This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

300644Z May 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
BANGKOK FOR WIN DAYTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2013 
TAGS: PGOV ZI MDC
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI TALKS ABOUT MASS ACTION, REGIONAL 
INITIATIVES, LEGAL WOES, AND TRANSITIONAL PERIOD NEEDS 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 C/D 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) At a meeting on May 28, 2003, MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai and MDC deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanikire 
 
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discussed the impending mass action, the status of the 
Mbeki-Muluzi-Obasanjo initiative, the court cases, and 
transitional period needs.  Tsvangirai seemed confident that 
the June mass action would be both non-violent and controlled 
and would push ZANU-PF hardliners closer to the negotiating 
table.  He seemed less optimistic about the success of the 
regional initiative to get ZANU-PF and MDC talking and the 
likelihood of the judge granting an acquittal in his treason 
case.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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MASS ACTION 
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¶2. (C) The Ambassador, AF/S Director Scott DeLisi, and PolOff 
met MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC deputy Secretary 
General Gift Chimanikire on May 28,2003, a day after 
Tsvangirai briefed G8 representatives on the MDC,s position 
 
SIPDIS 
vis--vis various current issues, including plans for mass 
action (See Reftel).  Tsvangirai said there has been a 
progressive frustration and anger among the Zimbabwean people 
and he expected a high level of participation in the mass 
action.  When asked what form the mass action would take, he 
said he had asked MDC supporters whether they preferred a 
stayaway or demonstration.  He said the overwhelming majority 
preferred the demonstration option.  Tsvangirai told us the 
MDC leadership had been preaching non-violence in preparation 
for the demonstration and believed it would be able to 
control the crowds.  Both the Ambassador and DeLisi 
reiterated the U.S. position that demonstrations should be 
non-violent and every precaution should be undertaken to 
ensure they remain non-violent. 
 
¶3. (C) In spite of this confidence in being able to control 
the crowds, Tsvangirai expressed concern about the youth 
getting out of control, particularly if the war veterans 
decide to take on the demonstrators.  Ironically, Tsvangirai 
was also concerned that if the police and/or military did not 
react to the demonstrations with force, the marchers would 
feel emboldened and expand the scope of activities and get 
out of control. 
 
¶4. (C) When asked where the demonstrations were likely to 
take place--city center or high-density suburbs--Tsvangirai 
said the city center was an option.  He said a march on State 
House was not planned.  Both he and Chimanikire seemed to 
believe the police and military (and most likely the MDC 
youth) would be less likely to behave in an unruly fashion or 
destroy the infrastructure in the city center than if they 
were in the high-density areas. 
 
¶5.  (C) In a separate conversation May 28, Gibson Sibanda, 
Vice-President of the MDC, told the Ambassador that the MDC 
was doing all in its power to keep its supporters under 
control.  MDC marshals will attend each rally and leaders at 
each event will remind people to remain peaceful.  The MDC 
does believe that the war veterans have been issued weapons 
and are planning to run an ad asking them not to interfere. 
(NOTE: In the past, rumors that war veterans were being armed 
have been false. END NOTE.)  Sibanda said the MDC was also 
planning to be on the lookout for potential infiltrators 
hoping to stir up trouble. 
 
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REGIONAL INITIATIVE ON HOLD 
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¶6. (C) Turning to the regional initiative and his meeting 
with Malawian President Bakili Muluzi, Tsvangirai said the 
planned meeting had to be cancelled because he needed to 
apply to the court to travel to Malawi and knew he would 
never get approval.  Tsvangirai also claimed that Mugabe 
expressed reservations about him going out of the country and 
was suspicious of the host,s and invitee,s intentions. 
 
¶7. (C) Tsvangirai commented that Mugabe met with Mozambican 
President Joachim Chisamo, Muluzi, South African President 
Thabo Mbeki, and other regional foreign ministers and heads 
of state at the Walter Sisulu funeral to discuss ways to 
resolve the Zimbabwe crisis.  According to Tsvangirai, these 
leaders were disappointed with the outcome because Mugabe was 
not willing to negotiate and offered no suggestions on how to 
resolve the situation.  As a result of the meeting, the 
regional initiative is on hold.  In spite of the failed 
talks, Tsvangirai feels it is important the region keep up 
the momentum and pressure on Mugabe.  Both the Ambassador and 
DeLisi commented that it might be necessary to regenerate the 
momentum first. 
 
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COURT CASES 
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¶8. (C) Regarding the treason trial, Tsvangirai thought the 
prosecution would wrap up its case in two or three weeks.  He 
said the MDC attorneys were planning to apply for an 
acquittal.  He said if the judge grants the acquittal then 
the trial is over but the judge may decide he wants to hear 
all the evidence before making a decision.  In that case, the 
defendants would most likely take the stand. 
 
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai said the election challenge was on hold for 
two reasons.  One, the MDC was trying to get another judge to 
preside over the case.  At the moment, Garwe, the judge who 
is presiding over the treason trial, is slated to hear 
arguments.  Two, Mugabe has said in a defense filing the 
trial is not an emergency, hence, it will not be tried soon. 
 
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TRANSITION 
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¶10. (C) The Ambassador remarked that the U.S. was interested 
in Zimbabwe's needs during a transition phase.  He asked 
Tsvangirai for recommendations for support.  Tsvangirai 
 
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responded that energy and food needs would be paramount but 
it would take at least two years before the agricultural 
sector would be up to par.  He revealed that the MDC is 
finalizing a recovery economic plan, which he would make 
available to the Embassy upon its completion in the first 
week of June. 
 
¶11. (C) Prior to the Ambassador,s specific questions on 
transition, Tsvangirai identified immediate changes that 
would need to occur if Mugabe were to step down.  He said the 
parties would need to agree on a transition strategy, be it 
what is already described in the Constitution or something 
new.  He thought ZANU-PF would like a shorter transition 
period before elections while MDC would like a longer period 
in order to build confidence in the process.  Whatever the 
method, Tsvangirai maintained that before any new elections, 
the militias would have to be dissolved in order to minimize 
the possibility of violence and Parliament would need to 
repeal repressive legislation, such as the Public Order and 
Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, and amend the Electoral Act to allow for 
independent and terror-free election education and 
campaigning.  (COMMENT: Tsvangirai, in effect, confirmed that 
his new public position against a transitional authority is 
merely a negotiating ploy to respond to hardened ZANU-PF 
public positions.  END COMMENT.) 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12.  (C) After weeks of speculation, it seems that the MDC is 
finally ready to move to the next stage in its campaign to 
force change.  The party leadership,s confidence in a 
successful mass action, the increased regional interest in 
resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe, and the belief that the 
treason trial may result in an acquittal, seem to have 
bolstered the confidence of the party.  Nonetheless, there 
are two serious risks here--the risk that the public will not 
turn out in the face of government threats and the risk that 
the confrontation between MDC demonstrators and government 
security forces will result in serious violence and massive 
arrests, including of MDC leaders--that jeopardize the 
efficacy of the mass action.  END COMMENT. 
SULLIVAN