This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 001411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR L/LEI, S/CT 
DOJ FOR DAAG BRUCE SWARTZ 
RIYADH FOR LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC PGOV KJUS YM TERFIN
SUBJECT: MOAYED: ROYG MAKES AN 11TH HOUR APPEAL 
 
REF: A. SANAA 1256 
 
     ¶B. SANAA 581 
     ¶C. SANAA 518 
     ¶D. SANAA 482 
     ¶E. BERLIN 406 
     ¶F. SANAA 127 
     ¶G. BERLIN 131 
     ¶H. SECSTATE 7011 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Alan G. Misenheimer for Reason 1.5 (b, 
d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  This is an action request - see paragraph 13. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  Begin summary:  Yemen has launched an aggressive 
11th hour campaign for the return of Sheikh Mohamed Ali 
al-Moayed, now awaiting an extradition ruling in Germany on 
charges of support for terrorist organizations.  After 
raising the case with FBI Mueller on June 2, the ROYG 
dispatched two high level envoys to Germany on 6/17.  On 
6/18, FM Qirbi called in the Charge to appeal for Moayed's 
return to Yemen for prosecution in lieu of extradition to the 
US, citing his age, poor health, political naivet, high 
national standing as a cleric and philanthropist, and the 
growing 'street' conviction that he has been judicially 
kidnapped by the FBI.  Also on 6/18, a close advisor to ROYG 
President Saleh contacted the Charge to convey Saleh's 
personal request for Moayed's return to Yemen and a proposal 
for a joint U.S./Yemeni investigation in Sanaa.   Saleh is 
traveling to Germany later this week and has requested a 
response before he departs Yemen.  End summary. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  With the German ruling on Sheikh Mohammed Ali 
al-Moayed's extradition to the US imminent, the ROYG has 
mounted an intense effort to bring Moayed back to Yemen. 
That effort is spurred by pressure from Islah, the 
conservative Muslim opposition party, as well as a growing 
media campaign and high-level appeals to President Saleh in 
support of the Sheikh.  President Saleh, who personally 
authorized funds for Moayed's defense team in Germany, raised 
the case with visiting FBI Director Mueller on June 2, saying 
that ROYG considers Moayed a businessman, not a terrorist 
(ref A).  Saleh suggested that the U.S. have the CIA and FBI 
investigate Moayed's activities, and, when the investigation 
is over, the U.S. should turn Moayed over to ROYG to perform 
its own investigation.  Director Mueller assured President 
Saleh that significant evidence of links to terrorist 
financing have been collected against Moayed and the case 
against him is quite strong. 
 
¶4.  (U)  With the extradition decision expected later this 
month, President Saleh ordered Isma'il Ahmad al-Wazir and 
Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim, members of his Shura (Consultative) 
Council, to travel to Germany on 6/17 to follow the case of 
Moayed and his assistant, Mohammed Zayad.  According to Saba, 
the official news agency, the two envoys will join Moayed's 
defense team and offer legal evidence to prove the 
defendant's "incorruptibility." 
 
¶5.  (C)  During a 6/18 meeting held at FM Qirbi's behest, the 
Charge was informed of ROYG's concern over a letter from 
Moayed's lawyers in Germany complaining about their inability 
to review U.S. provided evidence against their clients. 
Qirbi said he discussed this concern with the German 
Ambassador on June 17 and delivered a diplomatic note (text 
paragraph 15).  The Foreign Minister noted ROYG is focusing 
on the political as well as legal aspects of this case.  Many 
Yemenis view Moayed as a religious, charitable leader.  Qirbi 
voiced ROYG fears Moayed's extradition to the U.S. will 
derail ROYG efforts to enlist popular support for the war 
against terror, and could destabilize the country. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Qirbi suggested that Yemen, Germany, and the U.S. 
could get together to work this out, in lieu of proceeding 
with the extradition.  He believes that, even if Moayed had 
contact with terrorist organizations, he probably didn't know 
what he was doing.  Referring to the U.S. "entrapment" of 
Moayed, Qirbi commented dryly that he is clearly easily duped 
and misled. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In response, the Charge assured Qirbi that he would 
relay the ROYG's concerns to Washington.  He noted that this 
is not a personal attack against Moayed, as it has been 
portrayed in the local press, but part of a worldwide 
initiative to disrupt terrorist funding.  Asked if the ROYG 
had informed Moayed's supporters of the various assurances on 
Moayed requested by Germany and provided by the USG, Qirbi 
replied in the affirmative.  These assurances were an 
important positive element, he said, but not enough. 
 
¶8.  (C)  With the extradition ruling expected soon, the 
Charge highlighted the importance of sharing information in 
the coming days.  Moayed's defense team should urge him to 
begin cooperating fully with U.S. investigators, especially 
by providing full details of fund-raising in the U.S.  Qirbi 
agreed, but added that, if information, including information 
on terrorism, was the major goal, it would be better for 
Moayed to be interrogated in Germany by U.S. and Yemeni 
security.  He would be more cooperative in those 
circumstances than if he were taken to the U.S. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Qirbi further noted that the defense team was 
concerned about Moayed's deteriorating health, which has also 
been cited in recent press reports.  He asked that we confirm 
or deny this information. 
 
¶10.  (C)  At 10:00pm on 6/18 Mohamed Sudam, personal advisor 
and translator to President Saleh called the Charge to convey 
"an urgent personal message from President Saleh to the U.S. 
Administration".  The message (text para 14) is urgent -- 
Saleh travels to Germany on Friday June 20 and Moayed is 
among his top concerns. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Comment:  These unusual late night demarches 
immediately follow Qirbi's strong pitch to Charge earlier in 
the day.  The structure and phrasing of this evening's 
message (para 14), no less than the fact that it was 
delivered by the President's go-to adviser for dealings with 
the Americans, indicates that it really is a personal message 
from Saleh. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Comment continued:  The suggestion that the U.S. 
interrogate al-Moayed in Germany, or, even better, return him 
to Yemen for prosecution, reflects Saleh's genuine worry over 
domestic consequences if Moayed is sent to the U.S.  It also 
reflects his strong belief that political problems are best 
handled by personal negotiations, not by impartial judicial 
proceedings.  For Saleh, the weight of evidence against 
Moayed is easily balanced by the political consequences of 
angry domestic reaction as well as the increased economic 
devastation that would follow another terrorist attack 
against US or German interests.  End comment. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Action Requested:  Please advise if it will be 
possible to provide Post with a NIACT reply by COB 6/19 on: 
1) Response to Saleh's request that Moayed be returned to 
Yemen; 2) ROYG request that Moayed be interrogated in 
Germany; and/or 3) an update on Moayed's health condition. 
Charge told Qirbi on 6/18 that the best way to transform this 
case constructively would be for Moayed himself to cooperate 
with U.S. investigators seeking information on fund-raising 
in the U.S.  Post offers this as a possible point for 
inclusion in a U.S. reply to Saleh. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Text of President Saleh's 6/18 personal message to 
the U.S. Administration: 
 
(Begin text) 
 
President Saleh submits his personal request that al-Moayed 
be released and handed over to Yemen.  This is justified 
because he was not involved in terrorist acts.  If he had 
been, Yemen would be the first to investigate him, arrest him 
and break his head (sic). 
 
After his return to Yemen, he would be kept under arrest. 
There could be a joint U.S.-Yemeni investigation.  If the USG 
wishes, Germany could also participate. 
 
This question is being submitted in the common interest of 
Yemen and the United States. 
 
The President will leave for Germany in the next two days, 
and hopes to receive a positive answer from the U.S. side 
prior to his departure. 
 
(End Text) 
 
 
¶15.  (C)  Text of ROYG's June 17, 2003 diplomatic note to the 
German Embassy: 
 
(Begin text) 
 
No.: 1/144/102/1315 
Date: June 17, 2003 
 
Republic of Yemen 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Minister's Office 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen 
presents its best compliments to the Embassy of the friendly 
Germany in Sana'a. 
In reference to the subject of the two Yemen citizens Mohamed 
Ali Hasan al-Maiad and his companion, the Ministry could not 
understand the deprivation of the defense lawyers of the two 
arrested Yemeni citizens, requested for extradition by the 
United States of America, from knowing the decisively 
important records in connection of the evaluation of the U.S. 
request of their extradition.  The Ministry could not either 
understand the uncertainty of the legal prosecution that 
deprives the two-mentioned lawyers from knowing the referred 
records.  On the basis of all these uncertainties expressed, 
the Yemeni party has inquired the details of the subject once 
again in a way that allows it to corroborate what is 
mentioned as follows: 
 
The U.S. request for extradition is basically founded on 
extracted information according to the information mentioned 
in the request of the U.S. including audio records and 
recorded video tapes in Frankfurt.  These records, judging 
upon the circumstances in which they were taken and the 
permission of their transforming to be in U.S.'s possession 
must, logically and legally speaking, be submitted by German 
authorities.  Therefore, the legal interest of the two Yemeni 
citizens, without any additional explanation, is not 
obviously guaranteed to be fairly and objectively handled 
unless the defense lawyers have the access to find out the 
information the records contain.  These lawyers were not able 
to do so although they frequently requested to find out the 
information the records contain whether from the concerned 
authorities or even getting the records from these 
authorities, having a look at them and eventually returning 
them back later.  In addition, these lawyers were not 
informed even of the names of proper authorities that keep 
the records and the reference number that these files carry. 
What these lawyers know is only reference number that enables 
them to ask for a legal assistance from the Public 
Prosecution in the Regional Frankfurt Court.  The number of 
the reference is 9409AR204640/02.  That file does not 
contain, according to the Public Prosecution, any reports 
regarding the records conducted while the two Yemen citizens 
were subjected to monitoring.  In addition, the request of 
the two defense lawyers to find out what the file with the 
mentioned reference contains was not responded to. 
 
The Yemeni party sees what is going on as a quite striking 
fact when the defense lawyers were deprived in such a way to 
go ahead and defend the two Yemeni citizens. 
 
The government of the Yemen would like to mention here what 
was mentioned in the note received from the lawyer Mr. Klaus 
Gunter Newman dated March 27, 2003 that requests the return 
of the two Yemeni citizens to their country instead of that 
practice that represents a violation of the International 
Law.  The government of Yemen renews its request of the 
return of the two Yemeni citizens and handing them over to 
Yemen. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this 
opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the friendly German 
Republic its best respect and highest appreciation. 
 
To:  The Embassy of Germany 
     Sana'a 
 
(End text) 
 
 
MISENHEIMER