This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PINS PGOV VM ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE
SUBJECT:  IMPLEMENTING PARTY RESOLUTIONS ON 
-             RELIGION AND MINORITIES 
 
REF:  A.  HANOI 1687           B.  HANOI 0175 
-     C.  FBIS 20030324000089  D. 02 HANOI 1653 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  According to CPV and GVN authorities in 
Hanoi and the Northwest Highlands, new CPV resolutions on 
ethnic minorities and religion do little more than reiterate 
long-standing policies, while nonetheless trying to elevate 
attention to these issues and the need for better 
implementation.  On the ground, nothing seems to have 
changed.  Officials have refuted allegations of forced 
renunciations of faith, while confirming that evangelism is 
essentially illegal.  Despite more conciliatory comments 
from the new Chairman of Government Committee on Religious 
Affairs, most CPV officials seem to view religion as an 
inherited quality, like ethnicity, which makes them 
reluctant to accept the possibility of conversions.  Their 
own underground history likely also makes them unusually 
sensitive to "threats" from evangelism and "illegal" 
gatherings in Vietnam's mountainous areas.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The second session of the seventh plenum of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam's 9th Central Committee in 
January adopted new, sweeping resolutions of CPV policy 
regarding work on religious affairs, work with ethnic 
minorities, and land use (ref B).  Ref C provides full text 
of the religious affairs resolution. 
 
The Hanoi view 
-------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) In a meeting with Pol/C on June 30, Dr. Nguyen Duc 
Lu, Director of the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy's 
Center for "Science of Belief and Religion," explained the 
passage of the resolutions on religion and minorities in 
particular as a clear symbol of the importance the CPV 
places on handling these issues well.  (Note:  As reported 
in ref D, this Center not only trains CPV and GVN cadres on 
religious policy, but also provides recommendations on 
policy and regulations related to religion.  End note)  He 
emphasized that these resolutions did not/not indicate a 
shift in CPV policy.  However, he noted that previous CPV 
policy on religion had been issued by the Politburo; the 
decision to have the full Central Committee consider and 
approve this resolution demonstrated the broad scope and 
support for the CPV policy.  He added that the Central 
Committee resolutions, and expected subsequent study 
sessions at all levels of the CPV, would "popularize" and 
"unify" the "positive" views of the CPV toward ethnic and 
religious affairs and "encourage greater understanding." 
Dr. Lu reiterated that the CPV view is that "religion has a 
good role in promoting humanitarianism, good conduct, and 
culture." 
 
¶4.  (U)  Dr. Lu nonetheless cited concerns within the CPV 
about the "threat" from "hostile forces" who use illegal 
religious activities or illegal religions to undermine the 
State -- key themes of the resolution on religion.  He 
claimed, however, that such concerns did not stem from 
specific recent incidents, much less the 2001 demonstrations 
in the Central Highlands.  When pressed, he also admitted 
that "hostile forces" -- while being "hard to define" -- 
referred to individuals and organizations based overseas, 
and not/not to any programs or policies of the USG. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Dr. Lu noted some "confusion" about what -- exactly 
-- constitutes "legal" and "illegal" religious activities, 
and said his staff is currently conducting research on this 
issue.  The CPV and GVN are still drafting regulations 
covering religious activities that will spell this out in 
greater specificity, but much remains unresolved.  He has 
already participated in two conferences on these 
regulations; he admitted a "lack of unanimity."  He declined 
to predict when the regulations would be passed, but 
indicated that the goal was in the next year or two.  Still 
further ahead would be an even more definitive national law 
on religion, which the National Assembly would pass.  He 
expressed frank incredulity that the USG did not regulate 
the tenets of faith of religious denominations and "cults," 
noting the possibility of cults teaching "immoral 
practices."  Pol/C explained the US Constitutional 
separation of Church and State, and official respect for the 
personal nature of faith. 
 
¶6.  (U)  When Pol/C described continuing reports from Lai 
Chau, Lao Cai, and elsewhere of attempts at forced 
renunciations of faith, primarily among ethnic minority 
Protestants (ref a), Dr. Lu emphasized that any such efforts 
would indeed be illegal and that no one had the right either 
to force someone to believe or not to believe.  He implied 
that such reports might be fabricated by outside agitators. 
He added that Vietnamese remember how the French authorities 
had used the "pretext" of protecting Catholics in order to 
colonialize Vietnam, and implied that the CPV had to be 
vigilant to ensure that the "hostile forces" had no similar 
plans using a Protestant excuse. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Dr. Lu was vague when asked about the legality of 
evangelism and proselytism.  He initially indicated that 
Vietnamese have the right to spread their faith, but then 
added that, in principle, people who do so should be 
graduates from a recognized religious training center. 
(Note: The Protestant Seminary in Hanoi has been closed for 
a decade, and the seminary affiliated with the Southern 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam only opened in 2003.  End 
note) 
 
On the ground 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (U)  To determine provincial implementation of and 
attention to these resolutions and to investigate claims of 
harassment of ethnic minorities, Pol/C and Pol FSN visited 
Lai Chau and Son La provinces during the week of June 23. 
Both have only a minority of Kinh residents, with ethnic 
Thais predominant in each.  Each has significant Hmong 
populations and borders with Laos.  Lai Chau also has a 
border with China.  Both are among the poorest provinces in 
the country in terms of per capita income. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Provincial authorities in both Lai Chau and Son Lao 
flatly asserted that there were no religious believers of 
any kind living in these provinces.  Not only are there no 
Catholic churches or Protestant worship centers, there are 
not even any Buddhist temples, they claimed, citing the 
remote locations and different cultural traditions of the 
ethnic minorities.  They admitted that that many, perhaps 
most, families (Kinh and minorities alike) engage in some 
traditional ancestor worship.  At the same time, they 
stressed that all citizens have the freedom to believe or 
not to believe, as "guaranteed" in the Constitution.  Lai 
Chau officials admitted that there had been some efforts at 
evangelism by Hmong Protestants, noting that such such 
activities were "not according to the law" (while not 
explicitly labeling them "illegal.")  They declined to 
comment on whether anyone had been arrested or punished for 
having engaged in evangelism. 
 
¶10.  (U)  In the absence of worship centers, Son La 
officials escorted Pol/C to visit a shrine to a 15th century 
Vietnamese king who once visited this scenic spot.  Despite 
official prohibitions on "superstitious activities," the 
shrine was full of recent high school graduates lighting 
incense to pray for good luck on the July 4 nationwide 
university examinations.  The Ministry of Culture and 
Information has just devoted 4 billion VND (USD 267,000) to 
construct a temple-like building adjacent to the cave in 
which the shrine has long existed. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Officials in both provinces firmly denied the 
possibility of the reports Pol/C cited about harassment and 
forced renunciation of faith.  They claimed such incidents 
were "impossible" given the non-existence of religious 
believers.  They insisted that there were no official 
programs to convince people either not to believe in 
religion or to renounce religious belief.  They declined to 
comment on whether any official discovered to have attempted 
forced renunciation of faith could be punished 
administratively or under the law.  Lai Chau officials also 
flatly denied reports of a December 2002 gassing episode in 
Hoi Huong hamlet, although another provincial official had 
at the time confirmed a barebones version of this incident 
by phone to Embassy. 
 
¶12.  (U)  The passage of the seventh plenum resolutions on 
minorities and religion indicated the "full importance" the 
CPV and GVN places on proper work in these fields, officials 
noted, while insisting that there was no change in Vietnam's 
"consistent" policies.  They emphasized that there were no 
new programs, initiatives, or training efforts following up 
on these resolutions, and claimed that there had not even 
been any special classes or meetings to discuss the contents 
of these resolutions.  When pressed (with Pol/C reading from 
a VNA account of instructions given to the Ethnic Minorities 
Commission Chairman at the May 2003 Cabinet meeting), Lai 
Chau officials admitted that a delegation from Commission 
had visited the province in early June to "seek opinions" on 
how better to handle minority affairs.  Officials said that 
their bottom line response was "give us more resources." 
 
¶13.  (U)  Officials uniformly stressed that the most 
important way to help ethnic minorities was to promote 
overall economic development, as well as related programs 
against hunger and illiteracy, in order to "guarantee 
equality and solidarity."  Infrastructural investment under 
Program 135 was an important aspect of these efforts, 
including roads, schools, and health clinics, they noted. 
They nonetheless admitted that no educational programs in 
minority languages were yet available.  Lai Chau is now 
seeking to popularize junior high school education.  Son La 
has yet to achieve even universal primary education, 
although it has set a goal to ensure universal junior high 
school education by 2008. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Despite the predominance of ethnic minority 
populations and the reiteration of the importance of ethnic 
minority policy by the 7th plenum, only about 30 pct of 
provincial-level cadres in Lai Chau are now ethnic 
minorities (rising to 70-80 pct at the local levels), 
officials admitted.  In Son La, provincial officials claimed 
to have no idea of these ratios, but most of the provincial 
officials who met with Pol/C were ethnic Kinh or mixed 
Kinh/minority.  Notably, when the ethnic Kinh "handlers" 
took Pol/C and FSN to visit a "typical" Thai residence (of 
the village party chief), they ignored the well-known Thai 
habit of taking off shoes at the entrance to the house, took 
no note of the row of sandals outside the door and the bare 
feet of the host and hostess, and even appeared nonplussed 
when Pol/C and FSN took off their own shoes before entering. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Freedom of religion continues to mean different 
things to Americans and Vietnamese officials.  In a recent 
meeting with Ambassador, the new head of the Government 
Committee on Religious Affairs took a generally conciliatory 
line.  Overall, however, the more general CPV view appears 
to be that religion is essentially an inherited 
characteristic, much like ethnicity.  While the CPV's own 
history demonstrates how young idealists can be turned into 
Communists by reading seminal documents or listening to a Ho 
Chi Minh, current-day CPV logic appears to try to rule out 
the possibility of conversion after contact with a religious 
believer or first reading of the Bible, Koran, or Buddhist 
teachings.  That may be why the CPV/GVN is seemingly 
reluctant to register new churches (or temples) even within 
the framework of already legal religious organizations, much 
less reach formal acceptance of "new" religious bodies like 
the Ba'hai, Baptists, or the United Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam.   Alternatively, it is exactly because they are 
well aware of how successfully the CPV's ideological and 
administrative base grew underground in the first half of 
the 20th century that CPV leaders remain sharply alive to 
the "dangers" posed in particularly by non-recognized 
Protestants targeting already marginalized ethnic grounds in 
sensitive border provinces, and why they are seeking to 
ensure that all activities in these areas be fully and 
openly "legal" and under their supervision. 
BURGHARDT