------------------------- 
¶2. (U) Lying just off of the Northern Anatolian fault line, 
Istanbul (and its prior incarnations as Constantinople and 
Byzantium) has experienced major earthquakes every 100 to 150 
years during its long history.  The question is not whether 
an earthquake will occur, but rather when and how damaging it 
will be.  A sequential westward progression of major 
earthquakes this century has led experts to believe that 
there is now a 65 percent probability of a major earthquake 
near Istanbul in the next 30 years.  What troubles these 
experts and municipal authorities is the fact that modern 
Istanbul has grown in population from under a million to 
approximately 12 million in just two generations.  Most of 
this vast expansion has taken place in the absence of 
sensible land-use planning and earthquake-resistant 
construction.  These same problems led to the tens of 
thousands of deaths in the 1999 Kocaeli/Izmit earthquake, 
whereas similar magnitude earthquakes in developed countries 
with modern urban planning and construction cause relatively 
less damage (49 deaths in San Francisco/Oakland in 1989). 
 
 
¶3. (U) Recent studies (including one funded by the American 
Red Cross) indicate that a major earthquake (7.5 on the 
Richter scale) in the immediate vicinity of Istanbul is 
expected to claim 40-50,000 lives and cost USD 11-12 billion 
in direct building damages (not including other property 
damage, secondary losses in productivity, and a million or 
more homeless).  Severe shaking during the 1999 Izmit quake 
claimed almost a thousand lives and damaged over 23,000 
buildings in the Istanbul neighborhood of Avcilar (over 80 km 
from the epicenter but consisting mostly of unstable land) 
and forced Istanbul residents to flee their houses and 
prompted many to sleep in the streets for days.  Recent polls 
suggest that the psychological damage has endured: 58 percent 
of the city's residents are expecting a major earthquake, 29 
percent have moved (or plan to move) to "safer" 
neighborhoods, and 40 percent say that only their work 
prevents them from leaving the city altogether.  As recently 
as July 9, rumors of an impending earthquake panicked 
Istanbul residents until the Kandilli Observatory and 
municipal authorities debunked the scare. 
 
 
Challenges to Disaster Preparedness 
----------------------------------- 
¶4. (U) WHO'S IN CHARGE?: The problems and challenges involved 
in preparing for an earthquake are considerable.  They begin 
with the question of authority.  Outdated laws from the 1950s 
(when Turkey was predominantly rural) formally delegate 
disaster response to the national government and to its 
representatives around the country (i.e., state-appointed 
governors).  The Civil Defense Directorate of the Ministry of 
Interior employs 2000 people around the country, but their 
mandate and training deal primarily with the Cold War threat 
of nuclear attack, not disaster preparedness.  Although an 
Emergency Management Agency was created several years ago, 
its role vis-a-vis other disaster management agencies remains 
undefined.  The scale of the problem in large urban areas, 
moreover, is far beyond the capacity of local governors and 
has been unable to attract sufficient resources from a 
government preoccupied with an ongoing economic crisis.  In 
the absence of a national response on this issue of critical 
concern, the Istanbul municipal authorities have stepped into 
the vacuum, working closely with the governor's office and 
local organizations to coordinate unified earthquake 
preparations.  But tension between municipal and state 
authorities has created major problems, obstacles, and delays 
in advancing the city's level of preparedness.  Schools, 
hospitals, and cultural heritage fall directly under state, 
not municipal, control. 
 
 
¶5. (U) RESPONSE VERSUS MITIGATION: Earthquake preparations 
fall into two general categories: response and mitigation. 
Major steps have already been taken with regard to upgrading 
and reinforcing the city's ability to respond to an 
earthquake (training rescue teams and firefighters, 
pre-positioning supplies), but the much larger and more 
expensive mitigation efforts have only just begun.  The 
Istanbul Muncipality, Turkish Red Crescent (with American Red 
Cross assistance), and others have upgraded their response 
preparations.  Prof. Nuray Aydinoglu, head of the Kandilli 
Observatory (Turkey's premier earthquake research institute) 
told us that the response to the June 2003 Bingol earthquake 
showed that the response situation had improved considerably 
in the last five years, but added that mitigation efforts 
were few and unorganized.  Nasuh Mahruki, Chairman of AKUT (a 
search-and-rescue NGO that achieved national fame for their 
work after the 1999 Izmit earthquake), sardonically confirmed 
to us that the city and other organizations seem to have 
focused on the "glamorous" response preparations at the 
expense of the more important preventive mitigation efforts. 
Another earthquake engineer living in Bursa noted a similar 
tendency on the part of municipal authorities there.  Even 
response preparedness has focused disproportionately on 
"heavy" search and rescue (using machinery to save people in 
collapsed buildings) instead of "light" search and rescue 
(where neighbors and local communities pull victims from 
rubble), which typically accounts for 80 percent of those 
rescued. 
 
 
¶6. (U) BUILDING CODES, TESTING, INSURANCE: Ironically, Turkey 
adopted modern building codes (judged to have up-to-date 
seismic design provisions by the USGS) shortly before the 
devastating Izmit earthquake.  The new code, the product of 
five years of work by expert commissions, was prompted by the 
1992 Erzincan earthquake and largely tracked advances in U.S. 
codes.  Aydinoglu, who was also the primary author of the new 
code, told us that he is primarily concerned with his failure 
since the 1980s to get Turkey to strengthen the legislation 
regarding testing and enforcement of building codes. 
Currently, the professional qualification requirements for 
those testing designs and examining buildings are extremely 
low.  An independent earthquake engineer told us separately 
that the software that is used by architects to design 
earthquake-resistant buildings is outdated and that engineers 
testing the designs on behalf of the authorities use the same 
software.  Although earthquake insurance is mandatory, only 
25 percent of buildings are believed to be insured and 
insurance companies have yet to develop any expertise or 
experience examining buildings. 
 
 
¶7. (U) UNCHECKED AND UNPLANNED GROWTH: Despite the persistent 
problems in design, however, the biggest problems for 
municipal authorities are caused by poor land-use planning 
and inferior construction.  Both problems have been 
exacerbated by the massive and largely uncontrolled waves of 
rural-to-urban migration that have made Istanbul Europe's 
largest city at approximately 12 million people.  Municipal 
authorities have been unable to cope with the flood of 
immigrants, many of whom began their new lives in Istanbul 
building unlicensed squatter (gecekondu, literally "landed by 
night") settlements, often in "forest" or "state" lands. 
Although a series of property amnesties has legalized many of 
these buildings and neighborhoods, between 60 to 65 percent 
of Istanbul's 1 million or so buildings were built without 
proper construction permits (i.e., not according to the 
approved plan or without a permit altogether).  Government 
plans for yet another property amnesty could spur another 
wave of illegal construction and vastly complicate municipal 
efforts to prepare for an earthquake (see septel) (Embassy 
Comment: At the same time, these plans may be driven by solid 
political reasons. End Comment). 
 
 
¶8. (U) EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITY: One of the major challenges 
in Istanbul relates to the construction style and lack of 
building expertise.  Due to the ready availability of 
affordable wood, most residences in California are built on 
wooden frames, making them more ductile and 
earthquake-resistant (although they are also more susceptible 
to fires).  Due to a scarcity of wood, most Turkish 
residences are built on relatively more static reinforced 
concrete frames.  Furthermore, a lack of knowledge and 
expertise regarding the proper use of transverse bars, 
correctly-mixed concrete, and techniques to minimize moisture 
and corrosion have made many of these structures 
fundamentally unsound.  These simple problems have greatly 
increased Turkey's vulnerability to earthquake damage. 
Statistics from the losses in past earthquakes indicate that 
for every life lost in California, 10 are lost in similar 
earthquakes in Japan, and 100 in Turkey. 
 
 
¶9. (U) CROOKED CONTRACTORS AND DEATH-BY-"PANCAKE": Endemic 
corruption on the part of both building contractors and 
municipal authorities has given rise to thousands of 
sub-standard buildings that could become literal "death 
traps" in the event of a major earthquake.  According to one 
expert, authorities simply are not sufficiently well trained 
and paid to be able to resist corruption and properly enforce 
building codes.  The most common pattern of residential 
construction has been for self-financing contractors to 
conclude deals with land owners for permission to build in 
return for handing over a specified number of the future 
building's apartments.  With municipal authorities already on 
the take to overlook the illegal construction, the 
contractors have little incentive to comply with costly 
building codes.  Instead, they cut corners, using inferior 
materials and adding on unstable floors, to increase their 
overall profits.  It is these reinforced concrete, 4- to 
10-story, static or non-ductile apartment buildings that are 
at the greatest risk of damage or even "pancake"-style 
collapse that has claimed the most lives in previous 
earthquakes.  Studies predict that a major earthquake in 
Istanbul could result in between 5,000 and 6,000 such 
pancaked buildings. 
 
