This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004732 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/RA, T, NP/MNA, IO/T AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2013 
TAGS: DA IR KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: TURKEY PROMISES FULL SUPPORT FOR THE USG'S 
IAEA/IRAN STRATEGY, EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER IRAN'S 
NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS 
 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires ad interim Robert 
Deutsch. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY. NP A/DAS Mark Fitzpatrick and T Senior 
Advisor David Wurmser were in Ankara on July 24 to consult 
with a team of Turkish MFA officials, led by Ambassador Turan 
Morali (Director-General for International Security Affairs 
and Disarmament), on the way forward in addressing Iran's 
nuclear program through the IAEA. Morali and his team 
stressed that Turkey shares USG concerns over the Iranian 
program, and noted that the combination of Iran's nuclear 
weapons ambitions and ballistic missile program is 
particularly worrying. Morali expressed full support for 
delivering a tough message to Iran on this issue, both 
bilaterally and within the IAEA. Significantly, he also 
promised to speak with the Egyptians, who have provided 
top-cover to Iran within the IAEA. However, Morali also 
admitted that Turkey will maintain its policy of 
"constructive engagement" with Iran, due to the fact that it 
is a direct neighbor. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
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THE USG STRATEGY AND CONCERNS 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) The meeting began with Fitzpatrick and Wurmser giving 
an overview of the USG strategy for halting the Iranian 
nuclear weapons program through the IAEA. The USG expects 
that IAEA Director-General El Baradei's report to the 
September Board of Governors (BOG) meeting regarding 
inspections in Iran will provide ample evidence of safeguards 
violations. Therefore, the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) 
should issue a finding of Iranian non-compliance with IAEA 
safeguards requirements to the UN Security Council in 
September. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Fitzpatrick went on to say that it is crucial that the 
wording of the resolution and the votes in favor of it are 
lined up before the BOG meeting. However, El Baradei has said 
that he will issue the report on August 29 -- this allows 
only a week for consideration of the report and international 
consultation before the BOG meeting. The USG is pressing the 
IAEA Secretariat to release the report by August 15, 
Fitzpatrick said, and hopes that Turkey will also weigh in 
with the IAEA on this issue. Fitzpatrick also requested that 
Turkey use any influence that it has on countries like 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which have either tended to 
act as apologists for Iran within the IAEA, or have tried to 
expand the Iran issue to include Israel's nuclear program and 
a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. 
 
 
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TURKEY IS VERY CONCERNED OVER IRAN'S 
NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5. (C) Morali said that Turkey is comforted that it is not 
alone in its concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. The 
June BOG meeting demonstrated that many members of the 
international community fully concur with Turkey's position 
on the matter -- Iran's nuclear weapons program must be 
halted and reversed, and it must prove to the international 
community that its nuclear program is intended only for 
civilian, peaceful purposes. An aggressive strategy on the 
part of the IAEA and like-minded states is integral to this 
effort. To that end, Morali promised that Turkey would 
demarche the Egyptians in an effort to ensure their 
cooperation at the September BOG meeting. Morali also 
expressed concern that Iran would try to "clean up" some of 
its nuclear sites in hopes of hiding incriminating evidence. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Morali and Bulent Tulun (Deputy Director-General for 
Disarmament) agreed with the point made by Fitzpatrick and 
Wurmser that Iran does not need enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities for a civilian, peaceful nuclear program. Morali 
promised to raise this point with Iranian representatives. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Tulun also pointed out that the combination of Iran's 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs is of particular 
concern. Fitzpatrick and Wurmser strongly concurred. Wurmser 
also noted that Iran's ballistic missile program is itself 
evidence of an intent to develop nuclear weapons, since it 
does not make strategic sense to develop long-range missiles 
only for the purpose of delivering conventional warheads. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
TURKEY PRESENTS ITS CONCERNS TO IRAN 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶8. (C) Morali stressed that Turkey has made its concerns 
clear to Iran, and provided two specific examples of the 
occasions on which it has done so. He said that the Iranian 
ambassador had recently come to see him, complaining about a 
statement from Turkey in a recent CTBT PREPCOM (Morali told 
him that he must be referring to Turkey's statement before 
the June BOG meeting; it had made no such statement to the 
CTBT PREPCOM). Morali told him that Iran must stop stalling 
the IAEA and "open up." The Ambassador claimed that Iran is 
ready to give IAEA inspectors full access and that it is 
ready to sign the Additional Protocol, with one condition: 
that it reflect in writing that Iran will receive 
international assistance with its civilian nuclear program. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Morali reflected that he believed this condition to be 
acceptable, since Iran already receives such assistance from 
the IAEA. However, he also pointed out that Turkey's official 
position is that Iran should sign the Additional Protocol 
without condition. Fitzpatrick noted that the USG would not 
support any condition to Iran's signing of the Additional 
Protocol. 
 
 
¶10. (C) The Iranian ambassador also raised the "double 
standards" issue (i.e. the Israeli nuclear program). Morali 
told him that Iran should not push this argument, since if it 
starts pointing fingers at other nuclear powers, that implies 
it too wants to become a nuclear power. Turkey's policy is 
clear and consistent: it does not want any of its neighbors 
to have nuclear weapons. 
 
 
¶11. (C) In addition, the Turkish Prime Minister raised this 
issue with the Iranian Deputy President during a meeting in 
May. The Prime Minister told the Deputy President openly, in 
front of many other participants, that Iran must convince the 
international community that it has nothing to hide. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
THE DIFFICULTY IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) At the same time, Morali noted that there are a 
number of factors impeding the effort to convince Iran to 
roll back its nuclear weapons program (besides whatever 
strategic rationale has driven its development). The first is 
that many officials within the Iranian government probably do 
not know the extent of this program within their country. In 
addition, while the reformists don't want Iran to be isolated 
within the international community, they are also unlikely to 
push against the nuclear weapons program, for fear of 
recrimination from the conservatives. 
 
 
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....BUT WE CAN'T BURN OUR BRIDGES WITH IRAN 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶13. (C) Morali admitted that Turkey is handling this issue 
very delicately. The fact that Iran is a direct neighbor, and 
that the current Turkish government has some affinity for 
Iran, means that Turkey will maintain its policy of 
"constructive engagement" with Iran. Turkey's statement 
before the June BOG, for example, was "balanced," in that it 
did note some areas of Iranian cooperation. Nevertheless, 
Turkey fully concurs that a firm message must be given to 
Iran on this issue, even if Turkey presents its concerns 
quietly, out of the public eye. 
 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT: Turkey's response to our concerns on Iranian 
proliferation is clear. They will work closely with us 
diplomatically for an international effort to reverse Iran's 
program. Nonetheless, given Iran's proximity to Turkey, they 
will surely limit public elements of this effort and seek to 
maintain their stance in the bounds of "good neighborliness." 
END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶15. (U) This cable has been cleared with A/DAS Fitzpatrick. 
DEUTSCH