This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU PARLIAMENT U.S. RELATIONS RESOLUTION MIXED 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, 
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On June 19 the European Parliament (EP) 
passed a resolution on "A Renewed Transatlantic Relationship 
for the Third Millenium."  Foreign Relations Committee Chair 
Elmar Brok, a German Christian Democrat and strong advocate 
of close transatlantic ties, drafted the resolution and timed 
it to appear on the eve of the June 25 U.S.-EU summit.  The 
intent was constructively to point the way to renewed U.S.-EU 
ties, and most MEP's believe (or would want to believe) the 
resolution did that.  Despite the positive intent, however, 
the final resolution is replete with passages chiding the 
U.S. for its stances on the International Criminal Court, the 
Kyoto Protocol, the death penalty, etc.  For the majority of 
MEPs, the desire to assert a European voice on these 
hot-button issues, especially after Iraq, remains strong.  In 
that context, the fact that the strongest pro-Americans in 
the EP voted against the resolution only served to illustrate 
their isolation.  On a positive note, the EP resolution did 
affirm the importance of good U.S.-EU relations.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
The Saga of a Resolution: 
From A Call for a New Start to 
a Model of Ambivalence 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) We first learned in early May that the resolution was 
under consideration and that the drafter was British 
Conservative MEP James Elles, the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
Rapporteur on relations with the U.S.  Elles responded 
positively to our suggestion that a resolution expressing 
goodwill towards the U.S. in the wake of tensions over Iraq 
provided an opportunity for the EP to be noticed and 
appreciated. 
 
¶3. (C) On the basis of this discussion with Elles and the 
office of EP President Pat Cox, we engaged to see if the EP, 
or Pat Cox himself, could make some kind of additional 
statement about how the U.S.-EU relationship could move 
forward again.  Cox was interested in having such a statement 
in hand to present in the run-up to the June 25 U.S.-EU 
Summit.  Despite the intentions of our EP interlocutors, 
however, the efforts of the EP leaders got caught in the 
prevailing ambivalence of most MEPs towards the U.S.  First, 
the resolution was not ready to be passed by early June.  In 
May, drafting responsibility shifted from Elles to Foreign 
Affairs Committee Chairman Brok, and the new target date 
became approval in Committee on June 11 followed by final 
approval in plenary on June 19.  Second and more importantly, 
the resolution changed into a lengthy laundry list of 
complaints about the U.S. instead of the originally desired 
gesture of good will. 
 
---------------------- 
The Resolution Itself: 
A Mixture of the 
Good and the Bad 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) After the usual series of clauses referring to earlier 
declarations, treaty articles and the like, the resolution 
begins with solid affirmations of the importance and salutary 
effects of strong transatlantic ties, such as:  "reaffirming 
(the European Parliament's) commitment to the democratic 
values which are the foundation of...the transatlantic 
community;" "balanced EU-US relations are important to global 
peace and stability;"  "stressing...the positive results 
achieved in the field of external relations when a common 
approach...(is) developed;"  "in economic terms, Europe and 
the USA are the two most closely bound regions in the world;" 
 "by acting together Europe and the United States could 
develop solutions to global challenges;" and many similar 
passages. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The resolution goes on to advocate the creation of 
additional structures to underpin U.S.-EU dialogue, and to 
assert that a stronger EU is essential to progress in 
transatlantic relations.  Some of the relevant passages 
include:  "whereas the EU and the USA have treaties and 
agreements with almost every State in the world, but not with 
each other; whereas a new common framework could be created 
in economic and trade policy...;"  "whereas greater 
involvement of legislators on both sides of the Atlantic is a 
fundamental prerequisite for enhancing the whole 
transatlantic process;"  "stresses that the EU will only be 
recognized as a partner if (it has) a real CFSP and that this 
requires the extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council to...the field of the Foreign and Security Policy, 
the establishment of a European common diplomatic service, 
enhanced cooperation in defense policy...;" "underlines that 
EU-USA relations need a project aimed at enhancing...the 
partnership and that a...EU-US Framework Treaty...could be 
such a project;"  "underlines...that the existing 
interparliamentary exchange should be gradually transformed 
into a de facto 'Transatlantic Assembly'". 
 
¶6. (SBU) However, there are numerous clauses chiding the U.S. 
for not agreeing with the majority of the EP on a panoply of 
issues, including the death penalty, GMO's, international 
instruments on the rights of the child, and "safeguarding the 
treatment of prisoners of war in the wake of the recent 
conflicts."   One clause implicitly makes U.S. agreement with 
the EU on the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC a pre-condition of 
better transatlantic relations: "responding along the same 
lines to...global warming (i.e., by ratifying and 
implementing the minimum standards f the Kyoto Protocol) and 
that of global justice (i.e. the functioning of the 
International Criminal Court)...must become a priority in the 
reinforcement of transatlantic relations."  The resolution 
also contains a rather verbose swipe at American 
neo-conservatives:  "(The EP) expresses concerns that the 
EU-US partnership could be undermined...by the apparently 
growing influence of those neo-conservative currents in US 
politics which emphasize unilateral, and often military, 
solutions to global problems at the expense of the traditions 
of more than 50 years of US internationalism and 
multilateralism...." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Strong Support from Conservatives, 
Liberals, Socialists 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The resolution was passed by a vote of 303 in favor, 
109 against and 47 abstentions.  A roll-call of the vote was 
not published, but we confirmed that among those voting in 
favor were large majorities of the Social Democrats (PSE), of 
the Liberal Democrats (ELDR)and of the European People's 
Party (EPP--Christian Democrats and Conservatives), except 
the British Conservatives. 
 
---------------------------- 
MEPs and Staffers:  Goodwill 
Should Not Silence Critique 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Jacques Lecarte, ELDR Foreign Affairs staffer, told 
us that the consensus among both ELDR and PSE MEP's was that 
the resolution was a balanced mix of statements on the 
strengths and importance of the relationship with the U.S. 
and an honest assessment of the problems in the relationship. 
 The EPP view was similar, he said.  In response to our 
observation that the British Conservative group within the 
EPP voted against it, Lecarte laughed and said, "as always." 
 
¶9. (C) German PSE MEP Erika Mann told us during preparation 
of the resolution that she, as an Atlanticist Social 
Democrat, was against tabling the resolution.  She predicted 
that it would contain significant anti-U.S. content.  After 
the final vote, Mann's staffer told us that Mann's concern 
had been validated -- that the resolution contained too much 
critique of the U.S. to be understood in the U.S. as the 
goodwill gesture that many in the EP want it to be. 
 
¶10. (C) ELDR Secretary-General Alexander Beels told us that 
the ICC "had to be in there" because of European anger at 
American pressure on EU accession states to sign Article 98 
agreements and thereby undermine the ICC.  Carlo Chicco, the 
head staffer of the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue, 
averred that "American arrogance," such as in "threatening to 
move NATO out of Belgium" because of the Belgian Universal 
Competence law, rendered it impossible for MEPs representing 
angry European citizens to refrain from critical comments on 
America's rejection of the ICC. 
 
--------------------------- 
The Strongest Pro-Americans 
Voted Against 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) The generally most fervent Atlanticists in the EP, 
the British Conservatives and the Dutch Calvinist Alliance 
(VU), voted against the resolution as not positive enough 
towards the United States. 
 
¶12. (C) Vice-Chairman of the EP Subcommittee on the U.S., Bas 
Belder of the VU, and British Conservative Geoffrey Van Orden 
together tabled amendments striking all of the language 
critical of the U.S.  All of these amendments were rejected 
overwhelmingly in the Foreign Affairs Committee.  After 
talking with us, Belder had made a plea in a plenary session 
on June 4 that renewing transatlantic relations would require 
that Europeans approach the U.S. with an attitude of trust 
rather than suspicion.  He added that the resolution should 
not include a laundry list of European complaints that would 
cloud the message of friendship towards the U.S. 
¶13. (U) British Conservative MEP Charles Tannock sent us the 
Explanation of Vote he had drafted for his party group.  It 
declares that, despite the "good in this resolution - a 
commitment to act together to develop common solutions to 
global problems...", the British Conservatives are forced to 
vote against the resolution because of references which are 
not helpful to good relations.  The language following is 
specific on unilateralism and the ICC and a ringing 
condemnation of anti-Americanism in Europe:  "There is (in 
the resolution) a reference to unilateral approaches to 
problems that is offensive and which ignores the pre-eminent 
role which the United States as the world's largest and most 
powerful country must inevitably play if the values to which 
we subscribe are to be upheld.  The insistence that the U.S. 
share Europe's view on the ICC is also made plain - despite 
the problems that an unamended statute would cause for the 
U.S. at present.  We cannot expect the Americans to be 
multilateralist and engaged in the world and to risk 
malicious prosecution of their civilian and political leaders 
in the way that Europe requires.  Equally there is no need 
for Europe continually to seek disagreement with the U.S. 
over the death penalty which remains legal in international 
law.  We need to respect their difference of opinion, not 
attempt to raise it as a symbol of European moral superiority 
over the U.S.  We need to co-operate together, not brandish 
sticks.  There has been too much anti-Americanism in Europe 
recently and Europe needs to remember what it owes to 
America." 
 
¶14. (C) Comment: The EP resolution is not a surprise.  It 
reflects the current disposition in Brussels (and Strasbourg, 
where the EP holds its monthly sessions) to take America to 
task for disagreeing with Europe on the hot-button issues 
such as the ICC and global warming. Most disheartening is 
that, even while attempting to send a positive signal and 
bring U.S.-EU relations forward, the EP did not seriously 
consider lowering the volume of their complaints.  It is 
clear that we have a lot of work to do with the EP, 
especially as it gains new power under the Convention in the 
Justice and Home Affairs area, which could complicate, inter 
alia, management of homeland security concerns where the EP 
has been sharply critical.  End comment. 
 
FOSTER