 
¶10. (U) PUBLIC FACILITIES: In the event of an earthquake, the 
safety of schools, hospitals, and other government buildings 
will be critical to minimizing damages and coordinating 
assistance.  These facilities, too, have yet to be thoroughly 
examined and reinforced.  One World Bank-funded study 
examined 26 hospitals and determined that 86 percent of them 
needed major repairs and reinforcements.  The former Director 
of the Kandilli Observatory and the then-Minister of Health 
got into a nasty public quarrel over the failure to follow 
through on the needed repairs.  The Ministry of Education 
inspected the local schools, evacuated a few of the most 
unsafe, and is engaged in reinforcing many others.  An 
official from a major teachers' union told us, however, that 
the examinations were cursory at best.  Some cultural 
heritage sites and museums have also begun to prepare for an 
earthquake, but there is very little public funding available 
for this work.  The director of Topkapi Palace, for example, 
has obtained corporate sponsorship and has implemented a 
program, but the Hagia Sophia (which is expected to suffer 
serious damage in a major earthquake) has yet to do more than 
study the issue. 
 
 
Mitigation: Step By Small Step... 
--------------------------------- 
¶11. (U) Despite the challenges, in addition to the 
considerable work and organization that has been done on 
disaster response preparations, municipal authorities have 
also taken early steps to launch more comprehensive 
mitigation programs.  After overcoming obstacles and delays 
imposed by state authorities, the city conducted a loss 
estimation study and a geological survey with Japanese 
assistance to identify the areas and neighborhoods in 
Istanbul that are at greatest risk in an earthquake.  A 
consortium of universities, including Bogazici, Istanbul 
Technical, Yilidiz Technical, and Middle East Technical 
Universities, is set to complete a major study of economic, 
legal, technical, and sociological factors to determine the 
outlines for a mitigation project that will put all of 
Istanbul's buildings through a screening process to identify 
those that are at highest risk.  Istanbul officials estimate 
that the process will take about 10 years and cost as much as 
USD 10 billion.  A pilot project is due to begin shortly in 
the Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul.  Separately, a contract 
has also been awarded for retrofitting Istanbul's bridges. 
Perhaps the most encouraging steps with regard to mitigation 
have been taken by individuals sensitized to the dangers by 
recent earthquakes.  Although municipal authorities are still 
powerless to strictly enforce land-use plans and building 
codes, several earthquake experts have noted that individual 
land-owners and contractors are much less likely now to build 
in unsafe neighborhoods or to cut corners in construction. 
 
 
Much Left to Do.... 
------------------- 
¶12. (U) Although much of what remains to be done will take 
time and resources, there is also much that can be done at 
relatively low cost.  The American head of a 3-year old 
USAID/OFDA disaster awareness project believes that one of 
the key issues is to educate renters, property owners, and 
builders on how to construct earthquake-safe buildings. 
Simple measures and techniques that cost no more than 10 
percent of the construction cost could make new buildings 
much safer.  Another potentially productive area of education 
is non-structural mitigation efforts (properly fastening 
shelves and objects within buildings).  Fifty percent of 
earthquake injuries and 10 percent of deaths are attributable 
to non-structural causes.  The USAID/OFDA project (with only 
USD 530,000) has implemented a sustainable basic disaster 
awareness program for teachers and students, but has been 
unable to fully address these other critical education and 
awareness problems. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶13. (U) Because of the terrifying enormity of its scale and 
cost, preparing for a major earthquake is the proverbial 
elephant in the room that nobody in Istanbul really wants to 
talk about.  While the city does seem to have finally 
acknowledged its presence, the bulk of its early efforts have 
focused on the relatively easier and more glamorous task of 
response preparations instead of the more difficult and 
costly mitigation efforts.  Bottom line: Istanbul remains 
woefully unprepared for an earthquake.  Inshallah (God 
Willing), there will be enough time to advance major 
mitigation and educational efforts before the big one hits. 
ARNETT