This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EAP/J, EUR/NB 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  05-20-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  Mission recommendation regarding Tokyo donors 
conference:  Proceed as planned 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 829, and previous 
 
-      (B) SA/INS-Colombo 05-17-03 class e-mail 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills: 
Reasons:  1.5 (B, D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As matters now stand, it seems 
probable that the Tamil Tigers will not participate in 
the Tokyo donors conference in June, raising the 
question of whether the event should go forward.  After 
much reflection, we argue that it should proceed as 
planned whether or not the Tigers attend.  Even without 
their presence, the conference could very usefully 
underline international support for the peace process 
writ large, which the GSL is desperate to do.  At the 
same time, moving forward with Tokyo could have a 
salutary impact on the Tigers, perhaps by convincing the 
group to attend, or by making it clear that the donors 
will not hold the Tamil community hostage to their 
druthers.  For these reasons, we urge Department to 
press the Japanese government to hold the conference, 
and not postpone or cancel it.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) IMPASSE WITH THE TIGERS:  Since the group 
announced its decision to pull out of the peace talks 
and not to participate in the Tokyo donors conference on 
April 21, the Norwegians and the Japanese have worked 
feverishly to change the mind of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  As reviewed in Ref A, the 
Norwegian facilitators have not given up hope yet, as 
they await the LTTE's response to proposals meant to 
assuage Tiger concerns regarding the distribution of 
assistance.  Nonetheless, with the rapid approach of the 
conference, scheduled for June 9-10, it appears probable 
the LTTE will not be there unless it gets on board soon. 
As reviewed in Reftels, this strong possibility has 
given rise to concerns, most particularly among the 
Japanese hosts and the Sri Lankan government, as to how 
to proceed from here. 
 
¶3.  (C) MISSION'S RECOMMENDATION RE TOKYO:  After much 
reflection, we conclude that the Tokyo conference 
should proceed as planned whether or not the Tigers 
attend.  To be a success, the Tigers' presence is not 
necessary, as the conference could very usefully 
underscore international support for the peace process 
writ large without them.  Although the GSL-LTTE 
negotiations are stalled for now, the peace process is 
much larger than the talks alone and the international 
community should acknowledge that the situation in Sri 
Lanka remains a very hopeful one.  The process, for 
example, encompasses a ceasefire, which remains largely 
intact, enhanced people-to-people "track two" contacts, 
and plans that are underway for humanitarian/development 
assistance for both the war-torn north/east and the 
south.  It would be a mistake to subsume these very 
important aspects of the entire process simply because 
"track one" contacts are temporarily in abeyance.  With 
or without the LTTE, the donors could utilize Tokyo to 
highlight these positive aspects, while also possibly 
issuing their "Statement of Principles" document setting 
out milestones re assistance delivery and human rights. 
Overall, a "Tiger-less" Tokyo, somewhat recast from its 
original GSL-LTTE focus, could signal support for this 
overall process in a very constructive way.  It would 
also, in our estimation, be worth the participation of 
high-level donor country representatives, including the 
Deputy Secretary. 
 
¶4.  (C) GSL ANXIETY:  In coming to the conclusion that 
the conference should go forward, Mission has received 
significant input from a very worried GSL.  Simply put, 
government representatives, including Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe and Minister Milinda Moragoda, are 
apoplectic over the possibility that the conference 
could be subject to postponement or cancellation (see 
Para 7), and are arguing that it must go forward.  Way 
beyond what the conference was originally envisaged as 
representing (i.e., a major "public relations" event 
highlighting the success of the peace process), the GSL 
has made it a very, very big deal, with its ego heavily 
invested in its success.  (Note:  The gradual change in 
local perception that the conference is central to the 
peace process and not simply one key event among others 
has been propelled, in part, by the Japanese 
government's handling of the leadup to Tokyo.  In a 
clear mistake by Special Envoy Akashi, for example, the 
GoJ has almost made it seem that the conference is make- 
or-break for the process, even to the extent of setting 
public "deadlines" for the Tigers to reconsider their 
decision not to participate.  The GoJ's grandstanding 
has had the affect of panicking the GSL and others. 
This has been much to the chagrin of the Norwegians, who 
see Japan's involvement in the process as largely clumsy 
and inflexible.) 
 
¶5.  (C) The government has also made clear that if the 
conference does not take place as planned, it could come 
under heavy domestic criticism.  The president and her 
party are clearly positioning themselves to make hay of 
any change in plans by accusing the government of 
mismanaging the peace process.  (Note:  The president 
and the PM, in any case, share a very, very uneasy 
cohabitation relationship.)  Although the GSL has been 
criticized for its management of the economy, in fact 
growth is at 4 percent and rising.  Nonetheless, the 
peace process remains its key achievement.  If that 
achievement is tarnished, it could prove a major 
liability for the GSL.  Given this sensitive situation, 
we think that a change in plans re Tokyo could hurt a 
(basically pro-U.S.) government and possibly undermine 
cohabitation ties to the detriment of the peace process. 
These points, of course, argue for the conference to 
proceed as planned. 
 
¶6.  (C) IMPACT ON THE LTTE OF MOVING FORWARD:  At the 
same time, moving forward with plans could have a 
salutary impact on the Tigers.  There are roughly three 
weeks remaining before the conference starts on June 9, 
and the LTTE could decide to get on board when it 
realizes that the train will leave with or without it. 
Even if that does not happen and the Tigers do not 
change their mind, holding the conference could be 
instructive for the Tigers in making clear that the 
donors will not hold the Tamil community hostage to 
their druthers.  The U.S. -- and other members of the 
international community -- have long emphasized that the 
LTTE is not the "sole representative of the Tamil 
community" as the group would have it.  Tokyo thus 
provides an opportunity to make this point in neon.  All 
that said, we are not suggesting that a conference held 
without the LTTE should be confrontational toward the 
group.  In fact, we believe that conference participants 
should reach out to the group, urging it to return to 
the peace talks, and making it clear that the LTTE is a 
welcome partner in the peace process. 
 
¶7.  (C) OPTION OF POSTPONING OR CANCELING:  There has 
been some talk of postponing or even canceling Tokyo if 
the Tigers decide not to go.  We do not think either of 
these alternatives is good.  They both give the LTTE way 
too much power over the whole process, essentially 
rewarding the group for its intransigence.  (Note:  Many 
people argue that postponing or canceling are really the 
same thing in any case because Sri Lanka may not have as 
positive an opportunity to showcase itself as Tokyo 
presents in a very long time.)  By holding the 
conference, the international community will be making 
the point that it will not cave into the unreasonable 
demands of a terrorist group.  While it may seem silly 
to hold a wedding with only one spouse present, that's 
the LTTE's decision.  In making this very point re the 
group's stance on Tokyo, Norwegian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Helgesen has related that he has told the LTTE 
that "it may be able to mess with the Sri Lankan 
government or Norway, but it cannot mess with the 
international community."  With respect to the argument 
that holding Tokyo without the group may anger the LTTE 
and hurt chances for peace in the long-term, that is a 
risk.  When asked about this, however, Helgesen -- a 
representative of the government with the closet 
relations with the LTTE -- has said there is no reason 
that Tokyo should have such a negative impact if it is 
managed with proper care. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  For the reasons set out above, we urge 
the Department to press the Japanese government to hold 
the Tokyo conference as scheduled.  Even without the 
LTTE in attendance, we believe that the conference 
should take place at the same high-level originally 
planned.  In particular, given the USG's important 
position in underpinning support for the whole process, 
we urge the Deputy Secretary to continue with his plans 
to participate.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (C) LATE COMMENT:  Mr. Akashi called the Ambassador 
from Tokyo late May 20 to discuss "to Tokyo or not to 
Tokyo."  Although he was initially inclined toward 
postponing, Akashi seemed to accept the points we have 
reviewed above. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS