This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: MINORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN TURKEY: A 
QUESTION OF APPROACH ON PROPERTY ISSUES 
 
REF: (A) ISTANBUL 202 (B) 2002 ISTANBUL 1627 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David L. Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b) and ( 
 
 
d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent legal changes in property rights for 
minority foundations have elicited varied responses from 
different religious communities in Turkey.  The history of 
Turkish and Ottoman minority communities plays into their 
respective views on pastoral concerns, political connections, 
property issues, and outside audiences.  Each community's 
pragmatic calculation of its own best interest accounts for 
differences in minority community relations with the Turkish 
Government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
The Unbending Greek Position 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) The Ecumenical Patriarch has the difficult task of 
occupying the universally acknowledged, but often 
disregarded, Patriarchal throne of Constantinople and New 
Rome, recognized as ecumenical outside Turkey, but deprecated 
by the Turkish state.  First among the Patriarchs of all 
Orthodoxy, his pastoral duties include ministering to 
millions of diaspora Greeks in the United States (as well as 
other countries), and a tiny group (around 3,000) of aging 
Greeks in Istanbul.  His flock, which at the turn of the 
twentieth century numbered over 500,000 in Istanbul alone 
(and millions throughout Turkey), once owned vast areas in 
and around Istanbul, including all of Heybeliada, the island 
which still houses Halki Seminary, currently not permitted to 
function by the Turkish State. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Given the small size of the Greek Orthodox community 
in Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarch is not heavily encumbered 
with local pastoral obligations.  American Greeks, from whom 
he derives much respect, outside support, and funding, 
encourage him to remain firm in his insistence on (1) 
recognition from the Turkish State of his ecumenical status; 
and (2) reopening Halki Seminary.  In a recent submission of 
lost property to the General Directorate for Foundations, 
Metropolitan Meliton said the Patriarchate submitted claims 
for 1,374 disputed properties (other sources say they 
submitted close to 2,000).  In contrast, Armenians submitted 
less than 400, Jews four, and Chaldeans three. 
 
 
¶4. (U) NOTE: Radikal newspaper reported May 5 that 1593 
applications have been submitted to the General Directorate 
for Foundations so far.  Of those, 574 (or 36 percent) of the 
applications were rejected.  Of those property claims 
rejected, 302 were Greek, 232 Armenian (the article does not 
differentiate between Armenian Catholic and Orthodox claims), 
and 13 Jewish.  END NOTE. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Additionally, the Ecumenical Patriachate is 
considerably less concerned with angering the GoT by voicing 
objections to outsiders than the Jews or Armenians.  After 
the First World War, Greeks transferred some community 
properties into the names of private individuals in order to 
avoid expropriation.  The door, however, was closed behind 
them.  Until the most recent spate of legal reforms, a 
religious community could not make use of these 
nominally-private properties.  In one case, an orphanage was 
tranferred into private hands but could not be further used 
by the community.  Additionally, Turkish law forbade the 
religious minority communities from gaining property through 
inheritance, except under special circumstances as determined 
by the General Directorate for Foundations.  To the knowledge 
of ConGen Istanbul, no community has ever received permission 
to gain property by inheritance. 
 
 
¶6. (C) With these memories still haunting the Patriarch and 
his supporters, post believes an unwritten decision was taken 
not to pursue any legal loopholes in the future.  Rather, the 
Patriarchate has consistently pressed for explicit legal 
recognition of their various property claims (reftel).  To 
date, this has not borne fruit.  However, with a 
steadily-shrinking local community and a supportive overseas 
flock, the Ecumenical Patriarch has considerably less to lose 
than other religious minorities in confronting the GoT. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Flexible Jewish Policies 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶7. (C) The Jewish community in Turkey numbers approximately 
25,000 people, the vast majority of whom are in Istanbul. 
The community maintains property primarily on the European 
side of the city, with a synagogue and other properties also 
on Buyukada (an island in the Sea of Marmara).  Despite the 
community's size, few legal problems exist, largely due to 
the flexible approach the community has taken in maintaining 
its properties. 
 
 
¶8. (C) First, the community tranfers ownership when necessary 
to avoid expropriation or other loss.  While the Chief 
Rabbinate has had a historically close relationship with U.S. 
and Israeli diplomats, it avoids adversarial relations with 
the Turkish Government.  The community avoids formalisti=QQdealing with 
he General Directorate for Foundations (which 
all communities assess is not favorably disposed to Jewish or 
Christian needs to begin with), opting instead to approach 
elected officials who can bring pressure on the General 
Directorate's bureaucrats from above.  Poloff pointed out to 
Chief Rabbinate's Lay Vice President Lina Filiba that the 
community has a history of finding a modus vivendi within 
Turkish law ("and sometimes outside it," she said) to achieve 
their goals, while other communities were less flexible. 
Filiba said that meeting the spiritual needs of their 
community come first, and the means by which this is 
accomplished are less important. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Unlike the Greeks, the Jewish Community has a younger 
generation as well as a series of wealthy entrepreneurs who 
can assist when financial problems come up.  Jak Kamhi 
(Chairman of Profilo Holding), the Garih and Alaton families 
(founders of Alarko Holding), and others can be depended upon 
to assist when necessary.  Thus, fighting tooth-and-nail for 
one or two small properties that can bring little monetary 
compensation at a significant political cost is not their 
normal practice. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Tending the Armenian Flock 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) Patriarch Mesrob II finds himself in a delicate 
position: as head of the Armenian Orthodox community in 
Turkey, he must tend to the needs of his sizeable community 
(estimated at 65,000 to 70,000 people, now the largest of the 
Lausanne Treaty minorities) by working with the Turkish 
Government on practical matters such as minority education 
policy, church maintenance, and reconstruction of the 
patriarchate building.  At the same time, his working 
relationship with the GoT often comes under criticism from 
the Armenian Orthodox Church and the sizeable Armenian 
diaspora in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere.  Reflecting on 
the question of whether the tragic events that befell 
Armenians in the closing days of the Ottoman Empire should be 
called a "genocide" or not, Mesrob has said that the more 
important work is to focus community energy on healing, 
building bridges between Turks and Armenians, and moving 
forward. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Mesrob has elected to work publicly with the 
Government of Turkey.  He was the only Patriarch to travel to 
Copenhagen to voice support for Turkey's EU aspirations in 
the run-up to the most recent accessions.  Publicly voicing 
pride in his Turkish citizenship, Mesrob has sought to 
consolidate the position of his community by adopting a 
non-threatening approach.  Recently, when asked by poloff 
what concerns he had about property issues, Mesrob said that 
while there were some continuing concerns, the Armenian 
Orthodox community had no intention of airing the problems 
publicly, or relying on outside assistance.  However, the 
Patriarch and others have leveled complaints about property 
issues and complications in working with the General 
Directorate for Foundations; these complaints are similar to 
those of other communities. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Criticism of GoT policies is balanced with pragmatic 
interest in cooperation to improve Armenian community 
cohesion.  For example, in a recent discussion with poloff, 
Armenian Patriarchal Chancellor Tatul said the community 
remains interested in recent mother-tongue language laws, and 
is considering an Armenian-language radio station (if 
forthcoming regulations permit) in addition to their 
community newspaper, "Lraper." 
 
 
---------------------- 
Unrecognized Suriyanis 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶13. (C) Like other sizeable minority communities in Turkey, 
the Syrian Orthodox were offered Lausanne Treaty status as 
minorities.  Reflecting a spirit of patriotism toward the 
fledgling Turkish Republic, the Patriarch (then seated in 
Antakya, biblical Antioch) said that Suriyanis were Turkish 
citizens, and had no need of minority status, as the 
constitution would ensure their rights to freedom of 
religion.  Though both the Suriyanis and the GoT may have 
meant well, this left the community in limbo: not protected 
by Lausanne, not Muslim, and not foreign nationals.  As such, 
there is effectively no protection for the Syrian Orthodox 
Church. 
 
 
¶14. (C) In the years since Lausanne, much Suriyani church 
property was expropriated by the GoT.  The Tur Abdin area of 
Southeast Turkey, once home to a huge Suriyani community that 
emigrated starting in the 1960's owing to hostility on the 
part of Turkish officials, now has a series of abandoned 
monasteries and churches where property ownership is in 
question; perhaps only 400 Suriyanis remain in Tur Abdin. 
The Patriarch eventually left Turkey for Damascus, leaving 
behind two Metropolitans (effectively Archbishops), in 
Istanbul and Midyat, to serve the still-sizeable community. 
Both Metropolitans show great appreciation for any attention 
paid to their community and its plight.  Seeing the problems 
that resulted from an effective non-status for many years, 
they quickly recount the past occasions on which foreign 
dignitaries and Turkish officials paid them a visit, or even 
sent letters of congratulations on religious holidays.  In 
Istanbul, Metropolitan Yusuf Cetin speaks with admiration for 
President Sezer's willingness to visit their church two years 
ago (the only President of Turkey to do so). 
 
 
¶15. (C) Regarding property issues, the Suriyanis claim that 
much of what has happened in the past is now beyond the scope 
of the current law.  Key monsteries and churches remain in 
their possession, yet abandoned or expropriated ones have no 
congregants.  Migrations to Syria, Europe and the U.S., and 
Istanbul have emptied much of their population from the 
Southeast.  Midyat Metropolitan Samuel Aktas says that core 
concerns of the community are largely met--worship, Aramaic 
classes, and continued functioning of monasteries.  However, 
when the Suriyanis need to deal with the GoT, they are 
usually given unwritten approval for requests.  Such tacit 
(versus official) acceptance reflects the Suriyanis' 
still-unclear status under Turkish law. 
ARNETT