This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL KTIA YM KICC
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON 6/16-17 VISIT TO YEMEN: ARTICLE 98 
 
REF: A. 02 STATE 84875 B. SANAA 1263 
 
Classified By: DCM ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
------- 
Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:   ROYG Foreign Minister al-Qirbi pledged his 
support for an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. during the 
June 16-17 visit of U/S Bolton.  On timing, President Saleh 
was equivocal, suggesting that Yemen would not sign until a 
specified list of other Arab states were on board. According 
to the Foreign Minister, Saleh later agreed that Yemen would 
join "some" other Arab signatories by exchanging diplomatic 
notes (on the Egyptian model).  Al-Qirbi estimates the 
Ministry of Legal Affairs will take six to eight weeks to 
complete preparations for the notes. Parliamentary 
ratification of the Rome statute, which Yemen signed in 2002, 
will not come until some time later in the year. End Summary 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Article 98: Important to America 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During his June 16-17 visit to Yemen (septels), Under 
Secretary John Bolton pressed Foreign Minister Abu Bakr 
 
SIPDIS 
al-Qirbi on the urgent need to sign an Article 98 agreement 
with the U.S.  Explaining the importance of the issue to the 
American people, as well as the Administration, U/S Bolton 
assured the Minister that Article 98 is not meant to provide 
immunity for American citizens accused of serious crimes. In 
such circumstances, U.S. courts would provide immediate and 
vigorous prosecution.  The International Criminal Court, in 
contrast, risks becoming politicized and thus losing both 
credibility and effectiveness. 
 
¶3. (C)  U/S Bolton reminded the Foreign Minister that Egypt, 
Djibouti, and Bahrain had already signed Article 98 
agreements, and Kuwait was about to do so.  Yemen should join 
them as soon as possible.  A team of experienced U.S. 
negotiators would be ready to assist with any ROYG questions. 
 
----------------------- 
Endorsing the Agreement 
----------------------- 
¶4.  Al-Qirbi agreed on the importance of concluding an 
Article 98 agreement, having studied the issue for some time. 
His staff had recently completed a report on Article 98, 
recommending an exchange of diplomatic notes, rather than a 
bilateral treaty that would require parliamentary approval. 
Al-Qirbi promised U/S Bolton to refer that report, with his 
endorsement, to the Ministry of Legal Affairs for action. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
President Saleh: Bargaining on Numbers 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  President Ali Abdullah Saleh seemed less forthcoming 
during his Article 98 discussions with U/S Bolton.  Saleh 
said he wanted to see his GCC neighbors and a number of other 
Arab states on board before Yemen signed. His list of 
countries which must act before Yemen included the GCC 
countries, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Mauritania.   Half-jokingly, he proposed that the U.S. commit 
$100 million in development aid if it needed Yemen's 
immediate agreement. 
 
¶6. U/S Bolton reminded Saleh that it was politically 
important for Yemen to sign an agreement as soon as possible. 
 Other Arab States had either signed already, or were in the 
process of concluding agreements; Yemen should not wait for 
the last minute. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Yemeni Timetable: Six to Eight Weeks 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  In a follow-up meeting on June 18 with Charge, FM 
al-Qirbi said he had reviewed U/S Bolton's visit with ROYG 
President Saleh.  Saleh had agreed in principle to an Article 
98 signing, as long as "some" other Arab states were already 
enrolled.   With this presidential green light, Qirbi 
estimated that the Ministry of Legal Affairs would take six 
to eight weeks to prepare for the exchange of notes. 
 
¶8.  The Charge welcomed al-Qirbi's assurances, and again 
stressed the need for Yemen to conclude an agreement as soon 
as possible.  Rather than waiting for other Arab states to 
act, Yemen should lead.  Al-Qirbi quipped that leadership is 
costly in the Middle East, but Yemen would proceed.   Charge 
asked the Foreign Minister to follow the issue personally, 
and promised to supply any information required by the 
Ministry of Legal Affairs.  He stressed that the exact 
wording of the text is very important and should follow the 
successful models already in force to prevent unnecessary 
delay. 
 
¶7.  Qirbi concluded by noting that Yemen's formal 
ratification of the Rome Statute was "months away."  It had 
been referred to the Yemeni Parliament for ratification 
immediately after signing.  However, with the seating of the 
new parliament and government following the April 2003 
elections, the ratification process would have to begin again 
as new business. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  Comment:  FM Qirbi's timeline  - six to eight weeks for 
Legal Affairs to complete preparations for the exchange of 
diplomatic notes - is potentially achievable, given President 
Saleh's nod of approval and the number of Arab states now 
lined up for signature.  We will prod the ROYG on Article 98 
progress at every opportunity, and provide whatever 
information resources are needed to speed the work. End 
Comment 
MISENHEIMER