This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018 
TAGS: MASS PREL KTIA PGOV MARR MOPS NI KICC
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER MOD DANJUMA ON ART. 98, BENUE AND 
REFORM 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 205 
     ¶B. ABUJA 743 
     ¶C. ABUJA 989 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D) 
 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY: June 7 DCM paid a farewell call on 
former Minister of Defense LTG (ret.) T.Y. Danjuma. 
Danjuma did not expect the GON to conclude an Article 98 
agreement and doubted the Commission of Inquiry's report on 
the October 2001 Benue massacre would satisfy the U.S. 
Congress since the report failed to identify culpable 
individuals.  Danjuma also expressed frustration with 
endemic corruption in the GON. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
---------- 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Former Defense Minister Danjuma (strictly 
protect) strongly doubted Nigeria would sign an Article 98 
agreement.  Reiterating what he had told us in prior 
meetings, Danjuma said that Nigeria would likely mirror 
South Africa's decision - a refusal to conclude an 
agreement.  An inter-ministerial committee had met to 
develop a recommendation for President Obasanjo; the 
members were Danjuma, (former) Foreign Minister Sule 
Lamido, (former) Attorney General Kanu Agabi and another 
Minister who Danjuma could not recall.  On the date of the 
meeting, Danjuma had been ill, so Agabi (chair) called to 
seek his views.  Danjuma advised that Nigeria should stay 
in step with South Africa; he personally thought Article 98 
agreements "would weaken the UN" and thus had reservations. 
He counseled again that the committee should learn why 
South Africa had declined to sign before making a final 
recommendation to President Obasanjo.  Danjuma said Agabi 
voiced surprise since he expected Danjuma to be more 
positive about Article 98.  He stated that the other three 
members had reached the same conclusion.  Danjuma said that 
he believed a recommendation along these lines had already 
gone to Obasanjo. 
 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) COMMENT: During a May 12 meeting with Ambassador 
Jeter (REF C), Danjuma made similar comments regarding 
Article 98.  During that meeting, however, Danjuma said he 
would "try" to persuade Obasanjo to sign the agreement.  By 
his own account, he did not make the effort.  There remains 
a possibility that Nigeria could be encouraged to sign an 
Article 98, possibly as a "deliverable" should President 
Bush visit in the near future.  However, (assuming 
Danjuma's account is accurate) in doing so, Obasanjo would 
have to disregard the advice of the committee he 
established on the subject, a move not unprecedented if 
Obasanjo holds his own strong counsel on an issue (e.g. The 
2001 Racism Resolution).  Obasanjo indicated he might do 
just that in a June 11 meeting with Ambassador (reported 
SEPTEL).  END COMMENT. 
 
 
----- 
Benue 
----- 
 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Turning to the October 2001 Benue incident, 
Danjuma said he doubted that Senator Feingold would be 
satisfied with the Commission of Inquiry's report (REF A). 
Danjuma had read the report cover-to-cover, and the 
Commission had not tried to identify responsible 
individuals.  He commented that the military could convene 
a Board of Inquiry and easily determine those within the 
units who were responsible; the commander certainly knew 
which elements had gone into the area. 
 
 
---------------- 
Defense Minister 
---------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Danjuma said Salihu Ibrahim would not/not be the 
next Defense Minister; his successor would be a civilian, 
Danjuma predicted.  Danjuma also offered that during his 
second Administration, President Obasanjo would assume much 
of the MOD's portfolio himself, possibly to the extent of 
becoming the de facto Minister.  (COMMENT: Previous DAO 
reporting had indicated Salihu Ibrahim would be the next 
MOD (REF B).  If a civilian, we predict that Lawal 
Batagarawa, former Minister of State for Defense (Army), 
would be the likely candidate.  A northerner, Batagarawa 
has Obasanjo's confidence and worked ardently for the 
President's re-election.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Frustration with Corruption 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Danjuma said, "The last four years have been the 
most frustrating years of my life; there was no money."  He 
opined that money was leaking from the system at every 
joint in the plumbing, most particularly from the Ministry 
of Finance and the CBN.  His Ministry had caught three 
instances of double payment, and he thought the double 
payments were intentional and contrived with the support of 
Finance Ministry officials.  If the same sort of thing was 
replicated elsewhere, the impact could be substantial.  He 
said that corruption was particularly bad at the state 
level.  He noted that roughly half the road-building 
projects in Nigeria were stalled and that a third or more 
of the local construction firms were either bankrupt or 
nearly so because they had taken high-interest loans to 
start projects for which they were not being paid. 
 
 
---------------- 
Political Reform 
---------------- 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Danjuma said he had tried to present some thoughts, 
particularly on corruption and political reform, during his 
final meeting with Obasanjo as Defense Minister.  But, he 
commented wryly, "the President is not a very good 
listener."  Danjuma had, he said, broached several topics - 
- the most important of which he thought was improving 
relations with the National Assembly -- but Obasanjo had 
not let him say very much before offering his own opinions. 
Danjuma said he hoped to get some more of his points across 
in the coming days. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Danjuma is a close confidant of the President.  His 
negative assessment of Article 98 and that of the others on 
the inter-ministerial committee tasked with examining the 
issue will influence Obasanjo's ultimate decision. 
However, in the past, Obasanjo has overruled his advisors 
on issues about which he felt strongly and, possibly, this 
could be one.  Indications from the Ambassador's June 11 
meeting with Obasanjo (SEPTEL) imply that Obasanjo may have 
already come to a different conclusion from his advisors. 
END COMMENT. 
JETER