This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HO CHI MINH CITY 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL 
 
¶E. O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI PGOV PREL EAID EINV KIRF VM RELFREE HUMANR
SUBJECT: THICH QUANG DO -- HOW FREE AT LAST? 
 
REF: A) HCMC 0475    B) HCMC 0412 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  During a June 30 meeting with Consul 
General, recently "released" United Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam (UBCV) deputy Thich Quang Do launched into a two- 
hour plus discourse on religion, democracy, freedom, and 
capitalism.  Confirming press reports, he said he would soon 
attempt to test the limits of his "unconditional release" 
with a visit to UBCV patriarch Thich Huyen Quang in Quy Nhon 
on July 10.  Until then, Thich Quang Do said he would 
continue to receive visitors and monitor his health at the 
same pagoda where he has been detained incommunicado for the 
past two years under "administrative surveillance."  He 
asked ConGenOffs to convey his appreciation for the support 
of the USG, U.S. Congress, the EU, and various international 
human rights organizations over the years and encouraged 
continued outside pressure to bring about democratic change 
in Vietnam.  He predicted the GVN would one day lose control 
over a population that had grown accustomed to the benefits 
of economic reforms.  Citing upcoming medical appointments, 
he expressed regret that he would be unable to attend 
ConGen's July 4 reception.  Despite his chronic medical 
problems, Thich Quang Do appeared hale, hearty, and in full 
possession of his faculties.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Consul General and Poloff called on 75-year old 
Thich Quang Do on June 30, at the neat and well kept Thanh 
Minh Zen pagoda in HCMC.  The second highest ranking monk in 
the hierarchy of the outlawed Unified Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam (UBCV), Thich Quang Do had been isolated and 
detained at the pagoda under "administrative surveillance" 
for nearly two years after his June 2001 attempt to "rescue" 
UBCV Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang from conditions resembling 
house arrest at a remote pagoda in Quang Ngai province and 
bring him to HCMC.  The two years of administrative 
surveillance were originally part of a sentence imposed in 
1995 on charges related to organizing unauthorized 
assistance for flood victims in the Mekong Delta.  The 
administrative surveillance portion of the 1995 sentence, 
reinstated in 2001 despite his inclusion in a 1998 general 
amnesty, was lifted ahead of schedule and without advance 
notice on June 26. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  During the private meeting with ConGenOffs, Thich 
Quang Do was lucid and feisty for a man of his age.  He was 
in excellent spirits, considering his recent detention 
(something he attributed to Buddhist control of mind over 
body).  He was extremely animated, although not always 
responsive to the questions asked, and made frequent use of 
proverbs and Buddhist metaphor.  Describing himself as 
"having ears like a rabbit," Thich Quang Do said he needed 
to remain alert to stay one step ahead of the GVN.  He said 
he was surprised when the detention order was lifted ahead 
of schedule, but noted he never understood the government's 
reasoning as to why he was supposed to be released from his 
two-year detention in September, rather than June, in the 
first place (ref A).  He compared the GVN's actions in 
reinstating the administrative surveillance to those of a 
debt collector who continues to collect long after the debt 
has been paid.  He claimed to have no idea why he was 
released ahead of schedule, but felt it must surely be part 
of some GVN "scheme." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Thich Quang Do also dismissed outright the 
grounds for his original imprisonment in 1995, for "damaging 
national solidarity" by organizing relief to flood victims 
outside the GVN-approved Fatherland Front sponsorship via a 
Communist Party mass organization (such as the Women's 
Union, or Youth Union).  Noting that various Buddhist groups 
had been encouraged to carry out such charitable activities 
by the former southern regime prior to 1975, he accused the 
Fatherland Front (the umbrella group for mass organizations) 
of having divided people and prolonged the suffering of the 
masses. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  According to Thich Quang Do, the authorities who 
appeared unannounced at the pagoda on June 26 to deliver the 
oral release order were minor district-level officials.  He 
said the GVN was always careful to let local officials 
pretend to take the leading role, in order to protect the 
real decision makers at the central level.  In his view, the 
GVN had sent low-ranking functionaries because they were 
afraid to face responsibility for his unjust imprisonment 
and answer his questions directly.  Because he still noticed 
policemen watching the pagoda, Thich Quang Do was not sure 
what the release order meant. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  For now, Thich Quang Do plans to reside at his 
former "prison pagoda."  He bases his claim to administer 
the pagoda on the sequence of events following the communist 
takeover of the South.  In 1978, after his release from a 
two-year stay in prison for opposing the communist regime, 
the communist authorities had appointed him to run Thanh 
Minh Zen Pagoda in HCMC.  Because his 1982 transfer from 
HCMC to the North for his opposition to the formation of the 
Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) was accomplished without any 
formal, written order, Thich Quang Do considers the original 
Thanh Minh Zen assignment still valid.  So he therefore 
refuses to file any application for residency, even though 
local officials have already asked him to do so.  ("Why 
should I ask for something back that I never lost to begin 
with?")  The officials with whom he spoke on June 26 said 
they had no authority to decide this matter, but promised to 
convey his points to those who could.  Thich Quang Do also 
plans to apply for a telephone, though he is not optimistic 
about his chances for success.  He noted that during his 
detention, he could not use the single telephone at the 
monastery for fear the police would cut the line and 
inconvenience the Abbot. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Despite his "release," Thich Quang Do is certain 
he will still be "guarded" by security agents at the pagoda 
and followed whenever he ventured outside.  He believes the 
Vietnamese authorities had not interfered with ConGenOffs 
"out of respect" for the ConGen, but would be more 
restrictive with lay believers and other visitors.  Despite 
the continued security presence, some believers had visited 
him over the past few days, including a group of overseas 
Vietnamese (Viet Khieu) living in Australia.  Several 
visitors had been followed home by police and questioned. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Thich Quang Do plans to continue receiving 
visitors until July 10, when he hopes to travel to Quy Nhon 
(without GVN "assistance") to confer with UBCV Patriarch 
Thich Huyen Quang on "Buddhist matters."  He noted that 
unlike his religious superior, he now had a written order 
releasing him from detention.  Absent such an order -- 
something the GVN could never issue because it had never 
issued an order to detain him in the first place, and thus 
would then have to admit he had been detained for 21 years 
without legal documentation -- Thich Huyen Quang's current 
situation was different.  The GVN could move him around from 
pagoda to pagoda, something Thich Quang Do described as 
"mobile detention." 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Thich Quang Do said he was suffering from several 
chronic health conditions, including diabetes, high blood 
pressure, and unspecified kidney, heart and eye ailments. 
He was currently on several medications and was scheduled 
for three separate examinations on July 4 -- appointments 
that would unfortunately prevent him from attending ConGen's 
Independence Day reception.  According to Thich Quang Do, he 
was able to visit the doctor on a monthly basis during his 
detention by informing local authorities and waiting 
approximately one week for permission, but he refused to 
comply with demands to submit a written request for each 
visit.  He regularly told his "captors" that it would be 
their fault if he died.  A handful of plainclothes security 
officers usually accompanied him to his appointments, 
waiting just outside the doctor's office and retrieving 
copies of his medical records for their own files. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Other than his forays out for medical treatment, 
Thich Quang Do said local authorities had basically turned 
his room at the pagoda "into a prison" for the past two 
years.  He was completely isolated from the outside world 
and unaware of the many visitors who had attempted to meet 
with him.  He praised Thanh Minh Zen's  Abbot, however, for 
standing up to the authorities and denying them permission 
to place guards outside his actual room in the pagoda. The 
authorities had been forced to back down when the Abbot told 
them the pagoda was not under detention, and if they wanted 
a guard inside, they had better transfer Thich Quang Do to a 
prison.  The security forces then resigned themselves to 
sitting in the outer courtyard of the compound.  Thich Quang 
Do believes that undercover operatives continue to monitor 
the comings and goings of believers, and claimed to have 
noticed a decline in the number of worshippers at the 
pagoda. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Several times during the conversation, Thich 
Quang Do reiterated his Buddhist obligation to "be honest 
and speak the truth."  Disavowing any prejudice against the 
current government (even though he said four family members 
had been "killed by the communists"), he claimed to express 
the feelings of ordinary Vietnamese, who confided in monks 
and priests, but were otherwise afraid to speak out. 
Offering his views on the current government, he observed 
that all power still resides with the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) at the central level.  Any pretense of 
authority outside Hanoi was intended only to insulate the 
GVN and give it plausible deniability.  While they had no 
real authority, corrupt local officials abused their power 
for economic gain, and citizens were powerless to complain. 
If the CPV truly intended to fight official corruption, 
there would be nobody left to fill the government ranks. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Drawing on discussions with Thich Huyen Quang 
after the patriarch's meetings in Hanoi (ref B), Thich Quang 
Do noted that Prime Minister Phan Van Khai had accused local 
officials of "mistakenly" reinstating his original 1995 
detention order.  This was just another example of Hanoi's 
"good cop/bad cop" routine -- let the local authorities take 
the rap for implementing a central GVN decision, but then 
have the central GVN come in after the fact and "correct" 
the local authorities' mistakes. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Echoing what we have heard from other ranking 
UBCV monks, Thich Quang Do claimed that all Vietnam Buddhist 
Sangha (VBS) monks were merely UBCV monks who had succumbed 
to GVN pressure.  He dated CPV attempts to discredit the 
UBCV back to the formation of the first "Patriotic Buddhist 
Association" in 1975. ("The title itself means there must be 
traitors somewhere.")  Under the circumstances, he found it 
ironic that he and his colleagues in the UBCV were accused 
of destroying national solidarity, noting that even in 1975, 
"CPV strategy had been to divide and conquer."  Labeling all 
of Vietnam's rulers since the time of Emperor Bao Dai as 
dictators, Thich Quang Do described the CPV as the most 
sophisticated in the way it has sown fear and distrust among 
families and communities, and thus effected control.  In 
that same manner, the CPV had tried to use Buddhist monks to 
destroy Buddhism, but Buddhism could not be separated from 
the Vietnamese nation and people.  Although Thich Quang Do 
criticized the new generation of monks as "working for the 
government," he predicted that Vietnam's Buddhists would 
soon overcome their "spiritual restrictions," and that 
Buddhism would flourish again through the support of its 
believers, including those from overseas. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Toward the end of the meeting, Thich Quang Do 
offered his personal goals for the future.  An oft-repeated 
theme throughout the two-and-a-half hour conversation was 
that freedom and democracy were the most important elements 
for national development.  Freedom was what made the U.S. a 
superpower.  Along with promoting freedom and democracy, 
Thich Quang Do said he wished to re-establish "normal 
activities" for the UBCV.  He also expressed concern that 
Vietnamese students had been sent to Russia and China to 
study science and technical subjects, but the humanities and 
philosophy were ignored.  While he termed the establishment 
of a multiparty system "a must", he said "nobody dares to 
raise this subject." 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Thich Quang Do was aware of the recent arrest or 
Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, and the trials of Pham Hong Son and Tran 
Khue.  He said they showed the GVN's continuing fear of 
independent thought.  He pointed out the contradiction 
between the relatively light sentences accorded GVN and CPV 
officials implicated on corruption charges in the recent Nam 
Cam case, and the much stiffer sentence imposed on Pham Hong 
Son for receiving US$150 for translating a document on the 
Internet.  Without democracy, there was no chance for 
improved human rights in Vietnam.  A free press was the best 
way to keep citizens informed of deficiencies in their 
government, and draw attention to the large gap between the 
written laws of Vietnam and the reality of their 
enforcement. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  More generally, now that the Vietnamese people 
had tasted relative prosperity and reform, things could not 
go back to the way they were before.  According to Thich 
Quang Do, "Once a person knows how it feels to ride a 
motorcycle, they will not go back to a bicycle."  While the 
GVN would prefer to open up the system only to the level at 
which it could still maintain power, someday it would lose 
control.  Thich Quang Do believes that many top leaders have 
already lost faith in Marxism-Leninism themselves, and that 
nearly everyone was now a capitalist at heart.  This would 
be the driving force for the eventual collapse of the CPV 
and GVN.  But if Vietnam were a democracy now, it would not 
be communist ruled. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Thich Quang Do ended the meeting by asking the 
Consul General to again convey thanks to his many supporters 
in the U.S. Congress (including Representative Loretta 
Sanchez, whom he met twice), EU nations, and international 
human rights organizations (especially Human Rights Watch). 
While he specifically said he was not calling for direct 
intervention from outside, he asked that international aid 
donors and foreign investors "develop human rights and 
freedom too, not just the economy."  He urged that 
development aid be somehow linked to progress in human 
rights.  To simply pour money into various aid projects 
would only give the GVN greater financial means for control 
and further enrich corrupt officials. 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  Comment:  Thich Quang Do seems to have emerged 
from his two years of isolation as outspoken and feisty as 
ever.  Ready to challenge the GVN at every turn and unlikely 
to back down, he presents an interesting counterweight to 
Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang's more measured, modest 
approach.  Thich Quang Do's health remains a concern, 
however, and may mean that for all of his big picture 
criticism of the GVN and discussion of democracy, he may 
have to limit himself to a more immediate concern: finding 
some way to legalize the UBCV's status.  Whether the UBCV 
leadership is able to take advantage of this small window of 
opportunity to revitalize their church will depend a great 
deal on how provocative the GVN finds their actions in the 
coming weeks and months.  Thich Huyen Quang has maintained a 
low profile in Quy Nhon, but Thich Quang Do has generally 
been more of a firebrand.  Notably, Thich Quang Do skirted 
around any questions about reconciliation or merging with 
the VBS.  It is clear that the UBCV leadership believes it 
has benefited greatly from international pressure and hopes 
to continue to receive more targeted, focused support in the 
future.  The question is, will it use this pressure and 
support to push too far too quickly, or will it proceed step- 
by-step? 
 
YAMAUCHI