This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

061428Z Jun 03

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU
SUBJECT: DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: GENERAL STAFF AND GOVERNMENT STRUGGLE WITH THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2521 
     ¶B. ANKARA 2666 
     ¶C. ANKARA 2122 
     ¶D. ANKARA 1350 
     ¶E. ANKARA 0418 
     ¶F. 02 ANKARA 7682 
     ¶G. 02 ANKARA 7683 
     ¶H. ISTANBUL 0776 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Chief of the General Staff (TGS) Ozkok's 
attempt to smother disgruntlement in senior ranks and at the 
same time to warn ruling AK party against perceived 
anti-secular trends has achieved neither goal.  While 
tensions between the military and AK, and within each, will 
continue, we see no likelihood under the current 
constellation of forces for the military to force a change of 
government.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C)  Chief of the TGS Ozkok's May 26 political warning in 
the form of a briefing for selected newspaper journalists is 
yet more evidence that the TGS is very unhappy: 
 
 
-- Unhappy within itself (Ozkok is being pressed by a group 
of six to eight senior officers who hold what a broad range 
of journalist, political, and national security analyst 
contacts characterize for us as "Eurasianist, status quo, 
keep-military-procurement-secret" views; other TGS officers, 
such as J-5 chief of agreements Air Force MG Ajar, who is 
well connected to Ozkok, told us he agrees with the 
assessment that Ozkok is too soft on AK). 
 
 
-- Unhappy with the AK government, which proclaims itself 
conservative-democratic, but which the TGS and most of the 
rest of the Kemalist Establishment (presidency, most of the 
judiciary, bureaucracy, main opposition CHP, and large 
majorities of the media and academe) charge is both 
incompetent and carrying an Islamist torch. 
 
 
-- Unhappy with the fact, flexibility, and speed of change in 
the world. 
 
 
-- Unhappy with change at home, where social change from 
below, a growing freedom of debate about many hitherto taboo 
subjects, and the government's attempt to avoid submitting 
its newest package of EU Copenhagen Criteria-related reforms 
to the military-dominated NSC for review all suggest that, as 
ordinary Turks consider where their country should go, the 
Turkish military is beginning to lose its position as the 
ultimate arbiter of republican probity. 
 
 
¶3. (S) As many contacts -- among them premier national 
defense analyst Faruk Demir -- have reminded us, we should 
put Ozkok's latest remarks in the context of a longer series 
of TGS statements and growing military discomfort (refs A-F 
stretching back to October 2002).  Ozkok's aims on May 26 
were six-fold: 
 
 
(A) To cut the legs off the press reports, originating in the 
May 23 issue of Kemalist "Cumhuriyet" that "young officers" 
are very uneasy about AK party and the AK government's goals. 
 "Young officers" is a phrase redolent of the May 27, 1960 
coup, engineered by young officers against both the 
government of the day and senior commanders, and Ozkok was 
determined (1) to end public speculation that his tenure is 
under question in the officers' ranks and (2) to restore 
discipline in the ranks -- his use of an oblique Ottomanesque 
phrase ("kerameti kendinden menkul kimseler", roughly 
equivalent to "Lord Muck miracle workers") to demean his TGS 
critics made his message to them all the blunter. 
 
 
(B) While acknowledging that the TGS is not monolithic in its 
discussions of "ideas", to reject all speculation that there 
are differences of view or any polarization in the TGS (note: 
to protect his image as chief of the TGS, Ozkok felt he had 
to assert that there is no difference of view in the TGS, but 
others, including MG Acar, readily admit to us that there is 
a heated debate, especially concerning Turkey's direction on 
the EU, relations with the U.S., and what to do about AK 
party). 
 
 
(C) To declare that the TGS and AK government are not on the 
same wavelength. 
 
 
(D) To affirm that the TGS as a whole is "uneasy" with the 
current political situation. 
 
 
(E) To reject any discussion of a coup "under this roof" (the 
TGS) but to leave the journalists, and thus the public at 
large on alert (1) by emphasizing that the armed forces will 
continue its secularist struggle "to the very end" within the 
constitutional framework; and (2) by warning that the 
February 28 process (the "post-modern" coup that brought an 
end to the Islamist Erbakan government in 1997) is a cause 
and effect relationship, and "with the reasons for February 
28 continuing, its effects will continue." 
 
 
(F) To defend himself against the charges -- which appear to 
originate with the high-ranking generals aligned against him 
-- that he is too democratic and Western-oriented to be a 
strong guardian of core "secularist" values; Ozkok said that 
his attachment to democratic values and the benefits of 
having served in Western billets strengthen his ability to 
defend core values. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Ozkok's briefing has produced sound and fury, but 
uneven effect. 
 
 
¶5. (C) First, press and private commentaries have been as 
openly critical of the military's heavy-handedness as we 
recall ever having experienced in Turkey.  Not one of the 
journalists, analysts, politicians or businessmen we have 
talked to since the briefing sees a coup as possible under 
current circumstances, or even desirable.  However, Demir 
emphasized that the way Ozkok broached the coup subject 
leaves the door open should the AK government's performance 
cause widespread and sharp discontent, thereby eroding the 
resilient support Erdogan and AK continue to have in 
Anatolia.  Some see Ozkok's position as lessened or, more 
broadly, the military's ability to intimidate politicians and 
the public as diminished.  Emblematic of this latter view is 
the comment we heard from a major crude oil and molasses 
shipper, who expressed the hope that this controversy marks a 
definitive turning point toward full democracy and civilian 
control. 
 
 
¶6. (S) Second, senior generals' objections to Ozkok's more 
patient, reasonable line appear not to have abated.  Our 
defense and national security contacts identify seven of the 
generals opposed to Ozkok as Land Forces Commander Yalman, 
Jandarma Commander Eruygur, First Army Commander Dogan, 
Aegean Army Commander Tolon, Second Army Commander Turkeri, 
and NSC SecGen Kilinc, with Buyukanit described as playing it 
both ways.  Buyukanit's anti-American/anti-Western remarks at 
a May 29 conference in Istanbul (ref H) lend weight to 
classifying him in this group.  Cengiz Candar noted to us May 
29 a report that on May 28, General Dogan, in speaking at a 
memorial service for a recently deceased army colleague, 
deliberately used the inflammatory "young officers" phrase in 
a way which would underscore continuing defiance of Ozkok. 
 
 
¶7. (S) The carrying power of this group remains a subject of 
debate.  Three contacts (Faruk Demir, a military affairs 
journalist, and a center-right politician with close ties to 
high-level retired generals) have separately told us they 
have heard that this group of generals aims to give Ozkok a 
memorandum demanding that he resign or submit to their view 
and get tough with AK.  At the same time, MG Acar told us he 
sees no possibility of an "open rupture" within the military. 
 Moreover, Ozkok has the opportunity to put his own stamp on 
the military this year.  He can retire two of this group (who 
also opposed his nomination as CHOD) in summer 2003, and two 
more in summer 2004.  He will promote a significant number of 
three- and four-star generals and can change up to 80% of the 
senior TGS staff this year. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Third, P.M. Erdogan has publicly admonished those who 
would seek to foment AK-military tensions and privately 
acknowledged that it is essential to support Ozkok, although 
he told Cengiz Candar he is at a loss how to do so.  AK 
deputy party chairman Firat affirmed to us May 30 that 
Erdogan is searching for a modus vivendi.  At the same time, 
Justice Minister Cicek; Firat; and other AK M.P.s such as 
former Erdogan chief of staff Comez, deputy parliamentary 
group chairmen Ipek and Ergin, and human rights committee 
deputy chairman Torun, have each reiterated to us in the past 
few days that the party will press ahead with its new EU 
harmonization reform packages.  Ipek emphasized that the NSC 
is merely an advisory body and the fiery Torun asserted that 
the party is ready "to go down like Menderes" (the P.M. 
removed in the 1960 coup and hanged in 1961) to defend its 
reforms against the military.  However, most of our AK 
interlocutors admit that they will have to slow the pace 
owing to TGS and NSC objections to specific reforms. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Ozkok and Erdogan appear to be strange 
bedfellows as each grapples with lack of coherence and 
discipline in the ranks below and both try to figure out a 
modus vivendi with the other through weekly one-on-one 
meetings.  Each tries to give direction to the divided 
institution (military high command, parliamentary majority) 
he relies on for authority and power. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Given Erdogan's political savvy and the strong 
protection afforded him by his continuing solid support 
across Turkey, we see no evidence that a coup, direct or 
politically-engineered, is likely under current 
circumstances.  However, aside from the pressures Ozkok 
faces, his and Erdogan's challenge in finding a 
mutually-compatible way forward is compounded by the 
following factors in AK: Erdogan's self-imposed isolation and 
consequent dearth of fresh information from outside; the 
uneven level of competence among party vice chairmen and 
parliamentary group deputy chairmen (whips); static-filled 
communications between party and government on the one hand 
and parliamentary group on the other; factions which render 
the party a coalition in itself; controversy over whether the 
party's candidates for management positions in the 
bureaucracy are sufficiently competent or loyal to secular 
precepts; and questions over the party's intentions in 
pursuing certain draft legislation (e.g., right to set up a 
prayer room -- of any denomination -- in every apartment 
building).  See ref (F) and septel. 
 
 
¶11. (C) What is clear is that Ozkok's briefing neither 
satisfied those in the military who oppose his approach nor 
intimidated AK.  The tensions between the military and AK, 
and within each institution, will continue and affect 
Turkey's ability to set itself on a consistent course in any 
direction. 
PEARSON