This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 001674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - PROSPER/MILLER, EUR - BOGUE, EUR/SCE 
- JONES/GREGORIAN, L/EUR - LAHNE, INR - SPRIGG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.5 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY 
TAGS: PHUM PREL BK HR SR NL ICTY
SUBJECT: ICTY: LILIC'S TESTIMONY AGAINST MILOSEVIC A MIXED 
BAG 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 2170 
 
Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5 (b) and (d) a 
nd 1.6. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  To outside observers, Former Yugoslav 
President Zoran Lilic's testimony against Slobodan Milosevic 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) last week looked like a mixed bag.  Lilic 
gave a detailed accounting of Milosevic's role in 
decision-making in Belgrade and provided strong evidence for 
Milosevic's responsibility for aspects of the conflict in 
Kosovo.  However, Lilic gave direct evidence against the 
Prosecution's claim that Milosevic bears responsibility for 
the July 1995 massacres at Srebrenica.  Chief Prosecutor 
Carla Del Ponte told embassy legal officers that the 
prosecution was not surprised by the testimony and that it 
was, apart from Srebrenica, "good" on all counts.  A senior 
trial attorney in the case, however, gave a much more 
downbeat assessment of Lilic's performance, revealing that 
there was "fierce debate" within the OTP about whether, in 
light of his testimony on Srebrenica and the Sarajevo siege, 
he should be called by the prosecution at all. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Lilic testified before the ICTY after the Government 
of Serbia and Montenegro (SAM) granted him a release from his 
responsibility to maintain state secrets.  The testimony, at 
SAM's insistence, was limited in scope and two government 
representatives were present during the proceedings.  The 
representatives also made it clear that they objected to any 
document dated between 1993 and 1997 being discussed in 
public session.  Most of the three days of testimony (direct 
and cross-examination), however, were held in open session. 
 
¶3. (U) During cross-examination, Milosevic referred to the 
United Nations guarantee to respect the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Yugoslavia and asked Lilic if their 
resistance pushed former President Clinton back to the United 
Nations, since NATO was unable to "set foot in Yugoslavia." 
Judge May interrupted and stated that the witness "cannot 
give evidence for Mr. Clinton."  Milosevic responded that he 
hoped when the appropriate time comes, Judge May will issue 
an order for Mr. Clinton to testify. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
LILIC UNDERMINES PROSECUTION CASE FOR CRIMES IN BOSNIA 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (U) Lilic testified on direct that he was certain that 
Milosevic had not ordered the massacre, stating, "I know that 
he was personally very upset and angry; I think that he was 
very sincere in his behavior and conduct."  Lilic also 
claimed that there was no way that the Yugoslav Army (VJ) was 
involved in the massacre.  Lilic attempted to say more, but 
the Prosecution directed him to another topic.  On 
cross-examination, Milosevic noted that Lilic had mentioned 
Srebrenica several times during his testimony the previous 
day, but that lead Milosevic prosecutor Nice had kept 
interrupting him.  Judge May defended Nice's objections 
saying that he was correct to object to Lilic's opinions of 
Milosevic's involvement in Srebrenica.  Milosevic argued that 
Lilic had detailed knowledge of the events during that time 
period.  Milosevic asked Lilic to comment on Serbian 
involvement in Srebrenica, saying that it was a truly tragic 
and dramatic event.  Lilic responded that no one from the 
Yugoslav leadership could have issued an order or known about 
the massacres.  His impression was that Milosevic was 
"genuinely angry...shaken about it" when Lilic told him what 
had happened.  Lilic testified that Milosevic said, "Those 
crazy Serbs from Pale ...I cannot believe they did something 
like this."  Milosevic asked what the RS's response was to 
their inquiries into the massacre; Lilic responded that the 
RS leadership said they knew nothing about it. 
 
¶5. (U) Lilic did confirm that in the Fall of 1995, the 
Yugoslav army set up a military training center to aid and 
train Bosnian Serb troops.  He testified that General Perisic 
helped set up the facility, but that Milosevic put 
paramilitary leader Dragan Vasiljkovic in charge of running 
it.  Lilic said that when he found out about the training 
center, he was "amazed, and I ordered the camp to be 
disbanded." 
 
¶6. (C) Lilic's testimony relating to Srebrenica, and to 
limited command-and-control over RS forces in Bosnia, did not 
come as a surprise to the Prosecution, as Chief Prosecutor 
Del Ponte told Embassy legal officers directly.  Del Ponte 
gave an impression of being at ease with the testimony and, 
in particular, the positive points drawn out (paras 7 - 14 
below).  Yet Dermot Groome (strictly protect), a senior trial 
attorney (and former Manhattan assistant district attorney) 
with responsibility for the Bosnia portion of the prosecution 
of Milosevic, was much less sanguine about Lilic's 
performance.  He told an Embassy legal officer that there was 
a "fierce debate" within the prosecution team about whether 
Lilic should be called to testify given what they knew of his 
intended testimony.  When embassy legal officer noted that 
Lilic's testimony went beyond opinion, eliciting Milosevic's 
alleged "angry" and "shaken" responses to word of the 
massacres, Groome expressed his worry that the trial chamber 
would treat the testimony as direct evidence laying the 
ground for reasonable doubt that Milosevic knew of the JNA's 
activities in and around the Srebrenica enclave.  Moreover, 
the testimony suggesting a lack of real control over the JNA 
and Bosnian Serb officials could damage the prosecution's 
case that Milosevic bears responsibility for the siege of 
Sarajevo as well.  Groome, whose team is already scrambling 
to unearth evidence linking Milosevic to Srebrenica, left an 
impression of deep frustration that Lilic was allowed to 
testify at all. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION CASE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The Prosecution extracted from Lilic support for its 
case in two principal areas -- his dominating decision-making 
role in Belgrade between 1993 and 1997, and his 
responsibility for atrocities in Kosovo. 
 
¶8. (U)  Milosevic as decision-maker: Lilic testified that 
nothing important happened within official Belgrade without 
Milosevic's knowledge.  He helped the Prosecution untangle 
the web of relationships that tied the Milosevic circle 
together, focusing, for example, on Jovica Stanisic, the Head 
of the Serbian secret service within the Ministry of Interior 
(MUP), a key ally for Milosevic and one of the most powerful 
in the leadership at the time.  According to the 
Constitution, Stanisic was to report to the Minister of 
Interior, but in reality reported directly to Milosevic. 
(NB: Stanisic, in ICTY custody, pled not guilty to OTP 
charges on June 13.)  Lilic testified that the Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) 
"were under the domination and authority of Milosevic." 
 
¶9. (U) He also testified that Milosevic had a "great deal of 
influence" over Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia as well as the 
Yugoslav Army VJ, but that "'control' was too strong of a 
word."  Lilic testified that the VJ briefed Milosevic 
regularly and that the General Staff of the VJ was the only 
source of information they received.  He said that a group of 
Generals remained close to Milosevic to advance their 
careers.  Lilic alternated back and forth as to the Supreme 
Defense Council's (SDC's) power and Milosevic's influence and 
knowledge of all government matters.  Lilic further said that 
Milosevic did not do anything outside his right prescribed by 
the Constitution, but that he did play a dominant role in the 
SDC.  When asked about Milosevic's relationship with Mladic, 
Lilic confirmed other witness testimony that Mladic was very 
unpredictable and unreliable, so the relationship between 
Milosevic and Mladic varied.  The relationship deteriorated 
over time, but once the Vance-Owen Plan failed, efforts were 
made to improve their relationship. 
 
¶10. (U) Kosovo: Much of Lilic's testimony focused on a letter 
sent from General Perisic to Milosevic on June 18, 1998.  The 
letter detailed the problems in Kosovo, particularly the 
illegal activity of the police.  The letter urged Milosevic 
to order a state of emergency in Kosovo and reiterated that 
without a state of emergency, the activities of the VJ there 
were illegal and could be subject to reprisals from NATO and 
the international community.  The letter further accused 
Milosevic of going along with the illegal decisions of the 
SDC and that Milosevic did not have authority to do so, 
violating the principle of subordination and unity of 
command.  In writing the letter, Lilic said that Perisic 
wanted to draw attention to the seriousness of the problems 
there and that any undermining of this would make things 
worse.  He stated that Perisic was replaced four months after 
the letter was written.  In response to Judge May's query as 
to Milosevic's rationale for not responding, Lilic said that 
Milosevic did not want to accept the seriousness of the 
situation which was necessary to recognize and deal with the 
problems.  He also noted that in a state of emergency, the 
police would have been united and attached to the VJ. 
 
¶11. (U)  During the first day of cross-examination, Milosevic 
was nonconfrontational and at times rather complimentary 
towards Lilic, often referring to "we" when inquiring about 
the positive steps the Yugoslav government took during the 
conflicts.  Milosevic's actions and gestures appeared to be 
the result of knowing that Lilic could help him on some 
points.  Milosevic asked, "Did we make every effort for peace 
in Bosnia and Croatia?"  Lilic responded, "Yes, we did.  And 
the product of our efforts was the peace plans offered to the 
world."  Lilic said that it was clear that Milosevic's 
influence was dominant over foreign affairs.  He also said 
that there would have been no Dayton without the persistence 
and pressure from Milosevic.  He mentioned that Karadzic 
obstinately refused all suggestions for a peace plan and that 
no one trusted Karadzic.  Milosevic said, "This is what I 
wanted to hear...no doubt the efforts were crucial."  Lilic 
responded that "Yes, your efforts, your ability and 
negotiations were crucial." 
 
¶12. (U)  However, during the second day of cross-examination, 
the tone turned confrontational as Lilic testified to 
Milosevic's accountability for Kosovo.  Lilic became angry at 
one point and said that he wants his son to be proud to be a 
Serb, but that "there are more Serbs in the ICTY prison than 
there are in Kosovo now" and that they should have done more 
to intervene in Kosovo.  Milosevic focused many of his 
initial questions on the actions of the KLA and seeking 
Lilic's confirmation that there was no discussion within the 
government to expel Albanians from Kosovo.  Lilic testified 
that Milosevic never gave an order to launch an attack on the 
civilian population, and in fact they sought investigations 
into such attacks.  With regard to the Perisic letter, 
Milosevic asked Lilic if the letter was a "smokescreen" for 
what was to have been done in Kosovo and that the necessary 
actions could have been done without a state of emergency 
being issued.  Lilic responded that he could hardly agree and 
that it was Milosevic's opinion at the time that the army 
could have responded to terrorist activities without a state 
of emergency, but that the JNA could have done more if a 
state of emergency had been implemented. 
 
¶13. (U) Milosevic inquired about a letter Lilic sent to 
Milosevic that urged Milosevic to accept the latest United 
Nations proposal given to Milosevic after a G8 meeting in 
Berlin and championed by former German Chancellor Kohl to 
accept a UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.  Lilic stressed 
that all Milosevic had to do was make a public statement that 
he would accept the proposal.  Milosevic then referred to a 
letter which had handwritten notes from both Milosevic and 
Lilic dated around May 5, 1998.  Milosevic was adamant that 
he told Lilic to accept the proposal and said so in the note. 
 In response, Lilic referred to his handwritten note that 
said "useful ambiguity."  Lilic insisted that Milosevic did 
not authorize him to accept the proposal, but more 
importantly, he made it clear to Milosevic that he would have 
to publicly accept the proposal himself.  After Judge May 
asked for clarification, Lilic said that he tried to reach 
Milosevic for almost 2 weeks after the UN proposal was given 
to discuss an end to the conflict.  After that, he sent the 
letter to Milosevic outlining the problems in Kosovo, the UN 
proposal, and urging Milosevic to act quickly. 
 
¶14. (U) Milosevic and Lilic subsequently entered into a 
heated exchange where Milosevic said, "...that is why we 
responded favorably (to the proposal)."   Lilic responded 
with, "But...we did not favorably respond."  Milosevic 
countered, "You said you would send the note to Chancellor 
Kohl--my favorable response."  Lilic responded with, "Did you 
really think I would fax Kohl your handwritten notes?"  Judge 
May then intervened and asked what happened next.  Lilic 
testified that after he noted that Milosevic instructed him 
to be ambiguous in his response, Milosevic was scheduled to 
appear on television to accept the proposal.  Since that did 
not happen, Lilic did not transmit any response to Kohl.  At 
that time, Milosevic told Lilic that he wanted to 
re-establish contacts with the foreign interlocutors. 
 
------------------------- 
THE HEALTH OF THE ACCUSED 
------------------------- 
¶15. (C) Throughout Lilic's testimony, on both direct and 
cross-examination, Milosevic looked vigorous, alert and 
healthy, buoyed especially by those aspects of Lilic's 
testimony that seemed to be given in his favor.  Registry 
legal adviser Christian Rohde (strictly protect), who sees 
Milosevic regularly, confirmed to an embassy legal officer 
that the accused's health has been improving markedly since 
the middle of the spring.  He said that his blood pressure is 
in control and that he seems to be less stressed than in 
earlier portions of the trial.  With no hint of sarcasm, 
Rohde attributed the upturn in Milosevic's health to the 
absence of the accused's wife, Mira Markovic, from The Hague. 
 Early in the spring, many close observers of Milosevic saw 
the dip in his health as a sign of his concern for his wife, 
on the run from Belgrade prosecutors, and the impact of the 
round-up of his Belgrade support network in the aftermath of 
the assassination of Zoran Djindjic.  Rohde reports that 
during her previous visits to The Hague, Markovic -- widely 
known to be the organizing force behind Milosevic's defense 
-- would leave her husband demonstrably stressed and anxious. 
 Her calls from "some former Soviet republic" do not seem to 
impose the same kinds of rigors on him, Rohde reported. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) The OTP took a gamble with Lilic's testimony and, in 
retrospect, may have miscalculated.  While the testimony 
confirmed many points the Prosecution is trying to prove, 
such as direct links to individuals, the army and 
paramilitaries, knowledge of events, and most importantly his 
involvement in Kosovo, it was very damaging on Srebrenica. 
Given that the OTP already had a relatively strong case for 
Milosevic's responsibility for crimes committed in Kosovo, it 
may have been prudent, as some OTP lawyers urged, to forgo 
testimony that undercut the already shaky case on Srebrenica. 
 Limiting direct examination to non-Bosnia topics (with the 
resulting limitation on the scope of the cross examination), 
would at least have deprived Milosevic of an opportunity to 
be cleared by Lilic for any role in Srebrenica.  Lilic's 
value may be further diminished when he returns, "at a 
convenient date," for one additional day for 
cross-examination by Milosevic and the amicus curiae, as well 
as a chance for re-direct and to authenticate the documents 
recently turned over to the OTP. 
SOBEL