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Viewing cable 03ROME1971, PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL PROBLEMS COMING TO A HEAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ROME1971 2003-05-07 16:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL
SUBJECT: PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL PROBLEMS COMING TO A HEAD 
 
REF: A. ROME 1835 
 
     B. ROME 0757 
     C. ROME 0355 
     D. 02 ROME 0348 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01971  01 OF 04  080841Z 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) SENATE PRESIDENT PERA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR LAST MONTH 
THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL 
TROUBLES, AND FEARS THAT A MILAN COURT HE BELIEVES IS 
POLITICALLY BIASED AGAINST THE PM MAY ISSUE ITS VERDICT IN A 
JUDGE BRIBERY CASE TO COINCIDE WITH THE BEGINNING OF ITALY'S 
EU PRESIDENCY IN JULY.  BERLUSCONI, IN THE WAKE OF THE APRIL 
29 CORRUPTION CONVICTION (IN A DIFFERENT CASE) OF HIS FORMER 
LAWYER, HAS GONE ON THE ATTACK.  VIEWING HIS LEGAL IMBROGLIO 
AS A POLITICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST LEFT-LEANING MAGISTRATES BENT 
ON TOPPLING HIM FROM POWER, BERLUSCONI HAS CALLED ON HIS 
GOVERNING COALITION ALLIES TO RALLY AROUND HIM.  THEY, IN 
TURN, ARE HOPEFUL THAT A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND 
THAT WOULD PROTECT THE PM AND AVERT A HEAD ON COLLISION 
BETWEEN ITALY'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. 
 A DRAFT LAW THAT WOULD PROTECT HIGH OFFICIALS FROM 
PROSECUTION WHILE IN OFFICE MAY SOON BE SUBMITTED IN THE 
PARLIAMENT, BUT THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION IS SO FAR REFUSING 
TO SUPPORT IT. 
 
2.  (C) IN THE EVENT BERLUSCONI IS CONVICTED, HE WOULD HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AND WOULD REMAIN FREE UNLESS THE 
CONVICTION WERE UPHELD BY THE SUPREME COURT.  VARIOUS 
POLITICAL SCENARIOS ARE POSSIBLE.  IF THE VERDICT IS RENDERED 
DURING ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY, THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD 
BE BERLUSCONI'S CALLING FOR A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND 
REMAINING IN OFFICE.  THE TEMPTATION TO MOVE TO NEW ELECTIONS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01971  01 OF 04  080841Z 
AND CHALLENGE THE CENTER-LEFT IN THE VOTING BOOTH WOULD 
INCREASE AFTER THE PRESIDENCY, ALTHOUGH ONLY PRESIDENT CIAMPI 
HAS THE POWER TO CALL THEM.  CIAMPI, CONCERNED ABOUT ITALY'S 
INTERNAL STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION, IS TRYING TO 
PLAY A BALANCING ROLE BY URGING THAT JUDICIAL SENTENCES BE 
RESPECTED AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED BE PROTECTED.  WE ARE 
LESS CONCERNED ABOUT ITALY'S POLITICAL STABILITY THAN WE ARE 
ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CONVICTION FOR BERLUSCONI'S 
ABILITY TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL EU PRESIDENCY--AND HELP US 
ACHIEVE OUR GOALS--IF HE IS TARNISHED BY A GUILTY VERDICT. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
SENATE PRESIDENT WORRIED 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELLO PERA ON APRIL 18 EXPLAINED 
TO THE AMBASSADOR, WHO PERA HAD ASKED TO VISIT HIM IN HIS 
OFFICE, THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL 
TROUBLES (REF A).  IT WAS THE SECOND TIME THIS YEAR THAT PERA 
HAD EXPRESSED SUCH CONCERNS TO AMBASSADOR SEMBLER (REF B). 
PERA WAS CONVINCED (NOT EXPLAINING WHAT LEAD HIM TO THE 
CONCLUSION) THAT A MILAN TRIBUNAL HAD ALREADY REACHED A 
VERDICT IN THE SME TRIAL (NOTE:  THE PM IS ACCUSED OF BRIBING 
A JUDGE TO INFLUENCE A 1986 RULING ON A CORPORATE TAKEOVER 
BATTLE THAT INVOLVED A BID BY BERLUSCONI-OWNED FININVEST TO 
PURCHASE THE THEN STATE-OWNED FOOD CONGLOMERATE, SME. END 
NOTE).  PERA SPECULATED THAT MAGISTRATES IN MILAN WHO, HE 
SAID, WERE WAGING A POLITICAL BATTLE AGAINST BERLUSCONI, WERE 
WAITING FOR AN "OPPORTUNE" MOMENT TO MAKE THE VERDICT PUBLIC. 
 HE WAS WORRIED THEY WOULD DO SO CLOSE TO JULY 1, WHEN ITALY 
WILL TAKE OVER THE ROTATING EU PRESIDENCY, FOR MAXIMUM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  01971  01 OF 04  080841Z 
POLITICAL EFFECT.  THE GOI, PERA SAID, WAS CONSIDERING ITS 
OPTIONS TO COUNTER WHAT BERLUSCONI BELIEVES IS A POLITICAL 
VENDETTA BEING EXERCISED THROUGH PROSECUTORIAL MEANS. 
BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, HE EMPHASIZED THAT 
IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE PRESIDENT CIAMPI ON BOARD WITH 
ANY LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION. 
 
BERLUSCONI COMES OUT SWINGING 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) SINCE THE AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH PERA, 
BERLUSCONI APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BEST DEFENSE IS A 
GOOD OFFENSE.  IN AN OPEN LETTER PUBLISHED BY A NEWSPAPER (IL 
FOGLIO) SYMPATHETIC TO THE CENTER-RIGHT, BERLUSCONI COUCHED 
HIS LEGAL PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL TERMS AND UPPED THE ANTE. 
REFERENCING THE PROSECUTION AND POLITICAL DESTRUCTION OF HIS 
FRIEND AND POLITICAL MENTOR, FORMER PM BETTINO CRAXI, BY THE 
SAME MILAN TRIBUNAL NOW ADJUDICATING THE SME CASE, BERLUSCONI 
UNDERSCORED THAT HE WOULD DEFEND HIMSELF.  CRAXI, WHO DIED IN 
DISGRACE AND EXILE IN TUNISIA, WAS LEFT TO TWIST IN THE WIND 
BY HIS ERSTWHILE POLITICAL ALLIES.  BERLUSCONI MADE CLEAR TO 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7474 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01971  02 OF 04  080842Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------61B135  080842Z /20 
P 071649Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9726 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL
SUBJECT: PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL PROBLEMS COMING TO A HEAD 
 
HIS COALITION PARTNERS THAT THEY SHOULD THINK LONG AND HARD 
ABOUT ALLOWING HIM TO SUFFER THE SAME FATE.  WHILE BERLUSCONI 
IS CERTAINLY LOOKING TO ENSURE HIS OWN POLITICAL SURVIVAL, 
THE PM'S BEHAVIOR SHOULD ALSO BE VIEWED THROUGH THE PRISM OF 
HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO CRAXI; HIS BELIEF THAT THE POWER OF 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01971  02 OF 04  080842Z 
MAGISTRATES PURSUING WHAT HE SEES AS A POLITICAL AGENDA (HIS 
REMOVAL FROM POWER) THROUGH JUDICIAL MEANS MUST BE BROKEN; 
AND HIS RECOGNITION THAT THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION IS WEAK. 
 
5.  (SBU) TACTICALLY, BERLUSCONI IS PURSUING A THREE-TRACK 
APPROACH.  FIRST, HE USED A VOLUNTARY MAY 5 PUBLIC DEPOSITION 
IN MILAN TO CONDUCT A POLITICAL DEFENSE, SPEAKING AS MUCH TO 
PUBLIC OPINION AS TO THE ADJUDICATING MAGISTRATES. 
BERLUSCONI REVEALED THAT CRAXI HAD ASKED HIS FININVEST 
COMPANY TO INTERVENE TO HELP BLOCK THE PUBLIC SALE OF SME TO 
RIVAL INDUSTRIALIST CARLO DE BENEDETTI, BUT ASSERTED THAT 
BOTH HE AND CRAXI WERE ACTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS THE 
SALE WOULD HAVE DISADVANTAGED THE ITALIAN TREASURY. 
BERLUSCONI ALSO SAID HE HAD PROOF THAT FORMER PM GIULIANO 
AMATO KNEW ABOUT A KICKBACK DE BENEDETTI MADE TO THE NOW 
DEFUNCT CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY.  HE ALSO IMPLICITLY 
IMPUGNED EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT PRODI, WHO WAS 
PRESIDENT OF THE STATE-OWNED HOLDING COMPANY (IRI) INVOLVED 
IN THE PLANNED SME SALE (NOTE: PRODI IS ALSO WIDELY TOUTED AS 
THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE TO LEAD THE CENTER-LEFT IN THE NEXT 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS. END NOTE.)  ALL OF THIS WAS TO CONVEY TO 
THE PUBLIC THAT, "THERE WERE A LOT OF SHADY DEALINGS 
SURROUNDING THE SME AFFAIR, BUT SEE HOW THE MAGISTRATES ARE 
ONLY OUT TO GET ME, WHO WON YOUR VOTES IN A DEMOCRATIC 
ELECTION." 
 
