This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  06-17-13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT:  GSL tries to calm situation after sinking of 
Tiger ship; Key minister expresses concerns re navy 
 
Refs:  (A) Ops Center-Colombo 06/16/03 telecon 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1053, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Joseph L. Novak, Charge d'Affaires. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In the aftermath of the June 14 
sinking of a Tiger ship, the GSL is trying to calm the 
situation, assuring the Tigers that it is looking into 
ways to devolve power to the north/east.  Minister 
Moragoda, a key adviser to the PM, has expressed deep 
concerns to us about the navy's handling of the 
incident.  The Tigers remain very, very sore over the 
sinking of their ship.  Despite the GSL's best efforts, 
a bit of tension remains in the air.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
GSL Reaches Out 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In the aftermath of the sinking of a 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ship on June 14, 
the GSL is trying to calm the situation.  (Note:  Per 
Ref B, the ship sank off the northeast coast during a 
confrontation with the Sri Lankan Navy, "SLN," and 
all 12 of its crew are believed dead.  It remains 
unclear whether the crew of the ship detonated it or 
whether it was sunk by SLN gunfire.  The SLN insists 
that the Tigers destroyed the ship.)  In response to a 
question at a June 16 press conference, G.L. Peiris, a 
minister and the GSL's key peace process negotiator, 
said the June 14 incident did not increase the risk of 
war because the LTTE had promised it would not go down 
that route again.  Peiris added that the Norwegian-run 
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was looking into the 
incident and would report on ways to avoid similar 
incidents in the future. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Regarding the peace process in general, Peiris 
related that the government was putting together new 
proposals in an effort to break the ongoing stalemate. 
(Note:  The LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in late 
April and refused to attend the recent Tokyo donors 
conference.  The LTTE is demanding the immediate 
formation of an interim structure in the north/east, 
which it would basically control.)  Peiris said the 
government was thinking of recommending the formation of 
"district development committees" in the handful of 
districts comprising the north/east.  These committees 
-- perhaps acting in conjunction with "special 
commissioners" -- would be empowered to distribute 
assistance, including some of that garnered from the 
international community at the recent Tokyo conference. 
Peiris remarked that these proposals would take some 
more time to formulate.  The GSL hoped, however, to meet 
face-to-face with the LTTE soon to discuss them -- "It 
is necessary that the parties talk to each other to 
carry the process forward," he said.  He stressed that 
the proposals, if agreed to, would be only "temporary 
measures" subject to further GSL-LTTE discussions re 
forming some sort of interim arrangement in the 
north/east. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) (((Note:  At the press conference, Peiris was 
also asked about the recent assassination in Jaffna of 
an anti-LTTE Tamil politician.  Peiris said the police 
were investigating the incident and it would be handled 
as a criminal matter.  Per Ref B, the Jaffna slaying was 
perhaps the most brazen of about 30 similar killings 
which have taken place this year.  The killings are 
almost certainly being perpetrated by the LTTE.  End 
Note.))) 
 
------------------------------- 
Key Minister's Concerns re Navy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In his comments on the ship incident, Milinda 
Moragoda, another key minister working on peace process 
issues, told the Ambassador late June 16 that he had 
deep concerns about the navy's handling of the matter. 
Moragoda said as far as he understood the SLN had failed 
to keep the SLMM fully informed of its actions. 
Moreover, the SLN had not placed a monitor on board its 
ships before commencing the operation, which should have 
been standard procedure during the cease-fire. 
 
¶6.  (C) In parenthetical remarks, Moragoda said he also 
had serious worries about command-and-control issues 
related to the navy.  The government, for example, was 
not informed of the SLN's actions on June 14.  There was 
some indication, Moragoda continued, that the SLN had 
briefed President Kumaratunga, but Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe was not kept in the loop.  (Note: 
Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe share a tense 
cohabitation relationship.)  Admiral Sandagiri, the 
commander of the navy who was in Hawaii for meetings at 
CINCPAC, had also apparently been informed of what was 
transpiring.  Moragoda noted that the SLN had also not 
been fully in touch with the government re its 
activities during a previous incident in March in which 
a LTTE boat was sunk in similar circumstances.  Moragoda 
was not clear whether the GSL planned to take action 
against the navy in this instance, but he indicated that 
the government was looking into the matter. 
 
------------------- 
Tigers Remain Angry 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) As for the LTTE, the group has had no further 
comments re the sinking of its ship since its June 15 
letter to the SLMM.  (Note:  In the letter, the LTTE 
complained in harsh tones about the SLN's actions in 
intercepting the LTTE's ship, which the group said was 
only an "oil tanker" -- See Ref B.)  In a June 17 
conversation, however, Joseph Pararajahsingham, a MP for 
the Tamil National Alliance with very close LTTE links, 
told us that the group remained "extremely angry with 
the navy over the sinking of the ship." 
Pararajahsingham said the LTTE felt that the sinking was 
"totally uncalled for" and a clear violation of the 
February 2002 ceasefire agreement.  When asked, 
Pararajahsingham was not clear what the LTTE might do in 
response, but he said the group was still committed to 
the peace process.  Queried about Peiris' comments, he 
replied that the idea for "district development 
committees" was an old one and he doubted the Tigers had 
any interest in discussing the matter. 
 
¶8.  (C) (((Note:  In his comments to the Ambassador, 
Moragoda noted that the Norwegian government 
facilitators were having no luck enticing the Tigers 
back to the peace talks.  Moragoda said Anton 
Balasingham, the LTTE's London-based chief negotiator, 
remained virtually incommunicado.  In the meantime, 
Mission has been told by Japanese embassy sources that 
the GoJ has also been unable to arrange meetings with 
the LTTE in order to brief the group on what happened at 
the Tokyo conference.  End Note.))) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In his June 16 comments, Peiris was clearly 
trying to calm things down.  Based on what we are 
hearing, however, his remarks did not mollify the 
Tigers, who remain very, very disturbed over the attack 
on their ship and the apparent loss of their personnel. 
It is still unclear whether the group plans to take some 
sort of action to make its displeasure felt beyond its 
complaint to the monitors about the navy.  Until the 
Tigers' precise course of action is clear, however, some 
tension will remain in the air. 
¶10.  (C) As for Moragoda's comments, the apparent 
failure of the navy to bring the matter to the attention 
of the government represents a real breach in civilian 
control of the armed forces.  One would think the prime 
minister would have to react to such a snub, but his 
situation is a tricky one and a dressing down of the 
navy is quite possibly something he might choose to 
avoid.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
NOVAK