This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/CM, DRL-A/S CRANER, PRM 
LONDON FOR SOUTH ASIA WATCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL NP CH
SUBJECT: TIBETAN REFUGEE DEPORTATION: POST-MORTEM 
 
REF: (A) SECSTATE 144931 (B) KATHMANDU 715 (C) 
 
     KATHMANDU 753 (D) KATHMANDU 984 (E) 
     KATHMANDU 997 (F) KATHMANDU 998 (G) 
     KATHMANDU 1018 
 
-------------- 
Summary 
--------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Despite strenous efforts by the Embassy to dissuade it 
from doing so, the Government of Nepal on May 31 deported 18 
Tibetan refugees to China. Th Mission began working this 
issue in late April shortly after the refugees were first 
detained.  Post pressed for the refugees' release at all 
levels of the Government of Nepal (GON), from the King down 
to officials within the Home and Foreign Ministries, the 
National Police and the Immigration Office.  On June 4, Home 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mandal as well as Foreign 
Ministry Secretary Acharya gave strong assurances that the 
deportation was a one-time occurrence and did not signify a 
change in Nepal's official policy of allowing Tibetan 
refugees to transit the country.  Acharya also confided that 
the Chinese had exerted unusual pressure in this specific 
case, confirmed our suspicion that the decision was made at 
the highest level of government, and repeated with 
resignation that the decision was one of the last made by the 
outgoing government.  Post conveyed that the release of the 
one remaining Tibetan refugee, who had arrived just days 
after the group of 21 refugees, to UNHCR would go far to show 
the West of Nepal's commitment to allow future Tibetans to 
transit the country.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Overview of Events 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After the April 15 detention of 21 Tibetan refugees 
(the 18 deported refugees plus 3 young children who were 
later released to UNHCR) (Ref B), Ambassador Malinowski met 
April 25 with Home Secretary Tikka Datta Niraula (Ref C) and 
May 9 with King Gyanendra to press for the their release and 
to convey the importance the U.S. places on the plight of the 
Tibetan refugees. 
 
¶3. (C) On May 29, the Embassy learned that the Department of 
Immigration was preparing to hand over to Chinese Embassy 
representatives 18 Tibetans detained on immigration 
violations. Upon receipt of this information, Emboffs 
contacted Home Ministry Joint Secretary Niranjan Baral to 
stress the importance of abiding by internationally respected 
norms and established practice.  Emboffs also contacted 
Immigration Director Subarna Lal Shrestha, who suggested that 
the deportation to China was "per our regulation," referred 
Emboffs back to the Home Ministry.  EmbOffs, in a follow-up 
call to Home Ministry Joint Secretary Baral, learned that the 
international community's intervention, including that of the 
U.S., had made the Ministry reconsider the matter (Ref D). 
 
¶4. (C) On May 30, Charge delivered Ref A demarche to Foreign 
Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya, who denied that there had been 
 
SIPDIS 
a change in GON policy toward Tibetans transiting Nepal (Ref 
E).  Efforts to contact the Home Secretary throughout the day 
proved futile.  At 0600 on Saturday May 31, EmbOffs learned 
that the police were preparing to hand over the Tibetan 
detainees to the Chinese Embassy.  EmbOff immediately called 
Home Ministry Secretary Tika Datta Niraula at his residence, 
but was hung-up on after identifying herself as a U.S. 
diplomat.  Repeated attempts to call back were unsuccessful. 
After attempts to call Ministry Joint Secretary Baral proved 
in vain, Charge drove to Hanuman Dhoka jail to meet the 
police and attempt to avert the detainees' deportation. 
Unfortunately, by the time he arrived (8:00am), the detainees 
were gone (Ref F) and senior police officers made themselves 
unavailable.  The following workday (June 2), the U.S. 
Mission released a press statement deploring the GON decision 
to deport the 18 Tibetans.  EmbOffs' repeated calls to the 
Home Ministry went unanswered. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GON Assurances: No Change in Policy Toward Tibetans 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C)  In a June 4 meeting with Home Minister and Deputy 
Prime Minister Badri Prasad Mandal, Charge received 
assurances that GON humanitarian policy toward Tibetan 
refugees in Nepal had not changed and that future Tibetan 
refugees will be processed as before the deportation.  Mandal 
confirmed that the Chinese Embassy had made a specific 
request for this particular group of Tibetans, but had few 
additional details as the decision was made, he claimed, 
prior to his appointment as Home Minister.  (Note. Mandal was 
appointed Home Minister on April 11, 2003 -- three days 
before the refugees were detained.  End Note.)  Mandal 
asserted that "this type of case will not occur again," as it 
is in Nepal's interests to "keep cordial relations with the 
U.S."  He said he recognized the importance of USG assistance 
in combating the Maoist insurgency, adding, "we are serious 
about" preventing another such incident.  In spite of Nepal's 
two large neighbors, Mandal asserted that Nepal "can stand on 
its own legs" in order to ensure positive and productive 
relationships with the West, particularly the United States. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a second meeting on June 4, Foreign Secretary 
Mahdu Raman Acharya described both the official and 
nonofficial version of events surrounding the deportation. 
(Foreign Minister Shah has been ill and unavailable for 
official meetings.)  According to Acharya, the MFA directed 
its Embassies on June 4 to issue an official press release 
explaining the May 31 incident.  The text he presented 
follows below. 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Nepal is home to more than 135,000 refugees, including 
several thousand Tibetan refugees.  It is not the policy of 
the HMGN to extradite refugees.  HMGN understands and gives 
full consideration to humanitarian and human rights issues of 
the asylum seekers.  Last year alone some 3,000 Tibetan 
refugees were allowed to be processed from Nepal. There is no 
change in policy of HMGN with regard to the refugees. 
 
