This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

281413Z Jul 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE BATTLE OVER CONTROL OF GOT RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 
 
 
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S. Deutsch. 
Reason:1.5(b)(d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Recent controversy over AK Parliament and 
Government proposals to employ an additional 15 thousand 
imams at Turkish mosques is reawakening an age-old 
controversy over the role of religion in Turkish public life. 
It also reveals that: 1) both strict secularists and 
religious conservatives try to play the "Islam" card to their 
advantage; and 2) that Islam in Turkey, far from being 
monolithic or politically united, is more flexible -- and 
deeply rooted in mainstream society -- than many secularists 
will allow.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Mosque and State: Joined, not Separated 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Turkish elites and officials with at least a 
simulacrum of westernization routinely assert to foreigners 
that since Ataturk's day, secularism in Turkey has been 
characterized by a strict institutional separation of "mosque 
and State."  In fact, the "Turkish" version of secularism is 
diametrically the opposite of that in the United States; not 
a deeply ingrained, constitutionally-protected habit, but 
rather a constitutionally-enshrined and enforced State 
ideology.  While Turkish law explicitly denies 
religiously-derived ideas and sentiments any place in the 
public square, religious institutions are not only under 
strict state control, but are in fact an integral part of the 
Turkish State apparatus. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is, 
with approximately 90 thousand employees, one of the largest 
organs of the Turkish State.  It is formally charged with 
overseeing mosque construction/supervision, the hiring of 
religious "officials" (imams, etc), and dispensing all manner 
of religious advice.  Such functions are secondary to the 
Diyanet's main purpose: to ensure, as it has since the early 
days of the Republic, that "Islamic" ideas -- and independent 
religious institutions -- pose no threat to the secularist 
revolution of Ataturk. 
 
 
-- Consequently, the Diyanet is to its detractors -- 
including Islamists, centrist conservatives, and liberals 
alike -- the generator of a "Kemalist Islam" that all too 
often has little to do with the variegated strains of the 
faith practiced throughout Anatolia and in other, less elite, 
corners of Istanbul and Republican Ankara. It is even 
criticized by Turkey's sizable Alevi (heterodox Shia 
minority, which while strongly supporting the secular State 
has long been concerned that the Diyanet promotes the 
dominance of Turkey's Sunni majority community). 
 
 
-- Even as they are castigated from below, Diyanet contacts 
over the years have expressed to us their own frustration 
with what they perceive to be the Turkish Establishment's 
poor grasp of Islam and Islamic realities -- and thus the 
Establishment's inability to fully co-opt Islamic sentiment 
and subordinate it to the State.  In 1997 -- the year of the 
military's "post-modern" coup d'etat against the then 
Islamist Refah-led government -- the Diyanet won approval to 
centralize the Friday sermon to ensure content-control, 
fearful of what it has long believed are the numerous closet 
"reactionary" imams on the its own payroll. 
 
 
--------------- 
The Controversy 
--------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) Recent press coverage has once again brought the issue of Islam, and the Diyanet's role, to the public eye.  Various reports indicate that several AK Members of Parliament 
proposed that the Diyanet hire an additional 15 thousand 
imams to fill vacancies at mosques throughout Turkey.  The 
proposal won the support of State Minister Mehmet Aydin, who 
oversees the Diyanet.  However, it was quickly shelved by 
P.M. Erdogan in the face of accusations in the press and by 
the opposition CHP that AK was preparing to: 1) "infiltrate" 
the religious bureaucracy with Islamists and 2) take on an 
untenable financial burden by hiring more civil servants.  It 
was also criticized by more sympathetic pro-Islam activists 
like Yilmaz Ensaroglu of the Mazlum-Der human rights 
association, who asserted to us recently that the State 
should have no role in overseeing religious matters 
whatsoever. 
 
 
¶5. (C) While the press coverage has died down in the crush of 
news from Iraq and elsewhere, the Diyanet controversy 
illustrates the complexity of interests brought to bear on 
religious issues in Turkey. 
 
 
---------------- 
The Diyanet View 
---------------- 
 
 
¶6. (C) Yusuf Kalkan, a senior Diyanet official whose tenure 
pre-dates the arrival of the AK Government, received us at 
his office in the plush new Diyanet building, built by the 
Ecevit coalition government that preceded AK.  He explained 
to us recently that: 1) Turkey has not hired a new Imam since 
1991 (the Ozal Government in 1981 decreed that 2,000 imam 
slots would be provided to the Diyanet every year until 
1990); 2) that the Diyanet already has enough people to staff 
the mosques -- i.e. it will not have to look outside the 
Directorate -- but does not have the funds to pay them; 
3) that said, the timing of the motion was "inappropriate." 
Kalkan emphasized, however, that without Diyanet-sponsored 
imams, there is the danger that many of the mosques will 
become havens for the nominally illegal tarikats -- the sufi 
orders, such as the Naksibendi, that have exerted strong 
influence over conservative (particularly Kurdish) Anatolians 
-- and even terrorist groups like the Hizbullah. 
 
 
-------------- 
The Gulen view 
-------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Islamic activists have noted to us a steady warming of 
relations between AK and its followers and those of Fethullah 
Gulen, who leads a large and wealthy offshoot of the mystical 
Nurcu movement.  This new and unprecedented cooperation 
between two movements traditionally at odds dovetails at the 
Diyanet and other elements of the bureaucracy, where AK's 
influence over the appointment process and Gulen's centrist 
contacts and knowledge of the system provide the basis for 
mutually beneficial ties. 
 
 
-- While Gulen Nurcus have habitually feared efforts by AK's 
predecessor parties to monopolize religion in Turkey, Gulen 
representatives tell us they are able to work quite well with 
the non-dogmatic Erdogan, Deputy P.M./F.M. Gul, and other AK stalwarts (Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc's late son was a 
Gulen disciple).  State Minister Aydin is also an admirer, 
though independent, of Gulen and his movement.  An advisor to a senior AK M.P. told us that Ahmet Davutoglu at the Prime 
Ministry is also a Nurcu (though it is unclear whether he is 
in Gulen's group). 
 
 
-- Gulen has traditionally emphasized working with and 
through rather than against the Turkish State apparatus. 
Gulen stands accused by Judiciary prosecutors and others in 
the Establishment of militant tendencies and as a threat to 
the State.  Nevertheless, Gulen and his group have long been 
a pillar of centrist politics, and have long benefited from 
close ties to certain elements of the bureaucracy -- which 
makes Gulen useful to AK.  Gulen includes among his key 
patrons former President Demirel and the secularist former 
P.M. Ecevit.  Indeed, according to the July 28 "Hurriyet" 
daily, Ecevit praised Gulen's expansive network of schools -- 
thought by the Establishment GOT at various times as either a 
bulwark against or promoter of "reactionary" tendencies -- 
and noted that he is "from time to time" in contact with 
Gulen through intermediaries.  (Note: Pro-Gulen and other 
sources tell us the contact is direct and regular.  End note) 
 While Gulen Nurcus share with the Diyanet Kemalists a desire 
to supersede the traditional tarikats and "modernize" Islam, 
they seek to afford more official respect to Islamic values 
-- anathema to the Establishment but a cardinal principle of 
the center-right since Turkey began to liberalize political 
activity in 1946. 
 
 
----------- 
The AK View 
----------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) AK and its predecessor parties have long looked 
askance at the Diyanet, seeing it as an obstacle to religious 
independence.  There are signs however that the AK view has 
changed since it came to power as a single-party government 
exercising dominion over the Diyanet.  Zahid Akman, a 
theology Ph.D and member of the board of pro-AK Kanal 7 TV 
(and the station's U.S. correspondent), related to us that he 
was in fact a former student both of Aydin and Naksibendi 
Shaykh Zahid Kotku, religious mentor to the late former 
President Ozal, former P.M. Erbakan, and others.  Aydin, he 
said, is more of a political activist than Gulen, who tends 
toward quietism and emphasis on Islam as a personal, moral 
code.  Aydin is of the view that there is also a corollary 
obligation for Muslims to venture out into in the world and 
into public life.  Akman asserted that with Erdogan as P.M. 
there is a growing sense that the Diyanet can be a key to 
"reform" Islam in Turkey -- Akman emphasized stripping the 
State of Kemalist influence over religion.  "You cannot have 
a CHP Islam," he said.  Akman echoed comments from the 
Diyanet's Kalkan that vacant mosques pose a real problem, and an opportunity to weed out the charlatans and miscreants. 
Aydin's aim is to upgrade the quality of imams and other 
religious officials, Akman added. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Akman elaborated that the idea of mass hiring of imams 
came not from Erdogan or Aydin, but as a proposal from the 
floor of Parliament uncoordinated with the Cabinet. He 
noted in this regard that the controversy reflects the larger 
problems facing Erdogan: 1) lack of control over a party 
group with whom the P.M. has had little direct, personal 
contact since assuming office; and 2) a lack of strong cadre 
of advisers. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment: A Call for Nuance 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) The imam-hiring controversy reflects internal AK 
dynamics: a lack of experience in government and, at a time 
of budgetary shortfalls, an impulse toward ill-disciplined 
populist gestures. These, together with AK's newfound 
interest in re-directing rather than dismantling the apparat 
on behalf of its constituents, leave the party open to 
secularist charges that it has a "sinister" religious agenda. 
 Nonetheless, the difference between the AK Government and 
the Establishment on this front highlights a basic gap in 
Turkey between those who support an order linked to a rigid, 
statist-oriented view of what Ataturk wanted for the Republic 
of Turkey, and those who say they want a more open, EU 
candidacy-linked, conservative Turkey, with greater 
opportunity for Islamic influences, to prevail. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Indeed, Establishment accusations against AK are 
undercut by: 1) the complexity of Islam in Turkey; and 2) the 
fact that an ostensibly "secular" Republic has had since its 
inception its own "religious agenda," specifically the desire 
to mold Islam to coincide with Kemalist political purposes -- 
a highly questionable theological enterprise.  Indeed, while 
both secularists and Islamists try to play the "Islam" card 
to their advantage, it is clear that Islam, far from being a 
monolithic militant spectral "threat," is more variegated, 
flexible, and deeply rooted in mainstream society than many 
secularists will allow.  While as a political matter Islam 
remains a challenging subject open to both quietist and 
radical influences, the Establishment portrayal of Islam -- 
and the very nature and inspiration for an institution like 
the Diyanet -- reflects above all an effort to maintain elite 
dominance over the State and society.  As such, the 
Establishment view obscures the larger realities and 
restricts the room for the compromise essential to political 
development and social peace in Turkey. 
DEUTSCH