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Viewing cable 03ROME2045, REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ROME2045 2003-05-12 17:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ROME 002045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02045  01 OF 06  121721Z 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM



SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF 
 
REF: A. ROME 0292 
     B. ROME 0354 
     C. ROME 0600 
     D. ROME 0639 
     E. ROME 0699 
     F. ROME 0810 
     G. ROME 0842 
     H. ROME 1112 
     I. ROME 1143 
     J. ROME 1205 
     K. ROME 1264 
     L. ROME 1286 
     M. ROME 1347 
     N. ROME 1410 
     O. ROME 1679 
     P. ROME 1754 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 



1.  (C) SUMMARY.  ITALY ANSWERED THE CALL TO ASSIST THE 
COALITION WIN THE WAR IN IRAQ.  THE GOI MADE A STRATEGIC 
CHOICE TO KEEP ITS POLICY ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AND STUCK TO 
IT, DESPITE INTENSE INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE TO FOLD. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  01 OF 06  121721Z 
ITALY DID NOT SHY AWAY FROM THIS CHOICE, AGREEING TO BE NAMED 
PUBLICLY AS A COALITION MEMBER.  TOP OFFICIALS SPOKE OUT 
REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY ON THE NEED TO ENSURE IRAQI 
COMPLIANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS.  THEY STOOD UP FOR OUR 
OBJECTIVES AT THE UN, SPOKE OUT AGAINST IRAQ'S WAR CRIMES, 
AND EXPELLED IRAQI DIPLOMATS FROM ITALIAN SOIL.  OUR CONTACTS 
GAVE US HEARTBURN WITH THEIR PENCHANT FOR NOTIFYING THE 
PARLIAMENT ABOUT OPERATIONAL MINUTIA, BUT IN THE END REGULAR 
CONSULTATION KEPT POTENTIALLY UNRULY LEGISLATORS IN LINE AND 
OPSEC WAS PROTECTED.  WHEN PRESIDENT CIAMPI SEEMED ON THE 
VERGE OF CALLING INTO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THE DEPLOYMENT 
OF THE U.S. ARMY'S 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE DIRECTLY TO IRAQ 
FROM ITALIAN SOIL, THE GOI WORKED TACTICS WITH US TO ADDRESS 
HIS CONCERNS. 
 


2.  (C) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE U.S. MILITARY WAS 
OUTSTANDING.  WE GOT WHAT WE ASKED FOR ON BASE ACCESS, 
TRANSIT, AND OVERFLIGHTS, ENSURING THAT FORCES -- INCLUDING 
TROOPS ON CIVILIAN CHARTER JETS -- COULD FLOW SMOOTHLY 
THROUGH ITALY TO GET TO THE FIGHT.  ITALIAN AIRFIELDS, PORTS, 
AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE WERE PLACED AT OUR DISPOSAL. 
AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY BECAME A MAJOR RESUPPLY HUB, OVER 1,000 
MISSIONS WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AT THE SIGONELLA NAS, 
AND AVIANO SUPPORTED THE LARGEST COMBAT MOVEMENT OF C-17S IN 
HISTORY FROM ITALIAN SOIL.  MOREOVER, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITIES PREVENTED DETERMINED PROTESTERS FROM STOPPING 
TRAINS AND TRUCKS TRANSPORTING U.S. EQUIPMENT ACROSS ITALY TO 
STAGING AREAS FOR DELIVERY TO SW ASIA.  FORCE PROTECTION WAS 
BUMPED UP AT U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT ITALY AND 
THE GOI GRANTED VIRTUALLY ALL OUR REQUESTS TO ENSURE THAT 
U.S. VESSELS TRANSITING AUGUSTA BAY IN SUPPORT OF OIF WERE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02045  01 OF 06  121721Z 
ADEQUATELY PROTECTED.  THE GOI IS NOW MOVING AT A STEADY PACE 
TO FILL OUT A RELIEF AND PHASE IV STABILIZATION PACKAGE. 
ITALY IS PLANNING TO SPEND EUROS 79 MILLION ON RELIEF, IS 
DEPLOYING A FIELD HOSPITAL, AND IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE 
UK TO STAND UP A BRIGADE-SIZE ARMY FORCE (COMPLEMENTED BY 
CARABINIERI) IN THE BRITISH SECTOR IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. 
 



3.  (C) WE LEARNED SEVERAL LESSONS FROM WORKING WITH THE GOI 
ON OIF.  FOR ANY FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT INVOLVE 
ITALY, KEEPING DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION IN SYNC WITH THE 
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING 
THE RIGHT RESULTS, QUICKLY.  PRESIDENT CIAMPI CANNOT BE 
IGNORED ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES.  WHITE HOUSE 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD, WE ARE CONVINCED, PAY 
DIVIDENDS.  WHILE THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT CAN BE TRUSTED TO 
MANAGE THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THORNY SECURITY QUESTIONS, 
HAD A DIFFERENT COALITION BEEN IN POWER--IN PARTICULAR ONE 
CONTROLLED BY THE CENTER-LEFT--THE RIDE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
BUMPIER.  ITALY'S INTERAGENCY PROCESS IS IMPROVING, BUT STILL 
INHIBITS THE SMOOTH MESHING OF INTENT WITH CONCRETE ACTION. 
ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REFUSED TO ACT AS THE GOI'S ""MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANT,"" WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO HELP ELEMENTS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT TALK TO, RATHER THAN PAST EACH OTHER.  ALL SAID, 
THE EMBASSY REMAINS CONVINCED THAT ITALY IS AN EXCELLENT 
PLACE TO DO OUR POLITICAL-MILITARY BUSINESS, NOT LEAST 
BECAUSE THE COUNTRY'S MUCH-MALIGNED BUREAUCRACY HAS A CASTE 
OF TOP-NOTCH PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO 
HELP US GET THE OPERATIONAL JOB DONE ON OIF.  END SUMMARY. 
 


----------------------------------- 
OVERVIEW OF ITALY OIF CONTRIBUTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 

4. (C) AS THE COALITION SWITCHES GEARS AND MOVES FULL SPEED 
AHEAD WITH PHASE IV, WE WANTED TO CALL ATTENTION TO ITALY'S 
MANY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF AND HIGHLIGHT SOME LESSONS LEARNED 
ABOUT WORKING WITH THE GOI.  IT WAS A BUMPY RIDE AND WE WERE 
AT TIMES FRUSTRATED THAT THE GOI COULD NOT MOVE ON OUR 
REQUESTS AS RAPIDLY AS WE MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED.  HOWEVER, IF 
TANGIBLE RESULTS ARE WHAT COUNT, THEN BY ANY MEASURABLE 
STANDARD ITALY SCORES WELL; INDEED VERY WELL.  THE BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT BROUGHT A COUNTRY ROUNDLY OPPOSED TO WAR AS CLOSE 
AS IT COULD POLITICALLY TO THE BRINK OF BELLIGERENT STATUS. 
WITHOUT THE PRESSURE OF THE VATICAN, SEVERE POLITICAL AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  02 OF 06  121721Z 
PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO CONFLICT, AND UNEASE WITHIN THE 
GOVERNING COALITION ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE, THE GOI MIGHT 
HAVE DONE EVEN MORE.  AS IT WAS, ITALY, ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT 
PUT BOOTS ON THE GROUND, DID MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO 
HELPING THE COALITION WIN THE WAR IN IRAQ.  NOW, IT IS 
HELPING ENSURE THAT STABILIZATION TAKES HOLD AND 
RECONSTRUCTION CAN BEGIN.  WE THINK THERE IS A GOOD STORY 
HERE AND ONE WORTH REFLECTING ON.  NEVERTHELESS, FOR THOSE 
READERS WHO PREFER ONLY A SNAPSHOT OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS, 
WE BEGIN WITH THE FACTS. 
 
POLITICAL SUPPORT 
----------------- 
 
- ITALY AGREED TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY AS COALITION MEMBER 
- GOI OPPOSED EFFORTS IN UN TO CRITICIZE U.S. IRAQ POLICY 
- GOI EXPELLED FOUR IRAQI OFFICIALS SUSPECTED OF INTELLIGENCE 
TIES 
- GOI MAINTAINED PARLIAMENTARY BACKING FOR IRAQ POLICY 
- GOI ENSURED THAT PRESIDENT CIAMPI DID NOT CHALLENGE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 173RD BRIGADE'S DEPLOYMENT FROM VICENZA 
TO NORTHERN IRAQ, THE LARGEST COMBAT AIR DROP SINCE WW II 
 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
------------------ 
 
- GOI SUPPORTED 124 GLOBEMASTER TAKEOFFS/LANDINGS AT AVIANO, 
THE LARGEST EVER COMBAT MOVEMENT OF C-17S 
- GOI ASSISTED IN SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SOME 1,300 
MISSIONS FROM SIGONELLA NAS 
- GOI AGREED TO OUR REQUEST TO USE SIGONELLA AS DIVERT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02045  02 OF 06  121721Z 
AIRFIELD FOR OVERFLIGHT OF WMD SAMPLES 
- ITALIAN PORTS HOSTED 71 U.S. VESSELS 
- AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY SERVED AS MAJOR RESUPPLY HUB 
- U.S. CHARTER FLIGHTS TRANSPORTING OVER 8000 TROOPS TO SW 
ASIA TOUCHED DOWN ON ITALIAN CIVIL/MILITARY AIRFIELDS 
- GOI PREVENTED PROTESTERS FROM DISRUPTING FLOW OF 
MEN/MATERIEL THROUGH ITALY, INCLUDING COMPLEX MOVES IN 
SUPPORT OF THE 173RD'S DEPLOYMENT 
 
FORCE PROTECTION SUPPORT 
------------------------ 
 
- LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION 
WITH U.S. BASE COMMANDERS TO PREVENT SERIOUS INCIDENTS 
- MAJOR FP INCREASE/SUPPORT AT SIGONELLA AND AUGUSTA BAY 
INCLUDING ARMED ITALIAN NAVY ESCORT, ROVING GUARDS, NEW 
WATERSIDE SECURITY SYSTEM 
- U.S. NAVY SHIPS ALLOWED TO CONDUCT UNARMED TRAINING 
EXERCISES IN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS 
 
HUMANITARIAN/PHASE IV SUPPORT 
----------------------------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0798 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02045  03 OF 06  121722Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00 
      DOEE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /003W 
                  ------------------63C25B  121722Z /38 
P 121721Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9808 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY 
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY 
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY 
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 ROME 002045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02045  03 OF 06  121722Z 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF 
 
- INITIAL EUROS 15 MILLION TRANCHE DISTRIBUTED TO 
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES 
- DEPLOYMENT OF FIELD HOSPITAL TO IRAQ MOVING AHEAD 
- COOPERATION WITH UK ON DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADE-SIZE FORCE 
PLUS CARABINIERI IN BRITISH PHASE IV SECTOR 
 


--------------------------------- 
POLITICAL SUPPORT - DEPENDABILITY 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) PM BERLUSCONI MADE A STRATEGIC CHOICE TO STICK BY THE 
U.S. WHICH HE ABIDED BY AND PERIODICALLY REAFFIRMED.  HE 
COULD HAVE BUCKLED UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM SOME EU BRETHREN 
TO PEEL AWAY FROM THE COALITION.  OTHERS MIGHT HAVE; 
BERLUSCONI DID NOT.  SIGNING THE ORIGINAL LETTER OF THE EIGHT 
WAS A CLEAR AND HELPFUL SIGN TO EU MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE 
STATES OUTSIDE THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS THAT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE 
TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED, PUBLICLY.  MOREOVER, STRONG 
COMMENTS BY MINDEF MARTINO AND FM FRATTINI TO EU COLLEAGUES 
AND THE MEDIA ON THE NEED TO ENFORCE UN RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ'S 
DISARMAMENT KEPT THE UK AND SPAIN  FROM BEING ISOLATED IN THE 
EU.  ITALY READILY AGREED TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY BY THE USG AS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  03 OF 06  121722Z 
A COALITION MEMBER AND, WITH THE CONFLICT RAGING, ACTED ON 
OUR REQUEST TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST IRAQI WAR CRIMES.  WE ASKED 
THE GOI TO OPPOSE EFFORTS TO USE THE UNGA OR OTHER UN FORA TO 
CRITICIZE COALITION ACTION IN IRAQ, AND IT DID.  WE URGED THE 
GOI TO EXPEL IRAQI OFFICIALS SUSPECTED OF INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITY IN ITALY AND, WITHIN DAYS OF OUR DEMARCHE, ALL BUT 
ONE OF THOSE ACCREDITED TO ITALY WERE GONE (NOTE: WE HAD LESS 
SUCCESS WITH THE IRAQIS RESIDENT IN ITALY BUT ACCREDITED TO 
THE VATICAN OR THE UN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION.  END 
NOTE). 
 



6.  (C) THE GOI PROVED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IT KNEW VERY WELL 
HOW TO MANAGE A DELICATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION -- 
ESPECIALLY PARLIAMENT AND RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT CIAMPI. 
IN SOME INSTANCES, WE QUESTIONED GOI DECISIONS TO NOTIFY 
PARLIAMENT OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL DETAILS.  INDEED, MINDEF 
MARTINO TOLD US THAT HE PROBABLY SET THE BAR TOO LOW AND 
ULTIMATELY HAD TO WALK BACK PARLIAMENT FROM EXPECTING FINE 
GRANULARITY ABOUT ITALY'S ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.  AS WE HAVE 
SAID PREVIOUSLY ABOUT MARTINO, HE OFTEN TAKES A CIRCUITOUS 
ROUTE IN DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY ISSUES.  BUT HE 
USUALLY GETS IT RIGHT IN THE END.  THOUGH IT HAD TO 
RECALIBRATE MIDSTREAM, THE GOI WAS ABLE TO RETAIN CRUCIAL 
PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT THROUGH REGULAR CONSULTATION AND 
INFORMATION SHARING, ALL THE WHILE KEEPING ITS PROMISES TO 
PROTECT OPSEC. 
 



7.  (C) PERHAPS EVEN MORE CRITICALLY, THE GOI, WITH OUR HELP, 
KEPT PRESIDENT CIAMPI FROM BLOWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL WHISTLE 
ON ITALIAN ASSISTANCE.  HE NEGOTIATED A COMPLEX PACT WITH THE 
GOI NOT TO INVOLVE ITALY ""IN DIRECT ATTACKS ON IRAQ.""  WHEN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02045  03 OF 06  121722Z 
THE PRESIDENT SAW THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE'S DEPLOYMENT TO 
NORTHERN IRAQ FROM SETAF HQ'S IN VICENZA ON TELEVISION -- 
REPORTED AS AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION -- HIS FIRST REACTION WAS 
THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT.  THE GOI 
WORKED CLOSELY WITH US ON TACTICS TO ENSURE THAT CIAMPI DID 
NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
DEPLOYMENT, RECOMMENDING A LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE 
PRESIDENT EXPLAINING THE 173RD'S MISSION THAT, ACCORDING TO 
THE GOI, HEADED OFF HIS INTERVENTION TO BLOCK IT.  WHILE THE 
GOI WAS RIGHT IN REQUESTING THAT THEY, NOT US, MANAGE THE 
CIAMPI CONUNDRUM, IT REMINDS US FORCEFULLY THAT THE PRESIDENT 
CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED ON KEY NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS.  AS 
CHIEF OF STATE, HE EXPECTS WASHINGTON -- INCLUDING THE WHITE 
HOUSE -- TO RECOGNIZE HIS ROLE. 
 


----------------------------------------- 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT - GETTING TO THE FIGHT 
----------------------------------------- 
 

8.  (C) DESPITE CONSTANTLY BUMPING UP AGAINST THE GOI'S 
PRE-NOTIFICATION CRITERIA, WE RECEIVED OUTSTANDING SUPPORT ON 
BASE ACCESS, TRANSIT, AND OVERFLIGHTS BY U.S. FORCES. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0802 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02045  04 OF 06  121722Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00 
      DOEE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /003W 
                  ------------------63C26D  121722Z /38 
P 121721Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9809 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY 
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY 
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY 
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 ROME 002045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02045  04 OF 06  121722Z 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF 
 
THE GOI WAS ABLE TO ENSURE THAT U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 
EQUIPMENT WERE ABLE TO MOVE EFFICIENTLY IN, THROUGH, AND OVER 
ITALY.  ITALIAN RESOURCES COMMITTED TO HELPING US MEET ALL 
OUR OPERATIONAL FLOW OF FORCES REQUIREMENTS WERE SUBSTANTIAL. 
 FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOI  SUPPORTED THE LARGEST EVER COMBAT 
MOVEMENT OF C-17S -- 124 TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS OF THE 
GLOBEMASTERS FROM AVIANO, WITHOUT INCIDENT.  AT THE NAVAL AIR 
STATION IN SIGONELLA, THE GOI ASSISTED US IN COMPLETING 
ALMOST 1,300 MISSIONS (TAKEOFFS PLUS LANDINGS) TO THE THEATER 
OF OPERATIONS. WHEN WE ASKED THE GOI FOR PERMISSION TO USE 
THE NAS AS A DIVERT AIRFIELD FOR OVERFLIGHT OF WMD SAMPLES 
OUR REQUEST WAS READILY GRANTED. 
 

9.  (C) SEASIDE, ITALIAN PORTS HOSTED 71 U.S. VESSELS 
DIRECTED TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.  IN PARTICULAR, THE 
PORT IN AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY BECAME A MAJOR RESUPPLY AND 
SUPPORT HUB FOR A US NAVY CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, WITH THE GOI 
PROVIDING INCREASED PIER SPACE FOR U.S. COAST GUARD AND NAVY 
VESSELS.  ITALY ASSISTED WITH ENHANCED COMMUNICATION 
FACILITIES AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION ACCOMMODATIONS, REPAIRS, 
STORAGE OF HAZMAT, EXPEDITED CUSTOMS CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, 
AND ADDITIONAL FREQUENCY ACCESS AT BOTH AUGUSTA BAY AND 
SIGONELLA.   THE GOI ALSO RELAXED DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  04 OF 06  121722Z 
REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING FOR AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS CARRYING 
HAZMAT, EXPEDITED ISSUANCE OF SPECIAL PERMITS FOR MOVING 
OVERSIZED CARGO, AND INCREASED JET FUEL SUPPORT. 
 


10.  (C) THE GOI PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN KEEPING THE FLOW OF 
PERSONNEL THROUGH THE EUCOM AOR TO SW ASIA SMOOTH AND TIMELY. 
 ALTHOUGH, AT FIRST, WE WERE TOLD THAT CHARTER FLIGHTS 
CARRYING TROOPS AND AMMUNITION WERE RESTRICTED TO STOPOVERS 
AT MILITARY AIRFIELDS, THE GOI ALLOWED THE USE OF CIVILIAN 
TARMAC IN ROME AND MILAN AFTER THE AMBASSADOR PRESSED OUR 
CASE WITH BERLUSCONI.  IN THE END, OVER 8,000 U.S. TROOPS 
TRAVELING ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS TRANSITED  ITALY ON THEIR 
WAY TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.  ALTHOUGH THE GOI TOLD US 
SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT PREFERRED WE AVOID USING CIVILIAN 
AIRPORTS DUE TO THE HIGHER VISIBILITY, IT NEVER STEPPED BACK 
FROM THE PM'S COMMITMENT TO THE AMBASSADOR. 
 