6.  (C) SECONDLY, BERLUSCONI IS EXAMINING HIS LEGISLATIVE 
OPTIONS.  ONE POSSIBLE ROUTE IS PASSING A LAW, AS EXISTS IN 
SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THAT WOULD PROTECT HIGH 
OFFICIALS (THE PM, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AND PRESIDENTS 
OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF DEPUTIES) FROM PROSECUTION WHILE 
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PAGE 03        ROME  01971  02 OF 04  080842Z 
THEY ARE SERVING THEIR TERMS.  A MODERATE CENTER-LEFT 
POLITICIAN EARLIER THIS YEAR PROPOSED SUCH A MEASURE, WHICH 
BERLUSCONI AS WELL AS PERA AND PIERFERDINANDO CASINI, 
PRESIDENT OF THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES, HAVE NOW ENDORSED. 
HOWEVER, PIERO FASSINO, LEADER OF ITALY'S LARGEST LEFT-WING 
PARTY (THE DEMOCRATS OF THE LEFT), HAS REJECTED IT, ARGUING 
THAT "POLITICAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIGHT FOR A MEASURE THAT 
WOULD PROTECT CURRENT OFFICE-HOLDERS."  THE GOVERNING 
MAJORITY COULD PASS SUCH A LAW ON ITS OWN, BUT WITHOUT SOME 
CENTER-LEFT SUPPORT IT WOULD BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO 
ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS CRASSLY SELF-SERVING.  ANOTHER 
ALTERNATIVE IS TO REINTRODUCE FULL PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY FOR 
SITTING LEGISLATORS.  IMMUNITY WAS LIFTED IN PART IN 1993 TO 
ALLOW MAGISTRATES TO PURSUE SWEEPING ANTI-CORRUPTION 
INVESTIGATIONS.  FOR BERLUSCONI, REINSTITUTING PARLIAMENTARY 
IMMUNITY WOULD BE SWEET REVENGE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. 
HOWEVER, PASSAGE WOULD REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND, THEREFORE, A MINIMUM OF SIX MONTHS. 
 
7.  (U) FINALLY, BERLUSCONI'S LAWYERS HAVE THREATENED TO CALL 
HUNDREDS OF ADDITIONAL WITNESSES--INCLUDING MINISTERS IN THE 
BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AND FORMER HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS--IN 
AN ATTEMPT TO DELAY A VERDICT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.  HOWEVER, 
THE DECISION WHETHER TO ALLOW THESE WITNESSES RESTS WITH THE 
MILAN COURT. 
 
CONVICTION SCENARIOS 
-------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) THE MILAN TRIBUNAL WILL RULE ON BERLUSCONI'S CASE 
AS A COURT OF "FIRST INSTANCE".  THE LOSING SIDE (EITHER PM 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  01971  02 OF 04  080842Z 
OR PROSECUTOR) WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE VERDICT. 
UNDER ITALIAN LAW, A PERSON APPEALING A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
IS PERMITTED TO REMAIN FREE UNTIL A FINAL RULING IS RENDERED 
(UNLESS BEING HELD IN PREVENTIVE CUSTODY, INAPPLICABLE TO THE 
CASE IN QUESTION).  APPELLATE DECISIONS ARE OFTEN REVIEWED BY 
THE ITALIAN SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS MORE INCLUSIVE IN WHAT IT 
REVIEWS THAN IS ITS U.S. EQUIVALENT.  THUS, IF BERLUSCONI 
WERE CONVICTED, AND THAT CONVICTION WERE UPHELD ON APPEAL, 
THE CASE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ACCEPTED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT FOR ADJUDICATION, LIKELY PUSHING A FINAL RULING ON THE 
CASE SEVERAL YEARS INTO THE FUTURE.  BEARING THIS IN MIND, 
SEVERAL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS PRESENT THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT 
THAT BERLUSCONI IS CONVICTED THIS SUMMER AND THAT NO 
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE MEANTIME. 
 
9.  (C) IN DESCENDING ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD, BERLUSCONI COULD 
REBUFF CALLS FOR HIS RESIGNATION BY ARGUING--AS HE DID IN THE 
RECENTLY CONCLUDED PREVITI CASE (REF A)--THAT THE MILAN 
MAGISTRATES HANDED DOWN A "POLITICAL VERDICT," AND THAT HE 
HAS ULTIMATELY BEEN ACQUITTED ON ALL CHARGES IN EVERY TRIAL 
AGAINST HIM THAT HAS RUN ITS FULL COURSE.  (NOTE: CHARGES 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1272 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01971  03 OF 04  090048Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------623BC8  090049Z /34 
P 071649Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9727 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL
SUBJECT: PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL PROBLEMS COMING TO A HEAD 
 
AGAINST BERLUSCONI HAVE BEEN DROPPED IN SEVERAL CASES BECAUSE 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED.  END 
NOTE.)  BERLUSCONI COULD USE ANY PENDING PARLIAMENTARY VOTE 
AS A DEVICE TO CALL FOR A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS 
LEADERSHIP, WHICH WE BELIEVE HE WOULD WIN.  IN ITALY, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01971  03 OF 04  090048Z 
PAROCHIAL CONCERNS CAN OFTEN TURN VERY SERIOUS AND COULD 
STILL CAUSE A GOVERNMENT CRISIS.  HOWEVER, NONE OF 
BERLUSCONI'S KEY COALITION PARTNERS HAS AN INTEREST IN 
BRINGING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OVER BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL 
PROBLEMS.  THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE NORTHERN LEAGUE'S 
UMBERTO BOSSI, WHO HAS HAD HIS OWN TROUBLED HISTORY WITH 
ITALIAN MAGISTRATES AND HAS COME TO BERLUSCONI'S DEFENSE. 
MOREOVER, POLLS CONTINUE TO SHOW THAT THE PUBLIC IS STILL 
RATHER NUMB TO BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL IMBROGLIO.  NEARLY ALL 
CENTER-RIGHT VOTERS SHARE BERLUSCONI'S VIEW OF THE 
POLITICIZED JUDICIARY; EVEN A CONVICTION WOULD NOT CAUSE THEM 
TO CHANGE THEIR VOTES. 
 
10.  (C) EARLY ELECTIONS ARE A POSSIBILITY AND BERLUSCONI IS 
USING THEM AS A RHETORICAL STICK TO THREATEN THE CENTER-LEFT, 
WHICH IS UNPREPARED TO GO TO THE POLLS.  ONLY PRESIDENT 
CIAMPI IS EMPOWERED TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT AND CALL 
ELECTIONS, HOWEVER.  WE BELIEVE HE WOULD BE LOATH TO DO SO 
BECAUSE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY AT A 
CRUCIAL MOMENT IN ITALY'S POLITICAL HISTORY AND THIS IS 
SOMETHING CIAMPI HAS WORKED HARD TO PROTECT AGAINST. 
BERLUSCONI COULD, HOWEVER, RESIGN, FORCING CIAMPI TO ACT. 
HOWEVER, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO US THAT HE WOULD DO SO IN THE 
MIDDLE OF THE EU PRESIDENCY.  A RESIGNATION, FOLLOWED BY NEW 
ELECTIONS, WOULD BE MORE LIKELY IF A CONVICTION WERE HANDED 
DOWN IN 2004. 
 
11.  (C) FINALLY, WHILE THE OPPOSITION COULD CALL ON CIAMPI 
TO ORGANIZE A TECHNICAL GOVERNMENT TO USHER ITALY THROUGH ITS 
PRESIDENCY, THIS WOULD REQUIRE BERLUSCONI'S CONSENT AS LONG 
AS HE ENJOYS A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY.  SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  01971  03 OF 04  090048Z 
BE A REVERSION TO PAST PRACTICE AND A SEVERE DEFEAT FOR 
ITALY'S ONGOING POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION -- AGAIN, WE THINK 
CIAMPI WOULD BE DISINCLINED TO PURSUE THIS ROUTE, NOT LEAST 
BECAUSE HE PUBLICLY REITERATED THAT NO DEFENDANT IS GUILTY 
UNTIL PROVEN SO IN A COURT OF LAST APPEAL. 
 
12.  (C) CIAMPI, FOR HIS PART, WILL CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO 
CREATE A CLIMATE OF MODERATION.  HE, LIKE PERA AND CASINI, IS 
CONCERNED ABOUT ITALY'S STANDING -- NOT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF 
A CONVICTION BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF THE IMAGE CREATED BY THE 
CONTINUING STANDOFF BETWEEN BERLUSCONI, THE OPPOSITION, AND 
CERTAIN MAGISTRATES (REF C).  CIAMPI HAS THEREFORE SIGNALED 
THAT HE COULD ACCEPT A SOLUTION THAT PROTECTED THE HIGHEST 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE FROM PROSECUTION DURING THEIR 
TERMS IN OFFICE.  HE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK BEHIND THE SCENES 
TO FORGE CONSENSUS AROUND THIS OUTCOME, WHICH MAY BECOME MORE 
PRACTICABLE FOLLOWING LOCAL ELECTIONS AT THE END OF MAY. 
EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT PREDICT BIPARTISAN HARMONY, 
BUT AT MOST THE POTENTIAL ABSTENTION OF SOME OF THE MORE 
CENTRIST MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13.  (C)  CONVICTION OF THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER WOULD HARM 
NOT ONLY BERLUSCONI'S IMAGE, BUT ITALY'S AS WELL. 
UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS HARD TO ARGUE WITH PERA'S CONVICTION 
THAT A POLITICIZED MAGISTRACY HAS ALREADY DECIDED TO RELEASE 
A CONVICTION DECISION TIMED TO INFLICT MAXIMUM POLITICAL HARM 
ON THE CENTER-RIGHT MAJORITY:  THE MILAN TRIBUNAL DID JUST 
THAT IN 1994, DURING BERLUSCONI'S FIRST TERM AS PM.  DESPITE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  01971  03 OF 04  090048Z 
NERVOUSNESS AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES, HOWEVER, BERLUSCONI HAS 
DETERMINED TO STRIKE FIRST, AND HARD, IN AN ATTEMPT TO FRAME 
THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC IN HIS FAVOR, BEFORE A DECISION 
IN THE SME CASE IS RENDERED.  SILVIO BERLUSCONI WILL NOT GO 
QUIETLY INTO THE NIGHT, AND OF THIS HE HAS GIVEN THE 
OPPOSITION FAIR NOTICE.  THE PM IS OBVIOUSLY DETERMINED TO 
DEFEND HIMSELF, HIS POLITICAL LIFE, AND HIS HONOR, BUT WE 
WONDER IF HE IS NOT ALSO ACTING IN PART TO VINDICATE, 
POSTHUMOUSLY, BETTINO CRAXI. 
 
14.  (C)  WE REMAIN RELATIVELY SANGUINE ABOUT THE STABILITY 
OF THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT.  ITS MAJORITY IS LARGE AND WE 
THINK IT WILL HOLD, EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A CONVICTION -- AT A 
MINIMUM, THROUGH THE LENGTHY APPEALS PROCESS.  HOWEVER, IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE DIVISIONS IN EUROPE OVER IRAQ, AND IN 
LIGHT OF BERLUSCONI'S INSISTENCE ON HAVING ITALY PLAY AN 
EQUAL ROLE AT THE EUROPEAN TABLE -- EVEN WHEN IT MEANS 
DISAGREEING WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS -- THERE MAY BE THOSE 
OUTSIDE OF ITALY WHO WOULD NOT OBJECT TO SEEING THE PM IN AN 
UNFLATTERING PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT AS ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY 
SEMESTER COMMENCES.  THAT MAY BE THE GREATER DANGER IF THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1275 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01971  04 OF 04  090049Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------623BDB  090049Z /34 
P 071649Z MAY 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9728 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL
SUBJECT: PM BERLUSCONI'S LEGAL PROBLEMS COMING TO A HEAD 
 
JUDICIAL TRAP THAT PERA AND OTHERS IN THE GOI FEAR UNFOLDS: 
WILL ITALY BE ABLE TO REGISTER A SUCCESSFUL EU PRESIDENCY, 
AND HELP US WITH OUR EU AGENDA, WITH ITS PRIME MINISTER 
TARNISHED BY A GUILTY VERDICT? 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  01971  04 OF 04  090049Z 
 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
> 
 2003ROME01971 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL