This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2013 
TAGS: PREL IT IS KPAL EG JO
SUBJECT: PM BERLUSCONI'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
REF: A. ROME 2495 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 106646 
 
Classified By: ACTING POL MC JOHN BASS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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BERLUSCONI SEEING NEITHER ABU MAZEN NOR ARAFAT 
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¶1. (C) PM Berlusconi's swing through the Middle East (Israel, 
Jordan, and Egypt June 9-11) ruffled (French) feathers only 
because some chose to misconstrue Italian motives, 
Berlusconi's deputy diplomatic advisor told us June 18. 
Scarante said French FM de Villepin's criticism of 
Berlusconi's decision not to see Arafat was off-base.  The 
three visits were bilateral in nature; thus there was no 
obligation for Berlusconi to see either Abu Mazen or Arafat. 
Moreover, added Scarante, even though the EU feels that 
Arafat is an important symbol of the Palestinian cause, there 
is no common formal EU position on meeting with Arafat.  The 
EU recognizes that Abu Mazen is the head of the Palestinian 
Government and deals with him in such capacity.  Berlusconi 
had asked to meet with Abu Mazen.  When Abu Mazen told him he 
should also see Arafat, the PM decided to keep his word to 
President Bush (ref B), not see any Palestinian officials, 
keep the visit to Israel strictly bilateral, and invite Abu 
Mazen to Italy soon. 
 
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PRESIDENCY CONTACTS WITH ARAFAT GOVERNED BY EU POSITION 
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¶2. (C) Scarante said the Berlusconi government would have to 
determine how to handle contacts with Arafat during its EU 
Presidency if the EU ever reached a common formal position, 
implying it would be highly unlikely to do so.  As President 
of the EU, Berlusconi would have to respect any formal 
position the EU reaches on Arafat.  So far however, stressed 
Scarante, the only common position on Arafat is that he 
should play a symbolic role and the real power should be in 
the hands of Abu Mazen.  Scarante did not expect much 
discussion of Abu Mazen/Arafat/the MEPP at the June 20-21 EU 
Summit in Thessalonika. 
 
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BERLUSCONI SATISFIED WITH HIS VISIT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) During his three days in the Middle East, Berlusconi 
sought local perspective on the situation in the Middle East 
from PM Sharon, King Abdullah, and President Mubarak.  He 
also wanted to develop the positive personal rapport with 
these key leaders that would help Italy carry out its mission 
as EU President within the Quartet.  Sharon told Berlusconi 
that he welcomed greater EU involvement in the MEPP as long 
as the EU position was well-balanced.  Mubarak remained 
convinced that Arafat could still play an important role and 
cautioned against relying solely on Abu Mazen who, according 
to Mubarak, is too weak politically within the territories 
and does not have the means necessary to combat terrorism by 
himself.  Berlusconi stressed to the three leaders that a 
"Marshall Plan" type of economic aid package to the 
Palestinian economy was not only an economic tool but also a 
mandatory political tool needed to reach a comprehensive 
peace in the region.  The three leaders agreed on the need to 
revive the Palestinian economy.  Berlusconi also offered to 
host the first international peace conference called for in 
the roadmap during the Italian Presidency in Erice, Sicily. 
Sharon did not object to the idea as long the situation on 
the ground actually mirrored what to be expected at the end 
of the first phase of the roadmap. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: Berlusconi and Frattini continue to publicly 
maintain that the PM's trip to the Middle East June 9-11 was 
at the request of the President.  By casting it in this 
light, Berlusconi avoided an embarrassing court hearing he 
was supposed to attend in Italy June 11 on a pending 
corruption case (ref A). 
 
¶5. (C) Comment continued: "Don't meet Arafat" is probably the 
message we have delivered most often to senior Italian 
officials in the past months.  Italian officials assured us 
before the PM's visit that he was not going to see Arafat 
(ref A).  The President's reiteration of this point just 
prior to Berlusconi's departure ended any remote possibility 
he would have considered seeing Arafat.  Even though the EU 
 
does not have a common formal position in favor of seeing 
Arafat, it did ruffle some feathers; but this is clearly a 
price Berlusconi was willing to pay.  Berlusconi's decision 
underscores the respect he has for the President.  It also 
shows his desire to play an important part in the Quartet, 
not only by having a more balanced position on the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue than previous Italian governments 
have, but also by being closer to the US position.  This will 
not make his job any easier with some EU countries, but it is 
certainly a good sign on his ability to work well with us in 
the Quartet.  End comment. 
 
 
Sembler 
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 2003ROME02766 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL