This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/J 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KDEM BM
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S NEW BURMA POLICY: FULL ENGAGEMENT WITH NO 
STRINGS ATTACHED 
 
REF: A. GLAZEROFF-MCMULLEN 5/1 EMAIL 
 
     ¶B. RANGOON 445 
     ¶C. TOKYO 1194 
     ¶D. 02 RANGOON 1447 
     ¶E. 02 RANGOON 1366 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The new Japanese "Three Pillars" strategy of 
humanitarian aid, economic reform, and democracy was 
officially unveiled on April 29.  The Japanese ambassador in 
Rangoon explained the details and origin of this policy to 
the Chief of Mission (COM) during a lunch on May 5.  Though 
he did not expect U.S. support, the ambassador asked for U.S. 
understanding and pointed out how the U.S. and Japan 
strategies might be complementary in achieving democratic 
reform.  End summary. 
 
The Three Pillars Strategy 
 
¶2. (C) During a lunch at his residence on May 5, Ambassador 
Miyamoto gave a readout to the COM, DCM, and Economic Officer 
(notetaker) on the recent visit to Rangoon of former Prime 
Minister Yoshio Mori.  Mori visited April 29-May 2 on behalf 
of two private Japanese foundations.  The ambassador stressed 
that Mori was not an envoy of the Japanese government. 
 
¶3. (C) The former prime minister met with the SPDC leader, 
Senior General Than Shwe, and delivered to him a letter from 
current Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi explaining the new 
Japanese "Three Pillars" strategy for relations with Burma. 
This policy, which the Japanese government described in 
detail at the February Informal Consultative Group on Burma 
meeting (Ref C) is founded on the concept of "total 
engagement" with the Burmese regime; engaging on humanitarian 
aid, economic reform, and progress toward democracy. 
 
¶4. (C) The ambassador clarified the reasoning behind this 
definitive Japanese policy shift.  He characterized Japan's 
recent Burma policy as fickle and rootless, changing with the 
political winds.  These vagaries had eroded the traditional 
trust and influence that Japan felt it had with the regime 
and the Burmese people, adding that the Burmese people had a 
"warm place in their heart for the Japanese."  The ambassador 
said that upon arriving in the summer of 2002, he began to 
examine the situation on the ground to see how the Japanese 
might reassert themselves.  His conclusion was that the 
Japanese government should rebuild its foundation of trust 
with the Burmese regime through 360-degree engagement.  He 
contrasted this with the Chinese and ASEAN engagement 
policies that provide assistance without pushing for 
political or economic reforms, and with the U.S. and European 
policies that rely on sanctions and pressure for reform with 
no assistance. 
 
¶5. (C) The new policy is ambitious and, the ambassador 
admitted, quite risky.  However, the ambassador opined that 
something new was needed to break the current impasse, and 
thus it was worth a try.  He was unable to respond, though, 
to the COM's questions regarding the specific measurements 
of, or a timetable for, the policy's success or failure.  He 
would only say that success would be measured in 
(unspecified) political reform.  Later in the meeting, the 
ambassador, who clearly has a large personal stake in the 
policy's success, indicated that a personal goal for him 
would be substantial progress within a five-year time frame, 
though again it was unclear what exactly the endgame was. 
The new Japanese policy will have no conditionality, nor will 
it receive a large budget for implementation.  Instead, 
proposed projects would be approved for funding by Tokyo on a 
case by case basis. 
 
Trust But Verify 
 
¶6. (C) Miyamoto stressed that at this point the strategy is 
focused only on rebuilding trust and relations with SPDC 
decisionmakers.  He pointed out his aim to gain easier access 
to SPDC Secretary One, General Khin Nyunt, and the frank 
exchange of views between ex-PM Mori and Senior General Than 
Shwe.  When the COM asked how the Japanese would ensure that 
messages about political and economic reform would get 
through to the top, the ambassador quickly replied that if 
this problem arose PM Mori (or another senior envoy) could 
return to deliver the message personally.  According to 
Ambassador Miyamoto, PM Mori had invited Senior General Than 
Shwe to spend two or three days in Tokyo as "his guest" 
following Japan-ASEAN meetings coming up in December. 
 
¶7. (C) The ambassador claimed that if he had closer ties with 
Burmese leaders he would be able to read their intentions, 
and that their close ties would keep the SPDC honest.  He 
said that the Burmese government would respond better to 
earnest requests for necessary changes from a government with 
whom it has good personal ties, than to demands and pressure 
from hostile governments.  The COM was skeptical of the 
Japanese reliance on trust and goodwill as the basis for the 
policy's success. 
 
¶8. (C) If the relationships are established, the Japanese 
will push forward with their specific objectives.  The UN's 
overdue humanitarian assessment was mentioned as a possible 
benchmark for basic human needs assistance, while the 
long-awaited Japan-Burma economic structural adjustment 
review would be the economic starting point.  It was less 
clear what the Japanese had in mind for an opening gambit on 
the political side.  However, the Ambassador said he would 
use his hoped-for new relationships to push the SPDC to give 
increased importance to the visits of UN Envoys Razali and 
Pinheiro. 
 
Don't Stand in the Way 
 
¶9. (C) The overall message, diplomatically conveyed, was that 
the Japanese were going to try a bold new policy, and while 
they didn't expect U.S. support, they hoped that the United 
States would not object.  Ambassador Miyamoto told the COM at 
least twice that he thought the United States and Japan could 
work together with complementary policies aimed at the same 
objective -- democracy in Burma.  We are not yet 100 percent 
convinced that Japan's intention is as wholeheartedly 
democratic as the ambassador claimed.  Although it could be 
helpful to have a close ally, who at least professes to be in 
favor of democratic reform, with good access to Senior 
General Than Shwe, we remain skeptical that the regime 
understands that the goal of the Japanese policy is political 
reform and transition to democracy. 
Martinez