11. (C) TIME AND AGAIN, THE GOI IMPRESSED US WITH ITS ABILITY 
TO BALANCE THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE OF NO VIOLENCE AGAINST 
ANTI-WAR PROTESTERS WITH THE NEED TO HELP THE U.S. MILITARY 
DO ITS JOB.  ALTHOUGH ITALIAN AND U.S. METHODS DIFFER (OUR 
HOSTS PREFER LATE NIGHT MOVEMENTS, LAST MINUTE SCHEDULE 
CHANGES, AND GENERAL DECEPTION), THE GOI, WORKING 
HAND-IN-GLOVE WITH THE U.S. ARMY AND THE EMBASSY, 
SUCCESSFULLY PREVENTED PROTESTERS FROM STOPPING TRAINS AND 
VEHICLES MOVING OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT THROUGH ITALY.  WHILE 
THE ROLLING STOCK TRAVELED WITH PARAMILITARY CARABINIERI 
ABOARD, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY COORDINATED AND PROVIDED ALL 
GROUND MOVEMENT SECURITY AND ESCORTS.  THE NATIONAL POLICE 
CHIEF AND THE INTERIOR MINISTER WERE PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN 
THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO MISLEAD AND OUTWIT A SAVVY GROUP OF 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02045  04 OF 06  121722Z 
DEMONSTRATORS WHO, IF THEY HAD HAD LESSER OPPONENTS, MIGHT 
WELL HAVE CAUSED SEVERE DISRUPTIONS TO MOVEMENT OF OUR 
ITALY-BASED PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL.  THIS EXPERIENCE RESULTED 
IN NEW RELATIONSHIPS BEING FORMED BETWEEN EMBASSY PERSONNEL 
AND PUBLIC SECURITY SPECIALISTS AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
THAT WILL SERVE US WELL IN THE FUTURE. 
 


12.  (C) TO ASSIST US GET THE LOGISTICS RIGHT, THE GOI SET UP 
A FORMAL INTERAGENCY TEAM UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE PM'S 
MILITARY ADVISOR.  THE GROUP STUMBLED AT FIRST, BUT ITS DAILY 
MEETINGS FOCUSED ON COORDINATING RESPONSES TO OUR REQUESTS 
PROVED USEFUL.  EMBASSY REPS WERE INVITED TO ATTEND SOME OF 
THE MEETINGS, WHICH HELPED US GET A BETTER HANDLE ON WHO WERE 
THE KEY PLAYERS AT EACH MINISTRY.  THIS WORKING LEVEL 
MECHANISM WAS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING THAT THE POSITIVE 
RESPONSES WE TYPICALLY RECEIVED AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL 
LEVELS WERE INTEGRATED INTO OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING. 
 
---------------- 
FORCE PROTECTION 
---------------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0808 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02045  05 OF 06  121722Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00 
      DOEE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /003W 
                  ------------------63C280  121722Z /38 
P 121721Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9810 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY 
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY 
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY 
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 ROME 002045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02045  05 OF 06  121722Z 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF 
 


13.  (C) ITALY DOES FIRST CLASS FORCE PROTECTION.  LOCAL 
ITALIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. 
BASE COMMANDERS TO BEEF UP FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY 
INSTALLATIONS HOSTING U.S. PERSONNEL.  WE ASKED FOR A 
SIGNIFICANT BUMP UP IN FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT SIGONELLA 
AND AUGUSTA AND WE GOT IT -- ACROSS THE BOARD.  MORE ROVING 
GUARDS, ITALIAN NAVY ESCORT, AND PATROLS FOR SPECIALLY 
POSITIONED SENSOR PLATFORMS WERE ALL PART OF THE PACKAGE.  WE 
PUSHED FOR, AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FOR U.S. NAVY SHIPS TO 
CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES IN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS THAT 
SERVED AS A DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY.  THE 
GOI IN APRIL APPROVED A LONGSTANDING REQUEST FOR NEW 
WATERSIDE SECURITY SYSTEMS AT AUGUSTA AS WELL AS AT THE NAVAL 
SUPPLY INSTALLATION IN NAPLES AND AT SIXTH FLEET HQS IN GAETA 
THAT WILL HELP SIGNIFICANTLY TO PLUG VULNERABILITIES AT THOSE 
PORTS. 
 


--------------------------------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/PHASE IV - RAMPING UP 
--------------------------------------------- 
 

14.  (C)  ITALY IS MOVING AT A STEADY PACE TO FILL OUT A 
COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND STABILIZATION PACKAGE. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  05 OF 06  121722Z 
A FIRST EUROS 15 MILLION TRANCHE OF AN EVENTUAL EUROS 79 
MILLION IN MULTILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN 
ALLOCATED TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES.  THE MFA'S 
EMERGENCY OFFICE IN THE DG FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION HAS 
ALREADY PAID FOR THE DISPATCH OF A PLANE CARRYING EUROS 
250,000 WORTH OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SANITATION KITS, 
NON-PERISHABLE FOOD, ELECTRIC GENERATORS, BLANKETS AND TENTS 
TO KUWAIT CITY.  MOREOVER, ITALY'S INTERAGENCY IRAQ TASK 
FORCE IS MOVING TO DEPLOY A MODULAR FIELD HOSPITAL PROVIDED 
BY THE ITALIAN RED CROSS TO AN AREA NEAR SADDAM CITY IN 
BAGHDAD.  PROBLEMS WITH WORKING THE DETAILS OF DEPLOYING THE 
HOSPITAL THROUGH ITALY'S CENTCOM-ATTACHED LNO ARE ON THEIR 
WAY TO BEING RESOLVED, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO CENTCOM'S 
STEADFAST EFFORTS. 
 


15.  (C) PHASE IV INITIATIVES ARE GELLING AND ITALY WILL BE 
IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR.  PARLIAMENT ON APRIL 15 APPROVED AN 
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ OF UP TO 3000 PERSONNEL (MILITARY 
PLUS CIVILIAN) IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS AND 
RECONSTRUCTION. (NOTE: MINDEF MARTINO SAID ON MAY 6 THAT THE 
GOI WOULD SEEK FURTHER PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORIZATION FOR 
ITALY'S PHASE IV CONTRIBUTION; IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THIS WILL 
COME IN THE FORM OF ANOTHER VOTE OR SIMPLY INVOLVE 
NOTIFICATION.  END NOTE).  THE GOI, IN COORDINATION WITH THE 
USG, IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UK ON STANDING UP A 
BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCE IN THE BRITISH SECTOR IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. 
ITALY'S PHASE IV CONTRIBUTION ALSO WILL INCLUDE SOME 300-400 
CARABINIERI FOR SPECIAL FORCE PROTECTION AND POLICING DUTIES. 
 OUR BRITISH CONTACTS SAY THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT SHOULD BE 
FULLY OPERATIONAL BY LATE JUNE. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  02045  05 OF 06  121722Z 


--------------- 
EMBASSY COMMENT 
--------------- 
 

16. (C/NF) ITALY COMMITTED NO MEN OR MATERIEL TO COMBAT IN 
IRAQ, ALTHOUGH ITS SECURITY SERVICES PROVIDED US, FROM 
SOURCES WITHIN IRAQ, OPERATIONALLY VALUABLE INFORMATION BOTH 
BEFORE AND THROUGHOUT THE CONFLICT.  LACKING A SECOND UN 
RESOLUTION, THE GOI WOULD HAVE PROVOKED A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRISIS HAD IT PUSHED FOR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN COALITION 
OPERATIONS.  KNOWING THE ANTI-WAR VIEW OF THE MAJORITY OF 
ITALIANS, PM BERLUSCONI WAS VISIBLY RELIEVED WHEN PRESIDENT 
BUSH TOLD HIM IN JANUARY THAT THE U.S. DID NOT INTEND TO ASK 
ITALY FOR COMBAT TROOPS.  NEVERTHELESS, VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING 
THE USG ASKED FOR -- EXCEPT STAND-BY TEAMS TO ASSIST WITH WMD 
DISMANTLING, ARMED U.S. NAVY ESCORT IN AUGUSTA BAY, AND 
EXPULSION OF IRAQI OFFICIALS ACCREDITED TO THE VATICAN AND 
FAO -- WAS GRANTED. 
 


17. (C) WHAT STRUCK US THE MOST ABOUT THE GOI'S EFFORTS TO 
ASSIST WERE THE COMMITMENT TO SEE PROMISES THROUGH TO 
COMPLETION DESPITE VERY UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0810 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  02045  06 OF 06  121723Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   USNW-00 
      DOEE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /003W 
                  ------------------63C288  121723Z /38 
P 121721Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9811 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY 
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY 
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY 
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 ROME 002045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  02045  06 OF 06  121723Z 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF 
 
AND THE AGILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MANAGING TOUGH 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES.  IN RETROSPECT, THE GOI MAY HAVE BEEN 
OVERLY SKITTISH WHEN THE ROUTINE ALL OF A SUDDEN BECAME A 
SENSITIVE ISSUE -- ITS BACK AND FORTH ON USING ROME'S 
FIUMICINO AIRPORT FOR CIVILIAN CHARTERS COMES TO MIND -- BUT 
IN THE END OUR NEEDS WERE ACCOMMODATED.  WHILE BERLUSCONI 
DESERVES CREDIT FOR HEWING TO A PRO-U.S. LINE, AT THE SAME 
TIME WE WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WITHOUT 
THE ASSISTANCE OF DOZENS OF QUALIFIED AND PROFESSIONAL 
MID-LEVEL OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY. 
 

----------------------------------- 
COMMENT CONTINUED - LESSONS LEARNED 
----------------------------------- 
 

18. (C) AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE CAME AWAY FROM THE OIF 
EXPERIENCE WITH FIVE FUNDAMENTAL CONVICTIONS. 
 
-- FOR ANY FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT INVOLVE ITALY, 
KEEPING DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION IN SYNC WITH THE 
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL IS IMPERATIVE TO ACHIEVE THE 
RIGHT RESULTS, QUICKLY.  THIS MISSION WORKED WELL IN DOUBLE 
AND TRIPLE TRACKING REQUESTS THROUGH MILITARY AND POLITICAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  02045  06 OF 06  121723Z 
CHANNELS.  IN OUR EXPERIENCE, WE GOT THE FASTEST AND MOST 
POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE GOI WHEN WE HAD NOT ONLY THE 
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY MESSAGE WITH DETAILS, BUT ALSO AN 
INTERAGENCY CLEARED MESSAGE THAT PUT THE REQUEST IN THE 
BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT OF OIF. 
 


-- PRESIDENT CIAMPI MATTERS.  HE USED HIS MORAL AUTHORITY TO 
STRETCH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.  HIS GOAL WAS TO 
MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, BUT IT NEARLY HAD THE UNINTENDED 
(BY HIM) CONSEQUENCE OF JEOPARDIZING A KEY DEPLOYMENT.  WE 
WOULD GET DIVIDENDS FROM HIGHER LEVEL ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING 
BY THE WHITE HOUSE, WITH CIAMPI. 
 
-- THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT CAN BE TRUSTED TO MANAGE THE 
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THORNY SECURITY QUESTIONS, BUT HAD 
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT BEEN IN POWER -- IN PARTICULAR ONE 
CONTROLLED BY THE CENTER-LEFT -- WE WOULD HAVE HAD A FAR MORE 
DIFFICULT SITUATION ON OUR HANDS.  NOTHING CAN BE TAKEN FOR 
GRANTED HERE, ALTHOUGH HOW WE MANAGE THE RECONSTRUCTION 
PROCESS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THOSE WHO OPPOSED US 
PRE-CONFLICT. 
 
-- ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY AVOIDED BECOMING A ""MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANT"" FOR FIXING AN INTERAGENCY PROCESS THAT, DESPITE 
THE GOI'S BEST EFFORTS, STILL INHIBITS THE SMOOTH MESHING OF 
INTENT WITH CONCRETE ACTION, WE CAN HELP ELEMENTS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT TO TALK TO EACH OTHER.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW 
THIS NARROW PATH. 
 
-- RECOGNIZING THAT ITALY CAN APPEAR FRUSTRATINGLY ARCANE AND 
BYZANTINE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN EXCELLENT PLACE TO 
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PAGE 04        ROME  02045  06 OF 06  121723Z 

DO OUR POLITICAL-MILITARY BUSINESS, AS LONG AS A HEALTHY 
DEGREE OF PATIENCE IS THROWN INTO THE MIX.  END COMMENT. 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2003ROME02045 - Clas"	"sification: CONFIDENTIAL 

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