This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002702 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2013 
TAGS: PREL CY IT UN
SUBJECT: SCC WESTON DISCUSSES CYPRUS WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS 
 
 
Classified By: POL MC TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: In June 11 meetings with Italian MFA 
officials and Diplomatic Advisors to PM Berlusconi, Special 
Coordinator for Cyprus Tom Weston, accompanied by Cyprus desk 
officer Marc Collins, discussed the status of negotiations on 
Cyprus and pointed out likely turns in the road during 
Italy's EU presidency.  Our Italian interlocutors said that 
the GOI views the Cyprus issue in the broader terms of 
transatlantic cooperation.  Weston said that the US and the 
EU should use Turkey's EU membership candidacy as an 
incentive for Turkey to press for a Cyprus settlement.  On UN 
SecGen Annan's plan, Weston said that the SecGen wants to 
resume negotiations, but only after an expression of 
political will by all the parties to support a settlement. 
Weston urged caution about possible Greek Cypriot attempts to 
"Europeanize" the Cyprus issue, and reiterated the importance 
of reaching a settlement by the time of Cyprus, actual EU 
accession in May 2004, in order to incorporate it into the EU 
Accession Treaty as needed. END SUMMARY. 
 
Mutual US-EU Understanding on Cyprus 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) During a June 11 meeting with Bruno Archi and 
Francesco Talo, diplomatic advisors to PM Berlusconi, SCC 
Weston encouraged the Italians to use the long-shared US-EU 
goal of a Cyprus settlement as a positive factor in restoring 
transatlantic relations during the Italian EU Presidency. 
Talo said that the GOI views the Cyprus issue in the broader 
terms of transatlantic cooperation and is focusing on what 
actions it can take (i.e., confidence building, institution 
building measures) during its EU presidency to help further a 
Cyprus settlement.  Integrating new members (such as Cyprus) 
is a GOI priority during its presidency, Talo said, including 
facilitating Turkey's EU membership.  The GOI remains solidly 
behind the UN plan, and views spring 2004 as a window of 
opportunity to reach an agreement. 
 
Dealing with EU Partners 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) SCC Weston noted that several recent 
confidence-building measures announced by the Greek Cypriots 
to support Turkish Cypriots have not been enthusiastically 
followed up on.  Claims by the new Greek Cypriot president 
Papadopoulos that the UN plan needed changes, leading to 
maneuvers to "Europeanize" the plan, have thus far been 
unsuccessful, SCC Weston said, but will bear careful 
watching.  Papadopoulos needs to commit to SecGen Annan 
before this fall's UNGA that he is prepared to finalize a 
settlement plan in early 2004 that could then go to 
referendum before May 2004, SCC Weston said.  In Turkey, the 
reform effort needs to be strengthened, so that PM Erdogan 
may strengthen his political position and overcome resistance 
from the &Deep State8 in pushing for a Cyprus deal.  While 
PM Erdogan knows the Cyprus question must be resolved, he has 
not grasped that it is in Turkey's interest to settle by May 
rather than December 2004.  The outcome of the Turkish 
Cypriot elections in December may work to PM Erdogan's 
advantage in pushing for a settlement, SCC Weston said. 
¶4. (C) Archi noted that the European Commission report on 
Turkey's EU candidacy was due in October.  A positive report 
could lead to the start of negotiations, which could impact 
the Cyprus standoff.  Talo commented that building EU 
members' support, particularly in Germany, for Turkey's 
membership would be important. Weston added that, while the 
current Greek government has played a positive role, the GOG 
is still developing its relationship with the newly elected 
Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos.  The Greek Cypriot 
position will likely become more entrenched once Cyprus joins 
Greece in the EU.  Should the idea of an EU envoy or special 
negotiator resurface at the EU Summit in Thessolonika, SCC 
Weston stressed that it would be unworkable to have a Greek 
candidate serve in that capacity. 
 
Expression of Political Will 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) SCC Weston presented Amb. Paolo Pucci di Benisichi, 
Director General, MFA Bureau for Europe, with a brief review 
of developments on Cyprus and a timeline of turns in the road 
during the Italian EU presidency.  Weston said that the UN 
SecGen seeks to resume negotiations based on the Annan plan, 
but first wants a demonstration of political will by all the 
parties, which would include finalization of the plan and 
dates to put it to a referendum. Weston noted that so far 
only the Greek Cypriots have expressed the necessary 
political will. 
 
¶6.  (C) Pucci di Benisichi commented that the architecture of 
the Annan plan was good because it made balanced, acceptable 
 
concessions to both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots. 
Unfortunately, the plan had not succeeded, largely because 
Turkey was not prepared to accept it, he said.  Denktash was 
in a relatively comfortable situation as leader of the 
&TRNC,8 and wasn't willing to give up his leadership 
control in a reunified Cyprus, according to Pucci di 
Benisichi.  In addition, PM Erdogan was not able to continue 
his support for the plan once he became PM, due to the 
strategic influence of the TGS in Turkish society, he 
explained.  Finally, Turkey did not want to weaken its 
bargaining position on Cyprus without first knowing its 
future in the EU.  Despite Turkey's lack of political will, 
Pucci di Benisichi said it would be a mistake to pursue other 
solutions apart from the Annan plan. The opening of the green 
line had been a positive step in providing for direct 
relations between both sides, but such confidence-building 
measures should not substitute for a final settlement.  PM 
Berlusconi had offered to help bring the parties together to 
develop contacts and strengthen relations within the context 
of the Annan plan, he said. 
 
Turkish Intentions 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) SCC Weston agreed with Pucci di Benisichi's 
assessment, but said that the US had a different perception 
of PM Erdogan's actions.  PM Erdogan changed his position on 
the Annan plan largely because of the Turkish parliament's 
vote on Iraq, according to SCC Weston.  He noted that PM 
Erdogan is facing a leadership crisis within his Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and, thus, is attempting to pass a 
reform package that would establish civilian control over the 
military. If successful, PM Erdogan will not only increase 
his power within the AKP, but also advance Turkey's 
possibility for EU accession, which PM Erdogan has chosen to 
make a key measure of his party's success.  The US and the EU 
should use PM Erdogan's strong desire for EU accession as a 
lever to pressure Turkey into pursuing a Cyprus settlement. 
Erdogan needs to focus on December 2004 rather than May 2004 
to ensure a settlement is incorporated into the accession 
treaty.  The Greek Cypriots will not be as willing to 
compromise after May, he noted. 
 
Greek Cypriot Maneuvering 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On the Greek Cypriot side, SCC Weston pointed out the 
possibility of Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos pursuing 
changes in the Annan plan. SCC Weston said that the US will 
continue to press the Greek Cypriots to demonstrate the 
necessary political will for a settlement based on the Annan 
plan.  In order for the U.S. to pressure Turkey, the Greek 
Cypriots need to suggest dates for referendum and support 
measures aimed at improving the standard of living for 
Turkish Cypriots.  Weston noted the importance of finalizing 
the plan by January 2004, and holding a referendum prior to 
May 2004 in order to incorporate a settlement into the EU 
Accession Treaty.  Once a settlement is written into the 
Treaty, there is a much better chance of sustaining the 
agreement in the face of legal challenges from European 
courts. 
 
¶9.  (C) SCC Weston has cleared this cable. 
SKODON 
NNNN 
 2003ROME02702 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL