This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU CUBA POLICY: EMPHASIZING THE "CRITICAL" IN THE 
EU'S "CRITICAL DIALOGUE" 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 163468 
     ¶B. B) ATHENS 2081 
     ¶C. C) WARSAW 2299 
     ¶D. D) VILNIUS 758 
     ¶E. E) HAVANA 9549 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Todd Huizinga, 
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action message. See para 10. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: On June 18, Poloff delivered reftel 
demarche (ref a) and discussed the EU's announced 
reevaluation of its common position on Cuba.  Karl Buck 
(protect) of the EU Council Secretariat, said that the 
visit to Cuba of the Austrian Justice Minister 
Boehmdorfer (ref a) was in line with the EU's announced 
policy of limiting, but not banning, high-level EU visits 
to Cuba.  Buck said that he was drafting a reevaluation 
of EU Cuba policy that was slated to serve as the basis 
for a new common position to be approved by EU foreign 
ministers at the July 22 General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC).  He said his recommendation 
would likely be to continue the EU's "critical dialogue" 
with Cuba, but with a greater emphasis on the "critical." 
With the policy revision just beginning, Department may 
want to urge EU member states and institutions via 
political-level demarches to formulate a Cuba policy that 
foresees real consequences for Cuba's continued flouting 
of international norms.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
EU Secretariat: Austrian Cuba Visit 
Puzzling, But In Line with 
Restrictions on High-Level Contacts 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Karl Buck (protect), Head of the Latin America 
Division in the EU Council Secretariat, told Poloff that, 
while he was somewhat puzzled that an EU member-state 
minister would visit Cuba at this moment, the EU's 
limitation of high-level contacts with Cuba did not 
preclude Boehmdorfer's visit.  In fact, Buck stressed, 
the Austrians had consulted him on that very question to 
be sure they would not be breaking with the EU decision. 
Buck said that, although he had not been privy to 
Boehmdorfer's talking points, he was certain that 
Boehmdorfer would deliver a firm message to the GOC 
reiterating that the recent crackdown and the June 12 
public denigration of Berlusconi and Aznar were 
unacceptable.  However, Buck allowed that the USG view as 
expressed in reftel demarche made sense from our 
perspective, and promised to share the USG points with 
his counterparts in member-state ministries. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
New Common Position Planned for July 22: 
Continued Critical Dialogue Likely 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Buck said he would be the principal drafter of a 
proposed revised common position on Cuba.  His paper is 
due for presentation to the EU Latin America Working 
Group (COLAT), which coordinates working-level policy 
formulation among member states, on July 1.  In mid-July, 
a COLAT-revised version will then go to the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) to prepare it for final approval 
by EU FonMins at the July 22 GAERC. 
 
¶5. (C) Cautioning that he was just beginning to draft, 
Buck said the paper would have two main sections.  One 
part would examine whether current EU development 
assistance activity in Cuba was effectively promoting EU 
objectives there (peaceful transition to democracy, 
economic reform, respect for human rights).  That 
section, said Buck, would be drafted by EU member-state 
development officials.  Buck added that he had "no idea 
what each of the member states is doing on development in 
Cuba." 
 
¶6. (C) Buck said the section he is preparing would 
propose restructuring the EU's critical dialogue with 
Cuba so as to promote more effectively the EU's unchanged 
objectives there (see para 4 above).  When pressed for 
specifics, Buck remained vague.  It appears, though, that 
Buck is planning to suggest, when all is said and done, 
more of what the EU has announced in recent statements: 
a tougher line on GOC repression and specific signals of 
the EU's disapproval of Cuba's actions within the 
framework of a continued EU-Cuba "critical dialogue." 
The three measures announced on June 5, limiting high- 
level governmental visits, reducing the profile of member 
states' participation in cultural events, and inviting 
Cuban dissidents at national day celebrations may be 
reiterated, but Buck did not share specifics of any new 
ideas. 
COLAT Consensus:  Don't Isolate Cuba 
------------------------------------ 
¶7. (C) Buck noted his impression that the Cuban attempt 
to humiliate Aznar and Berlusconi had brought the member 
states closer together in mutual support, regardless of 
"opinions you or I may have about Berlusconi."  He said 
that, while he perceived shades of difference among 
member states on how tough they wanted to get with Cuba, 
"no one" had advocated cutting off dialogue.  He said the 
sense remained within the COLAT that isolating Cuba would 
only play into the hands of the regime's hardliners. 
 
------------------------------ 
EU Approach to Remain Distinct 
From That of U.S. 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Several times, Buck averred that USINT Havana's 
recent tough criticism of the regime had provided Castro 
with a cover and a justification for his actions.  (Buck 
did not specify which actions.)  His impression was that 
some U.S. "hardliners" thought that the EU might be 
coming around to an approach more supportive of the U.S. 
embargo.  He stressed that that was not the case, and 
implied that part of the EU motivation for reevaluating 
its Cuba policy was to avoid getting squeezed between 
"hardliners in the U.S. and hardliners in Cuba" towards 
cutting lines of communication with Cuba. 
 
¶9. (C) Buck said, however, that he believed that the 
statement of the EU's revised common position would avoid 
criticism of the U.S. embargo.  He said he doubted that 
the statement would mention any third parties at all, but 
that if the U.S. were mentioned, it would likely not be 
in name, but indirectly in an assertion of the EU's 
intention to work together with its partners to promote 
democracy in Cuba. 
 
------------------------------ 
Comment:  USG May Want to Push 
for Tougher EU Cuba Policy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The EU has repeatedly taken a tough line toward 
Cuba recently, culminating in declarations on June 5 and 
June 16 limiting contacts with Cuba and declaring Cuban 
behavior toward the EU unacceptable.  As USINT Havana 
points out (ref e), the GOC's recent taunts of the EU 
virtually dare it to take a stronger position against the 
regime.  Nonetheless, it appears that the new common 
position on Cuba could well become, for all practical 
purposes, more of the same:  continuation of EU dialogue 
with Cuba interspersed with regular, perhaps harsher but 
basically inconsequential, declarations condemning GOC 
repression.  With the reformulation of EU Cuba policy in 
its beginning stages, this may be the time for us to push 
the EU to back up its words with actions.  To that end, 
post asks Department to consider approaching member and 
accession states and EU institutions at the political 
level to urge them that their common position on Cuba 
include real consequences for Cuba's continued failure to 
live up to international norms.  With the regime's anti- 
EU antics, with Italy taking up the EU presidency on July 
1, and with many of the Central European EU accession 
states expressing strong aversion to GOC actions (refs c 
and d), a high-level demarche could carry considerable 
weight.  End comment. 
 
FOSTER