We have learnt that the reported case of Tibetans were sent 
back after the Immigration Authority of HMGN were fully 
convinced from the investigation that they were not seeking 
asylum, but were a rare case of illegal immigrants.  They 
were allowed to go back after the fines were paid. 
 
HMGN is convinced that the Tibetans sent back do not have 
anything which could be a cause of concern regarding their 
human rights abuses. 
 
End Text. 
 
¶7. (C) Acharya reported that immigration officials discovered 
the group of 21 Tibetans in a town in Eastern Nepal, adding 
that it was not known when the group crossed the border.  He 
said that Immigration officials believed the Tibetans were 
intending to reside in Nepal, and consequently were 
categorized as illegal immigrants.  (Note: The Office of 
Tibet had told us the refugees were arrested just outside 
Kathmandu, had just crossed into the country, and were on 
their way to India (Ref B). End Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) In confidence, Acharya admitted that the Chinese 
Government had a specific interest in the case of the 18 
Tibetan refugees.  "It is difficult to go against strong 
Chinese interests," he said, adding, "not that we like it, 
but we could not resist it."  Acharya acknowledged that the 
GON was perfectly aware of the USG position, but had "no 
choice in this case," adding, "the Americans more than anyone 
else know how difficult the Chinese can be."  He also 
confirmed that this decision was made at the highest 
political level within the GON.  He repeated with resignation 
that the decision to go ahead with the deportation was the 
last act of the outgoing government. 
 
¶9. (C) Charge showed Acharya copies of the Embassy and State 
Department press releases, as well as Chairman Leach's 
statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, adding 
that several Congressmen had indicated an interest in cutting 
U.S. aid to Nepal.  Charge then stressed to Acharya the 
importance of processing remaining refugees in detention as 
evidence of GON commitment to allow Tibetan refugees to 
transit Nepal. (Note: Post learned from UNHCR contacts June 4 
that one Tibetan man who arrived only a few days after the 
group of 21 Tibetans remained in GON custody.  Earlier this 
week, UNHCR was granted access for an interview, after which 
he was declared "of concern" to the U.N. and a formal letter 
of request for his release was made.  End Note.)  Acharya 
replied that there are "standing instructions" to process 
Tibetan refugees as previously done before this incident. 
 
¶10. (C) Acharya said that usually the Chinese are quiet about 
the flow of Tibetan refugees through Nepal. (Note. In a later 
June 4 conversation former PM Sher Bahadur Deuba told 
PolCouns that the Chinese frequently pressure the GON to hand 
over detained Tibetan refugees.  End Note.)  Acharya added 
that his government has conveyed to the Chinese that Nepal 
will not deport future refugees back to China.  In fact, 
Acharya suggested that the GON would try to shorten the 
detention period required to hold Tibetan "illegal 
immigrants" before their release to UNHCR. 
 
¶11. (C) In a June 4 telephone conversation, Prabakhar Rana, a 
close confidant of the Palace, confirmed that a letter on the 
refugees from an influential private American had been 
delivered on June 2 to King Gyanendra.  Prabakhar also 
confided that he is seeking an audience with the King 
specifically to discuss the Tibetan refugee issue and 
requested information on possible USG action in order to arm 
him for his conversation with King Gyanendra. 
 
------------------------------ 
International Response 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (U) The international response to this incident has been 
strong.  Acharya mentioned that the German Foreign Minister 
called the Nepali Foreign Minister to protest that week.  In 
addition to the United States, the UK, UNHCR and Amnesty 
International have issued press releases condemning the 
incident while the EU intends to follow suit as soon as 
possible.  The Foreign Secretary indicated that he has been 
inundated with international messages of protest. 
 
¶13. (U) However, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu also issued 
a June 3 press release defending the GON,s decision to 
deport the 18 Tibetans, claiming it fell "within Nepal's 
sovereign jurisdiction and a common international practice." 
The press release also states that "China attaches great 
importance to combating illegal immigrants, and is actively 
involved in various international and regional cooperation in 
this field.  We hold the view that politicizing or adopting 
double standards will not be conducive for the proper 
settlement of the issue of illegal immigrants." 
 
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Comment 
------------- 
 
¶14. (C) The consensus among diplomats, the press and the 
political elite, is that the primary reason for the 
deportation was the unusual pressure put on the GON by the 
Chinese Government.  Our meetings made it clear that despite 
the GON's clear understanding of the US position regarding 
the detained refugees, the GON made a calculated decision -- 
most likely at the level of the King himself -- to deport the 
refugees in order to appease their northern neighbor. 
 
¶15. (C) Comment Continued: The international outcry provoked 
by this incident should make the GON weigh carefully any 
future request to deport detained refugees.  We note with 
concern Acharya's assertion that the GON now plans to detain 
undocumented Tibetans as a matter of standard procedure -- a 
significant departure from past practice, in which they were 
directly transferred to the UNHCR.  Unfortunately, if their 
detention becomes an issue of income generation, it may be 
hard to stop.  Post is also concerned that despite Acharya's 
and the Deputy Prime Minister's assurances that this incident 
will not recur, any detention period could put the refugees 
in jeopardy of deportation.  We hope that Acharya's assertion 
that the GON desired to shorten the period of detention 
indicates an interest in keeping the refugees below China's 
radar screen.  End Comment. 
BOGGS