This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 002327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2013 
TAGS: EU IT IT PREL PRELEU
SUBJECT: ITALIAN MFA ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MC TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: IN A MAY 14 DISCUSSION ON THE EU 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MFA DIRECTOR FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02327  01 OF 02  271651Z 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, GUISEPPE BUCCINO, TOLD EMBASSY POLOFF THAT A 
TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY DURING THE ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY WAS 
HIGHLY UNLIKELY.  BUCCINO STATED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPERATIVE 
FOR THE IRISH TO CONCLUDE WORK ON THE IGC BY THE END OF THEIR 
PRESIDENCY IN JUNE 2004 OR THE MOMENTUM COMING OUT OF THE 
CONVENTION WILL BE LOST.  ITALY SUPPORTS GISCARD'S PROPOSAL 
TO REPLACE THE SIX-MONTH ROTATING PRESIDENCY WITH A FULL-TIME 
COUNCIL CHAIRMAN, ELECTED FOR A RENEWABLE 2 1/2-YEAR TERM. 
ITALY ALSO ENVISAGES A MERGING OF THE CFSP HIGH 
REPRESENTATIVE (SOLANA) AND COMMISSION EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
COMMISSIONER (PATTEN) POSITIONS, INTO A SINGLE DOUBLE HATTED 
EU FOREIGN MINISTER.  ON THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE OF 
STRENGTHENED COOPERATION ON DEFENSE POLICY, ITALY INSISTS 
THAT THE CRITERIA AND RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT MUST BE DECIDED BY 
UNANIMITY (IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANOTHER ESDP MINI-DEFENSE 
SUMMIT).   ITALY WANTS TO ENSURE THAT THE CONVENTION'S WORK 
ON DEFENSE POLICY SUPPORTS BERLUSCONI'S GOAL OF IMPROVING 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS.  BUCCINO WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH EMBASSY POLOFF ON THE CONVENTION'S 
PROGRESS AND ANY POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  BUCCINO BEGAN THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS A "STRANGE ANIMAL." ARTICLE 48 
OF THE TREATY OF ROME REQUIRES ANY CHANGES TO THAT TREATY TO 
BE DECIDED BY MEMBER STATES IN THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE (IGC). BUCCINO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DUE TO THE LACK 
OF VOTING POWER AMONG CONVENTION REPRESENTATIVES, DISCUSSIONS 
TEND TO BE RATHER GENERAL AND, THUS, THE PRESENTATION OF A 
FINAL PRODUCT IN THESSALONIKI SHOULD NOT BE OVERSTATED. 
ACCORDING TO BUCCINO, THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION WILL LIKELY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02327  01 OF 02  271651Z 
CONTAIN SEVERAL AMENDMENTS ON THE MAIN INSTITUTIONAL TIE-UPS, 
E.G. ON A FULL TIME COUNCIL PRESIDENT AND ON THE SIZE OF THE 
COMMISSION.  BUCCINO ALSO ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD BE ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE TO FINISH THE WORK OF THE IGC DURING ITALY'S 
PRESIDENCY, BUT STRESSED THE URGENCY IN COMPLETING THE 
PROCESS BY THE END OF THE IRISH PRESIDENCY IN JUNE 2004. 
OTHERWISE, THE EU WOULD BE FACING AN "INSTITUTIONAL MESS." 
THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS IN 2004, SUCH AS EU PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS AND REFORM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, WHICH 
WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE WORK OF THE CONVENTION. 
BUCCINO NOTED THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF SIGNING THE NEW 
TREATY IN ROME AND INDICATED THAT THE IRISH AND OTHER EU 
MEMBER STATES WOULD AGREE TO THIS AS LONG AS ITALY WORKS 
FASTIDIOUSLY IN HELPING THE IRISH TO COMPLETE THE WORK OF THE 
IGC. 
 
¶3. (C)  ITALY SUPPORTS CONVENTION PRESIDENT GISCARD'S 
PROPOSAL TO REPLACE THE SIX-MONTH ROTATING PRESIDENCY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL WITH A FULL-TIME CHAIRMAN, ELECTED FOR A 
RENEWABLE 2 1/2-YEAR TERM.  BUCCINO DESCRIBED TWO MAIN ROLES 
FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL: PREPARING, CHAIRING AND FOLLOWING UP THE 
DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, AND REPRESENTING THE EU ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE 
COMPETENCIES OF THE COMMISSION, OR THE DAILY CONDUCT OF 
FOREIGN POLICY BY THE EU FOREIGN MINISTER).  BUCCINO NOTED 
THAT THIS PROPOSAL IS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY THE SMALLER MEMBER 
STATES AND ACCESSION COUNTRIES, WHICH SEE IT AS A PLOT TO 
CREATE A DIRECTOIRE OF THE BIG STATES.  ITALY RECOGNIZES THAT 
FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE COULD 
ENDANGER THE CONVENTION'S CHANCES OF SUBMITTING A FINAL TEXT 
AT THESSALONIKI.  ACCORDING TO BUCCINO, ITALY HOPES TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02327  01 OF 02  271651Z 
FACILITATE A COMPROMISE ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE THESSALONIKI IN 
ORDER TO EASE OF THE WORK OF THE IGC. 
 
¶4. (C) ITALY ALSO ENVISAGES A MERGING OF THE CFSP HIGH 
REPRESENTATIVE (SOLANA) AND COMMISSION EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
COMMISSIONER (PATTEN) POSITIONS, INTO A SINGLE DOUBLE HATTED 
EU FOREIGN MINISTER.  ITALY'S GOAL IS TO SIMPLIFY THE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EU AND, THUS, BELIEVES A 
FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD PROVIDE FOR MORE CONSISTENCY AND 
EFFICIENCY IN EU EXTERNAL POLICY.  A MAJORITY OF MEMBER 
STATES SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL AS LONG AS THERE IS A GENUINE 
DOUBLE HATING WITH A LOCATION IN BOTH INSTITUTIONS.  HOWEVER, 
BUCCINO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE TECHNICAL DISAGREEMENTS 
AMONG MEMBER STATES AS TO HOW THIS PERSON SHOULD BE NOMINATED. 
 
¶5. (C) BUCCINO SAID THAT ITALY HAS OBJECTIONS TO THE 
CONVENTION'S WORK ON DEFENSE POLICY, SPECIFICALLY ARTICLE 
30.6 OF THE PRESIDIUM'S DRAFT TEXT.  GISCARD'S PROPOSAL CALLS 
FOR STRENGTHENED COOPERATION ON DEFENSE POLICY, BUT PROVIDES 
NO STRICT CRITERIA OR RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT.  ITALY'S 
OBJECTION IS THAT ARTICLE 30.6 LEGITIMIZES A GROUP OF MEMBER 
STATES TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE EU, AS OCCURRED DURING 
THE ESDP MINI-SUMMIT.  ITALY'S POSITION IS THAT STRENGTHENED 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3066 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02327  02 OF 02  271651Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AMAD-00  CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  SRPP-00 
      DS-00    EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  EPAE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00     /004W 
                  ------------------6B5FD8  271651Z /38 
P 271651Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0098 
INFO EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 002327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2013 
TAGS: EU IT IT PREL PRELEU
SUBJECT: ITALIAN MFA ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS 
 
COOPERATION MUST BE DECIDED BY UNANIMITY IN ORDER TO ENSURE 
MEMBER STATES ARE WORKING TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN POSITION. 
 IN ITS ROLE AS EU PRESIDENT, ITALY WANTS TO GUARANTEE THAT 
THE CONVENTION'S WORK ON DEFENSE POLICY SUPPORTS ITALIAN PM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02327  02 OF 02  271651Z 
BERLUSCONI'S GOAL OF CLOSING THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT. 
 
SKODON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2003ROME02327 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL