This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

211146Z May 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 05/21/13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  Tigers issue hard-edged letter demanding 
interim structure in north/east 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/21/03 unclass e-mail 
 
-      (B) Colombo 838, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons:  1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Tamil Tigers have sent the 
Norwegian facilitators a tough letter demanding the 
setting up of an "interim administrative structure" in 
the north/east, which the group would control.  The 
Tigers say they might restart peace talks and come to 
the Tokyo conference if the government reacts positively 
to their proposal.  With contacts telling us the group 
is in an increasingly hard-line mode, the sudden 
recrudescense of the interim structure idea raises real 
questions regarding the Tigers' commitment to the 
process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) TOUGH TIGER LETTER:  Late May 21, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sent the 
Norwegian government facilitators a tough letter 
demanding the setting up of an interim structure in the 
north and east.  (Note:  The text of the letter was 
posted on the pro-LTTE website "TamilNet" and has been 
sent to SA/INS in Ref A.)  In the long, complicated, and 
somewhat convoluted letter, which was addressed to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, LTTE spokesman 
Anton Balasingham makes clear that the Tigers believe 
that previous agreements on structures/modalities of 
funneling humanitarian/development assistance to the 
north and east are not working.  On this point, 
Balasingham states flatly: 
 
"Unfortunately, SIHRN (see note below) failed to 
function effectively and no progress has been made 
toward alleviating the hardships and suffering of the 
displaced population...This lack of performance and the 
failure to produce tangible results on urgent 
humanitarian issues has eroded all confidence of the 
Tamil people in SIHRN." 
 
(Note:  "SIHRN" stands for Sub-Committee on Immediate 
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs for the North and 
East, which was formed earlier this year as a joint GSL- 
LTTE committee working on assistance issues.  Since the 
committee was set up, the Tigers have basically argued 
that they wanted watertight acknowledgement of their 
right to control funds allotted for the north/east.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶3.  (U) In light of this characterization of SIHRN's 
performance and rejecting recent GSL proposals to reform 
assistance implementation, Balasingham goes on to state 
that the LTTE has no choice but to return to its long- 
standing demand that an "interim administrative 
structure" be set up for the north and east.  (Note: 
The letter is not clear, but the LTTE seems to be 
envisaging that the interim structure would mainly focus 
on economic matters, but would also have a dominant 
political role.)  In making this demand, Balasingham 
notes that during the December 2001 national election 
campaign the governing United National Party (UNP) 
advocated the setting up of an interim structure to 
govern the north and east.  Although the idea of forming 
such a body was left off the peace process' agenda up to 
now, Balasingham says the LTTE believes it is now time 
to revive it because the proposal is the only way 
forward given the failure of SIHRN and given that "a 
permanent political settlement is not feasible in the 
immediate future."  While couching his public comments 
carefully, Balasingham also leaves little doubt that the 
LTTE should control this interim structure.  He notes, 
for example, that the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord 
provided the "LTTE a dominant participatory role" in a 
proposed interim council to govern the north/east. 
(Note:  Aside from this one mention of the Indo-Sri 
Lankan accord, the letter is otherwise vague on 
potential constitutional implications.) 
 
¶4.  (U) Balasingham also addresses the issue of the 
peace talks, which the Tigers recently pulled out of, 
and the upcoming donors conference in Tokyo, which the 
Tigers have said they will not attend.  He indicates 
that a positive response to the LTTE's demands might 
lead the LTTE to change its mind on these matters, 
stating: 
 
"A positive and constructive response from the prime 
minister setting out his ideas and proposals in clear 
and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to 
take a crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks 
and participation at the donor conference in Japan." 
 
¶5.  (C) TAMIL CONTACTS ON LTTE MINDSET:  The LTTE letter 
came out too late on May 21 for contacts to provide us a 
considered response.  In discussions with poloffs held 
early May 21, however, Tamil political contacts who had 
met with the LTTE on May 20, indicated that the group 
was increasingly in a hard-line, uncompromising mode. 
Echoing the comments of other Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA) figures, Suresh Premachandran, told us that 
political chief S.P. Thamilchelvam, who led the Tiger 
side at the meeting, made clear that the LTTE was fed up 
with the GSL.  The LTTE felt that the government -- 
while basically well intentioned -- was not strong and 
could not carry through on its plans because it was too 
afraid of Sinhalese chauvinists.  In making these 
comments, Premachandran said Thamilchelvam asserted in 
very strong terms that the Sinhalese south could not be 
trusted because it had broken agreements with Tamils so 
many times in the past.  (Note:  In a May 19 meeting, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen told us that LTTE 
leaders had made this same point in vivid terms during 
recent interactions with the Norwegians.)  At this 
point, Premachandran added, the LTTE wanted written, 
ironclad assurances from the GSL on the way forward, or 
they would continue to stall the process. 
 
¶6.  (C) Despite their hardline positioning, 
Premachandran still thought that the Tigers "were 
committed to the peace process and would listen to 
reason."  He allowed that he was not sure the government 
could meet in short order all of the LTTE's demands and 
thus ensure the group's participation in the Tokyo 
conference.  He thought, however, that the LTTE had not 
totally discounted the possibility of participating in 
Tokyo. 
 
¶7.  (U) (((Note:  Before Balasingham's letter was 
issued, we had heard that the LTTE's S.P. Thamilchelvam 
was planning to hold a press conference on May 22 in the 
LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi in northern Sri 
Lanka.  This press conference had been originally slated 
to take place on May 21, but had been postponed.  In 
light of Balasingham's letter, which quite clearly 
enunciates LTTE thinking at this point, it is not clear 
whether the May 22 press conference is still on and what 
it might add if it is.  End Note.))) 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  While respectful in tone, the LTTE 
letter is hard-edged and clearly to be taken very 
seriously.  Balasingham, for example, at several points 
in the letter underscores that he is transmitting the 
views of V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE's supreme leader. 
The sudden recrudescence of the interim structure idea, 
which had basically dropped from sight for months, 
raises real questions re the Tigers' commitment to the 
process.  The group almost certainly knows that the 
issue is a very tricky one for the government and would 
-- under normal circumstances -- take months to 
negotiate.  That said, the Tigers are pressing the 
government for a response right now.  This degree of 
impatience does not appear to bode well for LTTE 
agreement to resume the peace talks and reconsider its 
decision not to participate in Tokyo.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS