This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 004001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/NGA AND PRM, PLEASE PASS TO USAID/OFDA FOR DART 
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD 
CPA BAGHDAD FOR WYLLIE AND LAPENN 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL IZ JO
SUBJECT:  2,200 REFUGEES LANGUISH ON IRAQI-JORDANIAN BORDER 
 
REF:  AMMAN 2427 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified; please handle accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and Comment:  On June 24, Amman-based 
regional refcoord and PRM DART-Iraq team members visited 
UNHCR refugee camps on the Jordanian-Iraqi border and in 
Ruweished, Jordan.  Combined population for the two camps 
remains near 2,200:  1,200 Iranian Kurds from Al Tash 
refugee camp and other undocumented nationals in no-man's 
land (NML) between the Iraqi and Jordanian border posts, as 
well as 899 Palestinians and 163 Somalis and Sudanese in 
UNHCR's refugee camp at Ruweished.  The Somalis and 
Sudanese, previously held in the Jordan Red Crescent's TCN 
transit camp, were moved to the UNHCR camp on June 23 as 
part of the GOJ's decision to close the TCN transit camp. 
The NML population has begun to decrease, with 44 Iranian 
Kurds having left for northern Iraq and another 75 
considering a move in the near future.  The MEK population 
in NML has dwindled from its original 96 members to just 
five.  Although concerned by the poor living and security 
conditions in NML, both the GOJ and UNHCR have indicated 
they are willing to support the NML camp until a solution 
can be found for the Iranian Kurds from Al Tash refugee 
camp.  End summary and comment. 
 
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NML Population:  Al Tash Kurds ... 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) UNHCR reports that the refugee population in no- 
man's land (NML) between the Iraqi and Jordanian border 
posts of Trebil and Karameh has remained stable at roughly 
1,200 since mid-May.  1,100 of the refugees are Iranian 
Kurds from UNHCR's Al Tash refugee camp near Ramadi, Iraq. 
The Al Tash Kurds began arriving at the border on April 14, 
citing a lack of UNHCR services, general insecurity and fear 
of political reprisals from neighboring Arab tribes as their 
reasons for fleeing Al Tash refugee camp (ref).  The Kurds 
have held daily protests since mid-May, demanding entry to 
Jordan and resettlement in third countries - but attracting 
no notice from the hundreds of journalists that pass through 
the Jordanian-Iraqi border en route to Baghdad. 
 
¶3.  (U) Since May 29, when the GOJ told the Kurds they would 
not be allowed to enter Jordan, more than 40 Iranian Kurds 
have left NML for the northern Iraqi village of Kallar, just 
outside Suleimaniyah, where some of the Kurds have 
relatives.  Another 75 are considering leaving NML for 
Kallar but are unwilling to do so without guarantees from 
UNHCR and the coalition forces regarding safety, security, 
humanitarian assistance and resettlement possibilities in a 
third country - possibly the United States.  The 75 Kurds 
told UNHCR they could convince another 600 to leave NML for 
northern Iraq if UNHCR could provide written guarantees for 
resettlement.  The Kurds told PRM officers that they view a 
move to northern Iraq as temporary, a transit point as they 
seek asylum in a third country.  The NML Kurds also reported 
"several hundred" Kurds have left Al Tash refugee camp for 
Kallar, wooed by promises made by visiting PUK officials 
that they would have a better life in northern Iraq. 
UNHCR/Iraq has been unable to confirm how many Kurds have 
left Al Tash camp for northern Iraq.  UNHCR/Iraq also has 
advised UNHCR/Jordan that it would be unable to support an 
assisted movement of NML Kurds to northern Iraq before 
November, as it has neither sufficient staff nor services in 
place to accommodate a new refugee population.  Frustrated 
by UNHCR's slow response, some of the 75 Kurds are 
considering moving to Kallar without UNHCR assistance. 
 
¶4.  (U) The core group of 1,000 Iranian Kurds in NML refuses 
to return to Iraq, claiming it is a "jail" in which they 
suffered for 23 years, restricted to Al Anbar governorate 
and deprived of social and economic opportunities.  The 
Kurds told PRM officers that they doubt that the change in 
Iraq's leadership will bring changes in their situation, 
claiming they suffer from poor UNHCR management as well as 
discrimination from local Arab tribes.  (Some of the Kurds 
claim, for example, that their applications for resettlement 
or voluntary repatriation to Iran languished for three or 
four years without a response from UNHCR.)  Some of the 
Kurds also claim they cannot return to their native Iran, as 
they are political opponents of the clerical regime and 
would face certain death or imprisonment if they returned 
home.  (Several hundred Iranian Kurds from Al Tash camp had 
in fact been rejected for voluntary repatriation by the 
Iranian government.)  The Al Tash Kurds in NML therefore see 
resettlement in a third country as their only option. 
Although the GOJ has indicated it would be willing to allow 
the Kurds to transit Jordan if they had onward documentation 
and tickets for resettlement in a third country, UNHCR 
(correctly, in our opinion) refuses to conduct resettlement 
screening from NML, fearing it would create a pull factor 
for disgruntled refugees and Iraqi nationals from throughout 
Iraq. 
 
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... and a Hodgepodge of Undocumented Others 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) NML also is home to another 100 or so people with 
document problems, a hodgepodge of nationalities and 
political problems.  The original group of NML residents - 
96 Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) members -- has dwindled to just 
five, three of whom have onward travel documentation for the 
UK and are waiting to sort out the details.  Six self- 
described Iranian Persians (former POWs and Iranian 
oppositionists) also fled Al Tash refugee camp and are 
seeking resettlement in a third country.  Two undocumented 
Jordanian Palestinians, who seem to have fled Jordan after 
Black September, also remain at the border hoping for 
resettlement.  A group of 41 undocumented Palestinians who 
arrived after the GOJ reverted to pre-war border practices 
for Palestinians on May 22 (see para 7 for details) also 
remains in NML, hoping to enter - and presumably resettle in 
- Jordan.  As with the Iranian Kurds, UNHCR has told this 
group it cannot be processed for a durable solution - 
including resettlement in a third country - as long as it 
remains in NML.  Like the Kurds, this group refuses to 
return to Iraq. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Palestinians and TCNs in UNHCR's Ruweished Refugee Camp 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6.  (U) UNHCR's refugee camp at Ruweished, Jordan is now 
home to 899 Palestinians from Baghdad and 163 Somalis and 
Sudanese, moved from the Jordan Red Crescent's TCN transit 
camp on June 23 after the GOJ decided to close the camp. 
This group of Somalis and Sudanese are long-term residents 
of Iraq who refuse to return to their country of origin but 
also are unwilling to return to Iraq.  UNHCR has interviewed 
this group and found that only four qualify for UNHCR 
refugee status. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GOJ agreed to admit the Palestinians to the 
UNHCR refugee camp on April 21, seemingly in the hopes that 
its gesture would encourage UNHCR to move the Al Tash Kurds 
to a new refugee camp just inside the Iraqi border.  Once 
the GOJ opened the border to Palestinians, a small but 
steady steam began, resulting in more than 1,100 
Palestinians in the UNHCR refugee camp by mid-May.  On May 
22, the GOJ reverted to its pre-war immigration policy for 
Palestinians, allowing only those with proper documentation 
and prior permission from the General Intelligence 
Directorate to enter Jordan.  (This policy remained in place 
for all other Jordanian borders - including the Allenby 
bridge - throughout the war.)  This decision, coupled with 
terrible sandstorms in late May, has led to a gradual exodus 
from the camp.  As conditions worsen in the camp over the 
summer, UNHCR expects that still more Palestinians will give 
up and return to Baghdad. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Nearly one-third of the Palestinians in the 
Ruweished refugee camp are "mixed marriages," Palestinian- 
Jordanian women (carrying Jordanian passports) married to 
Palestinian-Iraqi men (with either Iraqi or no 
documentation).  UNHCR believes that the GOJ will eventually 
allow this group - roughly 300 individuals - to enter 
Jordan.  According to the camp committee, the remainder of 
the group seeks resettlement in a third country, preferably 
in northern Europe where some of the Palestinians have 
relatives.  The Palestinians represent a mix of 1948 
refugees (all of whom were originally from Haifa, and fled 
Palestine with the retreating Iraqi army), 1967 refugees and 
other Palestinians who were thrown out of the Gulf in the 
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.  (Although the camp 
committee members did not mention this to PRM officers, the 
Palestinian community in Iraq also includes various 
rejectionist factions.) 
 
¶9.  (U) The Palestinians told PRM officers that Iraq is 
"finished" for them.   As a minority within Iraq's Sunni 
minority, they fear they will be the first to suffer 
political reprisals from the Shi'a majority.  The 
Palestinians also said Iraqis view the Palestinians as, at 
best, having been a privileged group under Saddam's regime 
and, at worst, supporters of the Saddam regime.  This is the 
reason, they said, that Palestinians have been kicked out of 
their homes in Baghdad.  (NOTE:  Other Palestinians have 
reported that economics, rather than politics, led to a rise 
in their bargain-basement rents, previously enforced by 
Saddam's regime.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Palestinians also rejected a theoretical 
return to an independent state of Palestine, emphatically 
telling PRM officers that they are from Haifa, inside Green- 
Line Israel and would not be welcome there.  A return to the 
West Bank or Gaza, they said, would not be a return to their 
country of origin.  Moreover, the GOJ's reluctance to accept 
more Palestinian refugees rules out local integration as an 
option.  For these Palestinians, resettlement is perceived 
as their only option.  (NOTE:  Palestinian refugees outside 
UNRWA's areas of operations - e.g., Iraq - fall under 
UNHCR's mandate and therefore could be considered for 
resettlement as a durable solution.  However, the fact that 
these Palestinian refugees are now under UNHCR protection in 
an area of UNRWA operation - Jordan - poses difficult legal 
questions for the two agencies.  Moreover, as UNHCR Jordan 
Representative Sten Bronee noted to PRM officers, UNHCR's 
predominantly Arab-origin expatriate staff in the Middle 
East express great resistance to the idea of resettling any 
Palestinian refugees, due to the implications of such 
resettlement for the larger Palestinian refugee question.) 
 
------------------------------- 
Camp Management and Cost Issues 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) UNHCR and its implementing partners - the Hashemite 
Charitable Organization, CARE, OXFAM and Japan Platform - 
continue to provide services in the Ruweished and NML camps. 
MSF, which had been providing additional medical assistance 
and some psycho-social counseling, ended its program on June 
¶30.  WFP is ending its food assistance on June 30, citing 
its usual policy of providing assistance only to refugee 
populations of more than 5,000 people.  ICRC and UNHCR will 
continue to provide food assistance.  Medical and dental 
care is emerging as a key issue for the NML camp, as UNHCR 
is required to obtain special GOJ authorization to bring NML 
residents into Jordan for specialized treatments.  (The 
nearest hospital is in Ruweished, Jordan - 75 km from the 
NML camp.)  Several NML refugees complained to PRM officers 
that they had not received adequate medical treatment due to 
the difficulties in traveling outside NML.  Refugee morale 
seems to have improved in recent weeks, due largely to the 
efforts of a UNHCR community services officer, seconded by 
Save the Children. 
 
¶11. (U) UNHCR and IOM currently are in negotiations over how 
to handle the costs of caring for the 163 TCNs moved to the 
UNHCR refugee camp on June 23.  UNHCR has recognized only 
four of these TCNs as refugees but has agreed to provide 
basic services on humanitarian grounds.  Water is likely to 
emerge as a key cost-sharing issue for UNHCR and IOM.  After 
three months of supplying water for the then-three refugee 
camps from the municipality of Ruweished, the GOJ has 
determined that it no longer can do so.  The GOJ turned on 
the partially USAID-funded reverse osmosis (RO) water 
treatment unit on June 23, enabling UNHCR to supply water 
for the two camps from the GOJ-dug well near the Ruweished 
refugee camp.  UNCHR officials note that the GOJ turned on 
the RO unit just a few days after the USAID-financed 
maintenance contract expired on June 11.  UNHCR is now in 
negotiations with the GOJ over the cost of maintaining this 
unit.  UNHCR estimates that it will require USD 2 million to 
run the two camps for another six months. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The GOJ's initial decision not to admit the 
Iranian Kurds to Jordan has remained firm and we anticipate 
that it will not change.  Although UNHCR initially 
considered creating a new camp for the Kurds just inside the 
Iraqi border, it has now ruled out the possibility, arguing 
that a new camp would create a pull factor for disgruntled 
nationals and refugees from throughout Iraq and create false 
expectations for resettlement in a third country.  UNHCR 
also believes a new cross-border camp would allow the GOJ to 
formally close the door to asylum seekers.  We agree with 
UNHCR's assessment.  Both the GOJ and UNHCR have indicated 
they are willing to support the NML camp until a solution 
can be found for the Iranian Kurds from Al Tash refugee 
camp.  In the meantime, we are working with UNHCR to 
identify solutions, including a return to Iraq and possibly 
resettlement for some Iranian Kurds in the United States. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The Palestinians' situation is both more 
complicated and potentially more manageable.  The division 
of responsibility between UNHCR and UNRWA is a legal and 
political morass, from which a durable solution for this 
group of Palestinians is unlikely to emerge.  Yet given the 
Palestinians' strong ties to Jordan, UNHCR believes (and we 
agree) that the GOJ eventually will admit some - if not all 
- of the Palestinians to Jordan.  However, it is unlikely 
that the GOJ will take any action regarding the Palestinians 
until the situation at NML has been resolved. 
 
¶14.  (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
GNEHM