This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  07-23-13 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR CE NO
SUBJECT:  In meeting, radical JVP party leader flays 
peace process, supports pact with president's party 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 1275; (B) 01 Colombo 1564 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge d'Affaires. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a July 23 meeting, Tilvin Silva, 
leader of the radical JVP party, asserted that the GSL's 
recent proposal on forming an interim structure in the 
north/east would give the Tigers too much power.  He 
also claimed that the Norwegian facilitators were biased 
toward the Tigers.  The JVP remained committed to 
forming an alliance with the president's party.  Based 
on Silva's comments, the JVP has not climbed down a wit 
from its long-standing anti-peace process views.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) MEETING WITH RADICAL PARTY LEADER:  Polchief and 
poloff met July 23 with Tilvin Silva, the General 
Secretary of the Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
 
SIPDIS 
("People's Liberation Front").  The meeting took place 
at the JVP's headquarters in a large house in a non- 
descript Colombo suburb.  Fitting with its radical 
image, the party's offices were modestly furnished (no 
bourgeois elements here!) and festooned with large 
pictures of "revolutionary" heroes, including Marx, 
Lenin, and Guevara.  There was also a large picture of 
Rohana Wijeweera, the JVP's founder, looking more than a 
bit like Che thanks to a beard and beret with a red star 
on it.  (Note:  Wijeweera, who led failed insurrections 
against the government in the 1970's and 1980's, was 
slain by security forces in November 1989.  Through the 
1990's, the JVP, which now professes a commitment to 
democracy, has steadily gained in elections and now 
holds 16 seats in Parliament.  End Note.)  While he 
clearly understands some English, Silva spoke in Sinhala 
throughout the meeting.  (Note:  The JVP is an 
overwhelmingly Sinhalese party and its officials make a 
conscious choice to speak Sinhala, the "mother tongue.") 
 
¶3.  (C) HITTING OUT AT THE PEACE PROCESS:  Silva used 
much of the meeting to flay the government's effort to 
achieve a negotiated settlement with the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  While sticking to his 
typically low-key style, Silva exuded a strong sense of 
purpose in the process, indicating no lessening in the 
JVP's long-standing hard-line stance against the peace 
track.  (Note:  For bio-data on Silva, who served time 
in prison during the 1988-89 JVP uprising -- see Ref B.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Silva, specifically, criticized the GSL's recent 
proposal setting out modalities on forming an interim 
structure in the north/east.  (Note:  Per Ref A, the 
Norwegian government facilitators provided the proposal 
to the LTTE last week and the Tigers continue to review 
it.)  Silva claimed that the proposal provides the 
Tigers too much power in running the north/east.  In 
addition, the proposal did not provide enough 
protections to minority communities, such as the Muslims 
and the Sinhalese.  While underscoring his party's 
support for an end to the war, Silva said peace could 
only come about through the disarmament of the LTTE, 
which had created an "illegal" military force.  In 
response, polchief underscored U.S. support for the 
peace process, urging the JVP to work with the 
government on this key issue of national importance. 
 
¶5.  (C) NORWEGIANS COME IN FOR SOME FLAK:  Regarding 
Norway's role, Silva had no/no words of support.  The 
JVP, he said, believed that the Norwegians were no 
longer acting as a "facilitator," but were increasingly 
acting as a "mediator," recommending items to the 
parties and, thus, trying to "direct" their course of 
action.  This was unacceptable to an independent 
country.  Moreover, the Norwegian government and the 
Norwegian-run Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had 
generally shown themselves to be pro-LTTE.  As an 
example of this, he said the SLMM should not have 
recommended that the government recognize the legitimacy 
of the "Sea Tigers," the LTTE's naval force. 
(Note:  Silva got this wrong:  the SLMM, reacting to 
several violent confrontations at sea, had earlier this 
year offered to work with the GSL and the Tigers on ways 
to avoid incidents.  The SLMM never said the government 
should "recognize" the Sea Tigers, however.)  Polchief 
remarked that the JVP should reconsider its view of the 
GoN effort; the Norwegians really wanted what was best 
for Sri Lanka and were in no way biased toward the 
Tigers. 
 
¶6.  (C) JVP STILL WANTS AN ALLIANCE:  When queried, 
Silva replied that the JVP still wanted to ally itself 
with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the key 
constituent element in President Kumaratunga's People's 
Alliance (PA).  Shooting down reports to the contrary, 
Silva said there had been no delay in forming the 
alliance:  the two parties were still negotiating a 
joint framework, which should be completed soon.  The 
major factor propelling the JVP's desire to form the 
alliance, he continued, was the need to bring down the 
United National Party (UNP) government, which was 
"ruining" the country.  If a SLFP-JVP alliance was 
reached and took power, the JVP would seriously consider 
assuming ministerial positions.  (Note:  This view re 
ministries is new.  The PA and the JVP formed a pact in 
late 2001 in which the JVP backed the faltering PA 
government in Parliament.  The JVP refused to assume 
ministerial positions at that time.  The pact later 
lapsed.) 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  Based on Silva's comments, the JVP has 
not climbed down a wit from its long-standing anti-peace 
process views.  It is hard to assess how dangerous the 
party is to the peace track.  If the JVP does link up 
with President Kumaratunga and her party, it may have a 
shot at being in the next government, which would be a 
serious blow to the peace process.  As an independent 
force, however, the party is a bit marginal:  it can 
stir up demonstrations, etc., but otherwise has little 
leverage.  Some observers say, however, that the party 
may be gaining strength in the rural Sinhalese heartland 
and be on its way to becoming even more of an electoral 
force than it already is.  (Note:  In the last election 
in December 2001, the JVP won almost 10 percent of the 
vote, an impressive total for a hard-line left wing 
party in Sri Lanka.)  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8.  (U) Minimized considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE