This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000925 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL BF PGOV CARICOM
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 -- A NON-ISSUE FOR CARICOM 
 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1.  Bahamian Ambassador to CARICOM Archer infers that CARICOM 
will not support Article 98 and clears post confusion based 
on mixed signals from the Prime Minster (positive) and the 
Foreign Ministry (negative).  In relation to Cuba, he states 
that CARICOM will not support discussion on the country in 
the OAS forum where Cuba is unable to defend itself.  End 
Summary 
 
 
Article 98: Dead in the Water? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  Deputy Chief of Mission, accompanied by Econ/Comm 
officer, met May 13 with Leonard Archer, Bahamian ambassador 
to CARICOM and the senior Foreign Ministry official who 
accompanied Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell to the May 8-9, 
2003, CARICOM Foreign Ministers meeting held in Kingstown, 
St. Vincent. 
 
¶3.  (U)  DCM had requested the meeting earlier in the week in 
order to obtain clarification and the Bahamian interpretation 
of the CARICOM communiqus dealing with Article 98 and Cuba. 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador Archer was candid.  In response to DCM,s 
request for clarification of CARICOM's stance, he stated 
categorically that the fifteen CARICOM member states were 
agreed that they could not sign an Article 98 bilateral 
agreement with the United States because to do so "would 
negate the Rome Treaty" establishing the International 
Criminal Court.  He reminded the Embassy that the CARICOM 
member-states had been "instrumental in initiating and 
resuscitating" the concept of the international criminal 
court. Ambassador Archer insisted that the CARICOM members 
felt that to sign an Article 98 agreement with the United 
States now would "neutralize or neuter" the Rome Treaty. 
"The (Rome) Treaty and an Article 98 agreement simply can,t 
legally co-exist in our opinion," he insisted. 
 
¶5. (C)  Asked what the particular position of The Bahamas was 
in light of the revised, customized texts of a proposed 
Article 98 agreement that had been provided to the GCOB, 
Ambassador Archer responded that the "many different 
versions" of a draft agreement that the United States had 
been circulating had been itself a cause of concern within 
CARICOM  The fact that the United States was circulating "so 
many" different drafts to different countries, rather than 
one single text was, to him and his colleagues, Archer 
insisted,  "proof that something was fundamentally wrong with 
(this) approach."  Reminded that the United States had indeed 
initially proposed one single text and had modified it -- 
reluctantly -- in response to the desires expressed by 
individual countries for a text that addressed their 
particular circumstances, Ambassador Archer had no response. 
 
¶6. (C) Asked about next steps, Ambassador Archer said that 
while CARICOM will keep the issue "under review" and was 
"open to discussion"  he saw little, if any possibility of 
any movement.  CARICOM he stated categorically, would not 
itself propose a revised, acceptable single draft Article 98 
text to the United States.   Asked if this meant the ball was 
in the United States, court to propose a new draft, Archer 
responded that while the United States could do so, "it was a 
very big if that CARICOM would respond...  in any event." 
 
 
Cuba and Natural Justice 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the communiqu on Cuba that the CARICOM 
foreign ministers had also issued, Ambassador Archer said 
that it was the "unanimous" view of the CARICOM membership 
that seeking to pass a resolution condemning Cuba in the OAS 
when Cuba was not permitted to defend itself as a member 
"violated the rule of natural justice."  Pressed if this was 
really a unanimous view or simply a strongly-held position by 
some member-states, Archer responded that "no one in the room 
objected to the communiqu's wording." 
 
¶8. (C)  At the end of the conversation, and following an 
extended exchange with DCM on the Castro dictatorship and its 
historical record of human rights and other violations, 
Ambassador Archer closed the conversation by telling DCM that 
"it was illogical" for the United States to continually try 
to obtain resolutions condemning Cuba since "the United 
States also had blood on its hands there," criticized the 
influence of Cuban-American and Cuban exile groups in 
Florida, and insisted that it was unlikely that the United 
States would ever obtain a sympathetic hearing from CARICOM 
members until it altered "its irrational Cuba policy." 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C)  In contrast to other members of the Bahamian Foreign 
Ministry, Ambassador Archer was refreshingly candid and 
forthcoming in explaining the GCOB position within CARICOM on 
these issues -- even if the news he delivered was unpleasant 
and tinged with outdated ideology.  On Article 98, Archer 
confirmed the view that the Foreign Minister and the Foreign 
Ministry have no political desire, or ideological 
inclination, to conclude an Article 98 agreement and are 
pleased to hide behind CARICOM solidarity on this issue. 
Further reinforcing their position is the fact that the 
Foreign Ministry officials are also well aware that unless 
and until they ratify the International Criminal Court 
treaty, they can free ride on this since there will be no 
consequences to opposing the U.S.  When Ambassador Archer was 
asked if there was any timetable to submit the treaty to 
parliament for ratification, an act that would trigger 
sanctions, Archer coyly responded that he "wasn't aware of 
any plans to do so."  Since the Prime Minister has been much 
more positive on this isse than the Foreign Minister, the 
only possiblity we see for an Article 98 agreement is if the 
PM overrules Foreign Minister Mitchell and gives him a direct 
order.  We have seen nothing in PM Christie's governing style 
and personality to indicate that this is likely. 8 
BLANKENSHIP