This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM NLD ASSK
SUBJECT: RAZALI SAYS ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH, BUT WHAT ABOUT 
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION? 
 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  UN Special Envoy Razali had a brief meeting 
with Aung San Suu Kyi this morning (June 10) and reported to 
diplomats later that she was not injured and was "feisty, as 
usual."  While Razali was quite pleased, with good reason, 
that he gained access to ASSK, he made no progress on 
reversing the SPDC's recent crackdown on the opposition. 
With all NLD leaders under detention, all NLD offices closed, 
and arrests of members continuing, conditions are now worse 
than they were in October 2000 when the SE began his mission. 
   Most distressing is that Razali was unable to address the 
larger objective of focusing the SPDC (particularly Senior 
General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to make tangible 
progress on the road to national reconciliation.  End Summary. 
 
Razali Confirms ASSK Is Okay 
 
¶2. (C)  On June 10, SE Razali told diplomats seeing him off 
at the airport that he had just met with NLD General 
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi and that she was in good 
 
SIPDIS 
condition.  He said ASSK was outspoken and "feisty, as usual" 
and she "did not have a scratch on her."  The meeting took 
place at an undisclosed location (Razali told us yesterday 
that he had agreed with authorities not to disclose the 
location) and Razali's three assistants, who usually 
accompany him in meetings with ASSK, were not allowed to 
attend.  Instead, Brigadier General Than Tun, who normally 
serves as military intelligence's liaison officer with ASSK, 
was in the room during the meeting.  As evidence of ASSK's 
good health, Razali told the diplomats that she appeared to 
be giving some terse instructions to BG Than Tun in Burmese 
periodically during the meeting. 
 
¶3. (C)  Razali would not comment on what he discussed with 
ASSK but in response to a direct question said he did not 
raise the issue of the May 30 attack on her party as they 
traveled in Sagaing Division.  (Note: It seems odd that 
Razali would not raise this issue, since the attack is what 
precipitated ASSK's detention and international concerns that 
she was injured.  Hopefully, he will provide more information 
on this in a more private meeting.  End Note.)  The COM said 
she hoped Razali had conveyed to ASSK the intense 
international interest and concern in her well-being.  He 
replied that she was aware of "all this." 
 
No Shift Evident In SPDC Position 
 
¶4. (C)  The COM asked Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win, 
who was presiding over the send-off, whether anyone else 
would now be able to have access to ASSK.  The DFM responded 
that, "in all honesty, we are not thinking along those lines 
for the time being."  When the COM asked why ASSK continues 
to be held incommunicado, the DFM said it was "for her own 
safety and security." 
 
¶5. (C)  While it is a relief that the SE has been able to 
determine that ASSK is alive and well, Razali's brief and 
closely monitored meeting with her was the minimum the SPDC 
could have done to address international criticism generated 
by the May 30 attack on her convoy and ensuing crackdown on 
the NLD.  The SPDC probably calculated that they might not be 
able to weather the storm of international protest (and 
possibly domestic unrest) if Razali left Rangoon 
empty-handed.  Having made this concession to international 
pressure, we expect the SPDC will now slide back into 
business as usual, and continue their crackdown on the NLD. 
(The DFM's remarks on her continued "protective custody" are 
the handwriting on the wall.) 
 
¶6. (C)  The SPDC's crackdown over the past ten days has 
produced conditions worse than those when Razali began his 
mission in October 2000.  At that time, at least some NLD 
offices were still open (none are now) and ASSK was under 
detention at her residence and could receive some 
international visitors.  Now she and NLD Vice Chairman U Tin 
Oo are being held incommunicado at undisclosed locations (and 
his health is still a concern), all other NLD leaders are 
under house detention, and arrests of NLD members are 
continuing. 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment:  Razali was quite pleased, with good reason, 
that he gained access to ASSK.  In his determination to do 
this, however, he failed to get any commitment from the SPDC 
on next steps on reversing their crackdown on the NLD. 
Razali noted (without apparent irony) that both Secretary One 
Khin Nyunt and Vice Senior General Maung Aye had assured him 
that they were still committed to the national reconciliation 
process.  Most distressing is that Razali was unable to 
address the larger objective of focusing the SPDC 
(particularly Senior General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to 
make tangible progress on the road to national 
reconciliation. 
Martinez