This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CORRUPTION CHARGES DIMMING GENC PARTY'S 
LUSTER 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 3784 
     ¶B. ANKARA 4026 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. Kass. 
Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: New corruption charges against Motorola 
deadbeat Cem Uzan, stemming from his abuse of Uzan-linked 
companies against Turkish citizens in Turkey, are having a 
negative impact on his populist, xenophobic Genc Party's 
standing in the public eye.  The controversy surrounding 
the notoriously shady Uzan clan is undercutting Genc's efforts 
to craft a more moderate (i.e, less anti-U.S.) facade, and to 
cultivate ties to the Turkish State/military seen as 
essential for Genc's emergence as a champion of the Establishment 
against the ruling AK Party.  End Summary. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Hitting, and Hurting, At Home 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Cem Uzan has long been a controversial figure, stemming 
from a string of criminal racketeering and other charges 
against the Uzan business empire.  Over the past year, most of 
the headlines focused on Uzan's defrauding of U.S. and other 
companies, which in a bizarre way had added to Genc's budding 
popularity and mystique among angrier elements of the Turkish 
electorate. In the words of a popular saying on the streets in 
Ankara and other urban locales, "if Uzan is smart enough to 
cheat the Americans he's smart enough to run the country." 
That sentiment seemed to hold sway when the mugs and suckers 
were the "foreigners" that, reflected in the xenophobic 
logorrhea of the Genc leader's stump speech, are intent on 
keeping Turkey perpetually in thrall. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Lately, however, the Uzans have been accused of 
fleecing Turkish citizens, whom Genc claims it is 
trying to protect.  As reported in reftels, the  GOT 
seized Cukurova and Kepez electricity companies -- both 
owned by the Uzans -- for serious accounting malfeasance. 
Uzan subsequently lashed out against AK and P.M. Erdogan in a 
speech in Bursa, prompting Erdogan to file a defamation suit 
against the Genc leader fueling a story that casts Uzan in the 
role of the heavy. 
 
 
¶4. (C) In recent meetings, many of our contacts have indicated 
to us that the corruption charges are beginning to have their 
effect on Uzan's popularity and public support for Genc. 
Huseyin Kocabiyik, former close advisor to former P.M. Tansu 
Ciller (herself the subject of numerous corruption charges) 
and head of an Ankara-based think tank, told poloff June 27 
that Uzan is making major tactical mistakes in his handling of 
the story.  "Uzan should have behaved as if he were a victim 
of oppression -- as Erdogan has done for so long and so 
successfully," he said.  (Note: playing the victim was also a 
Ciller specialty.  End note).  Citing data compiled by his 
firm, Kocabiyik stated that in the wake of Uzan's Bursa speech, 
public support for Genc had dropped from 14% to 12% in a 
matter 
of days. 
 
 
----------------------- 
Takkiye Makeover Muffed 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) The corruption charges and Uzan's public rebuke come as 
Genc is trying to moderate its public image in a bid for 
respectability and the mainstream votes it needs to challenge 
AK.  While the Genc reality remains unedifying, the rhetoric, 
for now, is less overtly hostile to the U.S. (reftels). 
 
 
-- Uzan himself has softened his tone, pleading publicly that 
the USG should "trust me."  Speaking to a group of reporters 
on June 18, Uzan noted, "we have been allies with the U.S. 
for 50-60 years; America is an important friend and ally." 
Privately, Genc officials are trying to convey a similar 
message. 
 
 
-- An Ankara provincial official responsible for political 
affairs told poloff June 12 that Genc will do whatever it 
takes to solve Turkey's problems.  Repeating a message we have 
heard many times from Genc, the administrator averred, "if 
people want to call us fascist, then we are fascist.  If 
people want to call us communist, then we are communist." When asked 
about Genc's rampant anti-American media campaign in the 
run-up to the Nov. 2002 elections and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
official  objected, saying "we have never been anti-American 
-- anti-IMF, maybe, but never anti-American." 
 
 
-- Genc Party's Amasya sub-provincial chairman Ali Dinc 
offered similar sentiments to poloff June 27. Because Genc is against 
the "overly strict conditions" the IMF places on loans, and 
because of U.S. influence in the IMF, "America gets blamed." 
He suggested that the U.S. is "too sensitive" to Genc's 
political tactics.  Kemal Aksungur -- from Genc's media and 
public relations office -- June 24 candidly explained to 
poloff that the anti-American messages were "just tactics," 
but needed to be modified now that Genc is trying to 
become a serious player. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Limits to State Connections? 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (C) As noted in ref A, contacts across the political 
spectrum have told us that Genc is reaching out to the 
military in an attempt to present itself as the only viable 
alternative to AK.  Genc members themselves are trying to 
promote this perception; AK, meanwhile, clearly recognizes 
Genc's potential as State-backed challenger.  A non-political 
(civil servant) Prime Ministry Adviser to Erdogan recently 
asserted to us that Maj. General Erdal Senel, head of the TGS 
Legal Department,is close to Uzan.  "Hurriyet" columnist 
Cuneyt Ulsever, among others, has also indicated to us that a 
number of retired senior military, including the disgruntled 
Gen. Doga Aktulga, are associated unofficially with Genc. 
Kocabiyik, the well-known political operator, suggested that 
there are a number of officers -- both retired and active -- 
who are Genc sympathizers. 
 
 
¶7. (C) There are, however, limits to Genc's efforts to 
cultivate and profit from ties to the military.  Ulsever 
speculated that the corruption charges against Uzan have 
made it more difficult for the Establishment to embrace him 
as its defender against AK.  Kocabiyik discounts support to 
Genc from the highest levels: "the man at the top of TGS -- 
I don't think I need to say his name -- told me that the 
military will not support Genc."  Several generals -- 
Turgut, Acar, Tasdeler, and Kalyoncu -- have privately 
expressed to us their disdain for Uzan and Genc, believing 
Uzan is out only for himself. 
 
 
¶8. (C) According to Yahsin Topaloglu, a researcher/activist 
and independent pollster who has worked for AK and several 
centrist parties, Uzan's outreach to the generals is 
circumscribed by the ethnic considerations that, lying just 
beneath the surface of State-fostered Turkish nationalism, 
are omnipresent and define patterns of relationships and 
influence in Turkish socio-political life.  Uzan, Topaloglu 
stated, is from Adapazari, and of ethnic Bosnian descent. 
While he has friends among his ethnic brethren, he is 
cordially despised by the "Anatolians, Chechens, 
Circassians," and others in the services. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
One Rival Down, One to Go? 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) According to a number of contacts, the Uzans have 
always profited from their relationships with Turkey's 
top guns -- including Presidents Ozal in the 1980s and 
Demirel in the 1990s.  Now, however, Uzan appears to have 
been caught flat-footed by AK -- which is clearly becoming 
adept at some aspects of political hardball as executed in 
Turkey.  While Genc is by no means down for the full ten- 
count, the recent corruption charges have disoriented it, 
siphoning off some of its momentum and, perhaps more 
importantly, tarnishing its image as a party of the people. 
This has left Erdogan and AK, for the moment at least, free 
from serious political threats -- except, perhaps, from 
within AK itself (septel).  Our discussions with several 
senior military officers suggest that, consequently, 
they feel compelled for now to tolerate AK in power, 
precisely because they cannot see Genc as an alternative. 
They would certainly do otherwise if they had any hope 
that Genc could fit the bill. 
PEARSON