This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000949 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; S/CT, DRL; NSC FOR 
¶E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  06/03/13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  Tigers continue to flex muscles in Jaffna 
 
Refs:  Colombo 939, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Poloff traveled to Jaffna in northern 
Sri Lanka, May 28-29.  Amid signs of pervasive Tamil 
Tiger influence, residents urged the GSL to meet Tiger 
conditions, so the group would attend the Tokyo donors 
conference.  Meanwhile, as they have on previous Mission 
visits, Tamils cited frustration with the military over 
its control of large-scale "high security zones."  Amid 
the rumblings, the best that could be said of Jaffna was 
that the situation remained a far, far cry from the 
years of war.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) A QUIET JAFFNA:  On May 28-29, poloff and pol 
FSN traveled to Jaffna Peninsula on one of Mission's 
regular visits to the war-torn region.  (Note:  In a 
rare visit, the team also visited Kayts Island, just off 
the southwest coast of the Peninsula -- See Paras 7-8.) 
Jaffna was largely quiet, at least on the surface. 
Poloff talked freely and openly with a wide variety of 
residents.  People strolled the streets peaceably, 
schoolchildren in bright uniforms rode bicycles 
laughing, and shops had a variety of goods for sale 
(though markedly less than that available in Colombo and 
other Sri Lankan cities). 
 
¶3.  (C) TIGERS TO TOKYO, OR NOT:  In poloff's meetings, 
one issue that was on everyone's minds was whether the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would attend the 
Tokyo donors conference.  (Note:  In late April, the 
Tigers announced that they would not attend Tokyo.  The 
GSL, the Norwegian facilitators, and the Japanese have 
been trying feverishly to convince the LTTE to reverse 
its decision -- See Reftels.)  Nearly all the Tamils 
that poloff spoke to wanted the LTTE to go to Tokyo, and 
urged the government to meet LTTE demands re the 
formation of a north/east interim administration as soon 
as possible.  Many interlocutors also urged the USG to 
"pressure" the GSL and the LTTE to resolve their 
disputes, so that rehabilitation work could begin right 
away.  While opinion was mixed among interlocutors on 
whether the Tigers would actually attend the upcoming 
Tokyo conference (most did not think so), the desire for 
rehabilitation in the north and east came through loud- 
and-clear.  Characterizing the Tigers as "very 
concerned" with the administration of aid, Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organization (TELO) MP K.Sivajilingam cited 
Tamil fears that aid pledged at the upcoming Tokyo 
conference would and go to the south, when it was most 
needed in the north and east.  (Note: In spite of the 
comments of some Tamils, some international assistance 
is indeed finding its way to Jaffna.  Poloff visited a 
State Department-funded demining site located 20 
kilometers outside of Jaffna town.  Per Reftel, the 
Quick Reaction Demining Force team has been extremely 
successful in removing mines and unexploded ordnance.) 
 
¶4.  (C) FRUSTRATION WITH MILITARY RUNS HIGH:  As they 
have during past visits by Mission personnel, Tamils 
cited a high degree of frustration with the presence of 
the Sri Lankan military's "high security zones." 
Echoing the LTTE's long-standing demand, Tamils 
underscored that Jaffna would not be restored to 
normality until Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were 
allowed to return to their homes within the security 
zones.  (Note:  The military's "high security zones" and 
other posts occupy about 18 percent of the land area in 
Jaffna District.  The GSL continues to review various 
ways to shift around troops, so as to minimize the 
impact of the zones on Jaffna residents, while allowing 
IDPs to return.) 
 
¶5.  (C) LTTE'S PERVASIVE INFLUENCE:  As for the LTTE, it 
was clear to poloff -- based on his discussions and 
observations -- that Tiger influence in Jaffna is 
pervasive.  Contacts made clear that -- despite military 
patrols and some checkpoints -- LTTE cadre move with 
impunity about the streets of Jaffna town and anywhere 
else, making no secret of their presence.  Poloff, for 
example, was witness to one instance of apparent LTTE 
grandstanding:  Three suspected Tigers -- one armed with 
what appeared to be a revolver -- loitered outside 
poloff's hotel while he was engaged in meetings. 
Although they did not directly threaten poloff or 
apparently anyone else, the message was clear that the 
LTTE is watching the Jaffna situation with great 
interest.  (Note:  Per the terms of the February 
ceasefire accord and the late 2002 legalization of the 
group, unarmed LTTE personnel are allowed to move about 
in Sri Lanka.  What is different in Jaffna today 
compared with last year is that the group seems to be 
making use of that right more and more.  Per poloff's 
experience mentioned above, some LTTE cadre also seem to 
be cutting corners and to be carrying arms.) 
 
¶6.  (C) FEAR OF THE TIGER:  There was a lot of concern 
about the spreading tentacles of the LTTE.  Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA) MP N. Raviraj cited what he 
called the LTTE's "repression through fear" of "all 
people" in Jaffna.  He said Tamils were angered by the 
group's use of taxation and forcible recruitment. 
(Note:  Representatives of the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission, "SLMM," also told poloff that they 
had evidence of large-scale recruitment efforts by the 
Tigers.  SLMM contacts were not sure how many of the 
recruits might be children, but there seemed to be 
some.)  Raviraj further stated that the LTTE allows 
precious little political dissent either, often 
threatening Tamils who oppose the group in private 
conversations, or in public.  All that said, Raviraj and 
other contacts said the LTTE seemed to be open to some 
forms of discussion, as long as opinions were expressed 
in careful, nuanced fashion.  (Note:  Raviraj, while not 
anti-LTTE, has long expressed concerns about the LTTE's 
use of intimidatory tactics in Jaffna and elsewhere in 
Sri Lanka.) 
 
¶7.  (C) DIFFICULTIES ABOUND ON KAYTS:  In a rare visit 
by Mission personnel to Kayts, poloff met with the 
Government Agent (GA) there, V. Selvanayagam. 
Explaining the political situation, the GA noted that 
the people of Kayts existed among three competing 
forces:  the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Navy, and the anti- 
LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).  (Note: 
Kayts and other islands off Jaffna have long been a 
stronghold of the EPDP, a former Tamil paramilitary 
group.  EPDP influence on Kayts was reinforced by 
assistance from its allies in the Sri Lankan military, 
but that link has been weakening during the course of 
the peace process.)  Characterizing the centrally based 
position of the Kayts Navy base as a "hand on the 
throat" of the people, the GA said there was little sign 
that political tensions among the three contending 
groups would decline soon.  (Note:  Based on poloff's 
observations, the LTTE seems to be quickly gaining the 
upper hand in Kayts.  The group had recently opened up a 
spanking new office on the island.  In the meantime, 
EPDP posters on the island had been systematically 
defaced, apparently by LTTE cadre.  In addition, in 
recent incidents of small-scale violence, the LTTE has 
reportedly got the better of the EPDP, which -- per the 
ceasefire accord -- has been largely and controversially 
disarmed.  End Note.) 
 
¶8.  (C) Re the island's apparent lack of basic services, 
the GA laid out in stark terms the harsh realities 
governing the area.  Electricity, provided by 
generators, is available for only seven and a half-hours 
a day.  Phone service is next to nonexistent, with the 
GA having to drive or walk one kilometer into a nearby 
town to use one of the few phone lines.  There are no 
buses, no hospitals or doctors, and if injuries occur, 
the patient has to face a grueling 15-kilometer long 
drive to Jaffna, partly accomplished by a causeway that 
is barely above sea level. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  There was a lot of rumblings in 
Jaffna, with Tamils worried about the military and the 
LTTE.  In the meantime, Kayts Island seemed tense with 
the ascendant LTTE challenging long-standing military 
and EPDP control.  Given these negative vibrations, the 
best that could be said of Jaffna was that the situation 
was a far, far cry from the years of when the Peninsula 
was literally torn apart by the war.  Tamils, in 
general, seem to realize that and to be counting their 
blessings, though it is not clear whether the LTTE is on 
the same page.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS