This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM ASSK
SUBJECT: RAZALI: NO ACCESS TO ASSK AS YET, MEETING WITH 
MAUNG AYE ON JUNE 9 
 
REF: RANGOON 664 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  Late on June 7, Special Envoy Razali 
briefed COM Martinez on his meeting earlier in the day with 
SPDC Secretary One Khin Nyunt.  Khin Nyunt told Razali that 
the crackdown on the NLD was in response to actions by ASSK 
that constituted an unacceptable threat to the SPDC.  He 
assured Razali that ASSK was in good health and provided two 
photos dated May 31 to prove it.  Razali said he did not 
contest Khin Nyunt's justification for the crackdown, 
choosing instead to make the case that it was absolutely 
essential that he gain access to her on this visit.  Khin 
Nyunt said this was not his decision to make and asked for 
Razali to make the case for access to ASSK directly to Vice 
Senior General Maung Aye in a meeting early Monday.  The SE 
is well aware that this may just be a ploy to wear out his 
patience so he will leave and the SPDC can claim that he 
"quit."  Razali is determined to go the last mile and see 
Maung Aye, although he did not seem hopeful of the outcome. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Special Envoy Razali and his team (Hitoki Den, Damon 
Bristow, and Leon DeReidmatten) met with COM Martinez on June 
7 to provide a read-out of his meeting earlier in the day 
with SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt.  In what he 
termed "a long session" with Khin Nyunt, Razali said he made 
a strong case for access to Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), saying, 
among other things, that it would be an embarrassment to 
ASEAN to not allow the Special Envoy access.  Razali said 
Khin Nyunt responded with a long explanation of the SPDC's 
perception that ASSK posed an unacceptable threat to the 
state based on her recent actions.  Khin Nyunt provided 
photos of crowds that have gathered to hear ASSK at various 
stops and said she had begun to deviate from the agreement 
she had with the SPDC on the parameters of her travel.  Khin 
Nyunt said that in addition to the agreed to visits to NLD 
offices, ASSK had begun impromptu visits to monasteries and 
delivering roadside talks, often taking the opportunity to 
criticize the government and the performance of civil 
servants.  Khin Nyunt stated that the regime had evidence 
that ASSK had also been meeting with other political parties, 
some of whom had ties to groups responsible for recent 
bombings in Burma. 
 
¶3. (C)  In a strange twist, Razali said Khin Nyunt posited 
that ASSK's more threatening stance began after a January 
2003 meeting she had with ex-Charge d'Affaires to Rangoon 
Priscilla Clapp (Note: Clapp made a personal visit to Rangoon 
in January.  If she met with ASSK, it was with no Embassy 
involvement.  End Note.)  COM asked Razali to clarify if Khin 
Nyunt indicated that the regime believed that Clapp was in 
Rangoon on instructions from Washington or if they understood 
that she was on a personal visit.  Razali said this was not 
clear from what Khin Nyunt said but the regime clearly linked 
the change in ASSK's strategy to the Clapp visit.  (Comment: 
This is in all likelihood a red herring thrown out by Khin 
Nyunt in order to build on the theme that ASSK is a pawn of 
foreign governments.  We do not know, however, how much the 
regime may believe its own propaganda.  End Comment.)  Khin 
Nyunt said that the regime had evidence that the NLD had 
recently been working with other political parties to "bring 
things to a boil" before Razali's visit and that there was a 
plan to proclaim democracy on June 17, ASSK's birthday and to 
demand a transfer of power by September. 
 
¶4. (C)  Razali said he was dumbfounded by the logic behind 
Khin Nyunt's presentation.  "What do they expect, the people 
love her, of course they are going to turn out."  And he was 
very concerned with the regime's response to this perceived 
threat; "If they think the crowds that came out to see her 
were bad, wait until they see what will happen if they 
continue to hold her."  He deemed it totally illogical to 
respond to this perceived threat with a harsh crackdown. 
Razali said he did not want to take on the substance of Khin 
Nyunt's presentation at that point and, instead, he told Khin 
Nyunt there would be time to hash through all of these issues 
later but the immediate priority was to get access to ASSK. 
Khin Nyunt responded by showing Razali two photographs dated 
May 31 showing ASSK sitting on a four-poster bed in nice 
surroundings with a few females, possibly her assistants. 
Razali said ASSK looked fine, "not a scratch," in the photos, 
but he told Khin Nyunt that this was no substitute for 
meeting with her.  At this point, Khin Nyunt told Razali, "I 
can't do it, it's not my decision, it is a group decision." 
Razali implored Khin Nyunt to take the issue to the others 
necessary to make the decision and make the case, reiterating 
that it was of utmost importance. 
 
¶5. (C)  Khin Nyunt finally responded by asking if Razali 
would meet with Vice Senior General Maung Aye on Monday, June 
9 in the morning to make the case for access to ASSK directly 
to him.  Razali told COM that this would be the first 
substantive meeting he would have ever had with Maung Aye. 
Razali speculated whether Khin Nyunt needed Maung Aye's 
support in order to take the issue to Senior General Than 
Shwe or if perhaps Maung Aye is behind the recent hard-liner 
retrenchment and crackdown.  Razali said Maung Aye has gone 
to lengths to avoid any substantive discussion with him, so 
Razali looks forward to hopefully gaining an insight into the 
decision making process of the junta's top three, in addition 
to obtaining access to ASSK.  He said he was not very 
confident that they would allow him access to her but there 
was at least a small chance.  At any rate, he felt that he 
would probably know after the Maung Aye meeting whether or 
not he would gain access to ASSK.  If not, he said he would 
probably leave on the noon flight to Kuala Lumpur. 
 
¶6. (C)  Discussing the intense press interest in his visit, 
Razali said he would just say at this point "he continues to 
work hard to obtain access to ASSK."  After discussing 
various scenarios for a departure statement with the COM, he 
felt it probably best to provide a short statement in Rangoon 
before departing for KL where he will provide a full briefing 
to the international press. 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment:  The SE is well aware that the SPDC is 
probably trying to wear out his patience hoping he will leave 
so they can claim that the SE "gave up."  Razali is 
determined, however, to go the last mile and see Maung Aye on 
June 9.  At this point though the SE did not seem hopeful of 
getting access to ASSK.  This is particularly worrisome as we 
and others in the diplomatic community are receiving more 
frequent reports that ASSK may have received serious injuries 
in the May 30 attack.  End Comment. 
Martinez